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ABSTRACT 
This thesis presents an alternative interpretation of the rules constituting the South African law 
of defamation. Defamation is typically understood to be a wrong in which the defendant has 
caused the plaintiff reputational harm. It is argued that it is more justifiable to view the wrong 
as a wrong of having increased the risk of reputational harm. Defamation law is an instance of 
state power and it is argued that this alternative interpretation better justifies that exercise of 
power. In making this argument, the fundamental features of the law are analysed, including 
what reputation is and why we value it, why it is problematic to view the wrong as being about 
the causation of reputational harm, and why liability for risk is problematic in the case of 
negligence but less problematic in the case of defamation. As the risk interpretation is meant 
to be an alternative interpretation of the existing rules, it is also shown that this interpretation 
is compatible with those rules, such as the presumptions and defences, and the standard 
remedial response of damages. While this thesis argues for an alternative interpretation of the 
rules, it is hoped that this analysis of those rules will shed new light on the law even if the risk 
interpretation is not accepted wholesale.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I INTRODUCTION 
The South African law of defamation has long been a site of jurisprudential debate. The 
intermingling of English and Roman-Dutch sources led to significant theoretical disagreements 
about fault and the nature of the wrong, and debate on those themes continues. There is still 
disagreement about the fault standard, for example, such as whether fault in the form of 
intentional conduct requires ‘consciousness of the wrongfulness’ of one’s actions,1 and whether 
such a fault standard is compatible with the defences borrowed from English law.2 It is also 
controversial whether media defendants can be liable if they merely acted negligently, rather 
than intentionally.3 The nature of the wrong also appears open to doubt. While there are many 
dicta stating the law exists to protect one’s reputation, it is also sometimes claimed that 
defamation is really a form of aggravated insult. In line, perhaps, with this debate about whether 
the law is protecting reputation or protecting one from insult, the function of damages also 
sometimes appears open to question. The focus of the courts sometimes falls heavily on the 
idea of hurt feelings, and sometimes on the idea of publicly vindicating the plaintiff’s 
reputation. Over-reliance on the idea of hurt feelings recently led the Supreme Court of Appeal 
to struggle to explain the function of damages in cases involving corporations.4 
 The law of defamation is replete with doctrinal controversy, then. This thesis adds new 
fuel to that controversy, rather than attempting to defend one well-known position against 
another well-known position. The stance taken here is that the best interpretation of the current 
practice requires one to reconceptualise that practice. The wrong of defamation is best 
understood not as a wrong of having caused reputational harm, but as a wrong of having 
increased the risk of reputational harm. In making this argument, the hope is that this thesis 
will also shed light on the controversies that already exist, such as whether the interest is best 
understood as being about reputation rather than insult, the nature of the remedial response, 
                                                 
1 See Anton Fagan ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict’ (2005) 122 SALJ 90. The debates about fault 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
2 Helen Scott ‘Contumelia and the South African law of defamation’ in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott (eds) 
Iniuria and the Common Law (2013). 
3 For general discussion of the various perspectives, see Daniel Visser ‘Compensation for harm to the personality 
- actio iniuriarum’ in Francois du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9ed (2007) 1187-1190. 
4 See Media 24 Ltd and others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd (Avusa Media Ltd and others as Amici Curiae) 
2011 (5) SA 329 (SCA). This doctrinal problem, and how to resolve it, is discussed in Chapter 8. 
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and the way in which one’s understanding of fault interacts with these other debates. Therefore, 
even if one did not accept the position taken in this thesis in its entirety, the intention is that 
this exercise in jurisprudence will shed new light on various aspects of the law of defamation, 
some of which may help with the resolution of existing debates. The argument in support of 
the risk interpretation of the law of defamation unfolds in the following way: 
 This chapter outlines the general argument that is presented in the thesis, and places the 
law of defamation, and the existing doctrinal disputes, in historical context. Here, the conflict 
between reputation and insult is made clear. 
 If an argument is to be made that the wrong is best understood as a wrong of having 
increased the risk of reputational harm, then it first needs to be established that the law is 
concerned with reputation, rather than insult. Chapter 2 defends this position by explaining the 
nature of reputation, why we might value it, and why the South African law is best understood 
as being about reputation rather than insult. The arguments made in that chapter would be 
compatible with a more orthodox understanding of defamation being about the causation of 
reputational harm. So, it is not only relevant to the risk interpretation pursued in later chapters. 
 Chapter 3 outlines the orthodox understanding of the law of defamation, namely, that 
it involves the causation of reputational harm. Specifically, it outlines the elements of liability 
and what the plaintiff needs to establish in order to succeed in his or her claim. The chapter 
then proceeds to contrast the approach in defamation with the approach in the South African 
lex Aquilia (the delict of negligently causing harm that causes patrimonial loss). By contrasting 
the elements of liability for Aquilian delicts with the elements of liability for defamation, one 
can see that it is much harder to justify the claim that the defendant probably has caused harm 
to the protected interest in the case of defamation as compared to Aquilian delicts. 
The fact that the causation of harm hypothesis is harder to justify in the case of 
defamation presents a philosophical problem for the state. If the state is to exercise its power 
in imposing liability for defamation, then it needs to be able to present a convincing argument 
that the exercise of force is justifiable. When one considers the basis upon which the courts 
find that liability has been established, there is reason to doubt whether the practice really is 
justifiable. If the wrong really is about having caused harm to the plaintiff’s reputation, then 
more should be required in order to establish liability. As Chapter 3 notes, there are two 
possible responses to this concern. One could either change the rules to require more evidence 
of reputational harm, or one can justify the existing rules in some other way. This thesis (in the 
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argument developed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5) takes the latter route, and presents an alternative 
justification. The alternative justification is that the defendant is liable, not for probably having 
caused harm to the plaintiff’s reputation, but for probably having increased the risk of harm to 
the plaintiff’s reputation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 develop this alternative interpretation of defamation by explaining 
why the wrong of defamation is best understood as being about an increase in the risk of 
reputational harm, rather than the causation of reputational harm. Chapter 4 unpacks the 
concept of risk, and some of the ways in which it has been employed in the lex Aquilia and the 
English tort of negligence. These areas of law are considered both because they demonstrate 
some of the different ways in which risk can feature in the law of delict (some of which are 
more controversial than others), and because the idea of risk-as-injury has been explored by 
some English judges as a viable idea. While this shows that risk-as-injury is not a completely 
untenable idea, the primary benefit of this analysis is to show that the arguments that speak 
against adopting risk-as-injury in the law of negligence or the lex Aquilia do not apply as 
forcefully to the law of defamation. There are crucial differences between Aquilian liability 
and defamation that make risk-as-injury more tenable in the case of defamation. 
Chapter 5 then demonstrates why the objections against adopting risk-as-injury in the 
context of negligence are overcome in the case of defamation. The main problem with adopting 
risk in the context of negligence is that the lex Aquilia and the tort of negligence are transversal 
torts, i.e. they protect a variety of interests against various forms of conduct. Imposing liability 
for mere risk in this context would err too far on the side of security and impose too high a cost 
on freedom of action (and negatively affect other matters, like the costs of insurance and 
litigation). By contrast, the South African law of defamation is a vertical tort, meaning that it 
protects a particular interest (reputation) from a particular form of conduct (the publication of 
a defamatory assertion). This, along with its non-negligible fault standard, helps to limit the 
scope of liability. When one then also takes into account the importance of protecting one’s 
reputation (Chapter 2) and the difficulty of proving reputational harm (Chapter 3), then 
imposing liability for increasing the risk of reputational harm becomes justifiable. 
As the risk interpretation is supposed to be an alternative justification of the existing 
rules, the remaining chapters then demonstrate that that interpretation does fit with the current 
structure of the South African law. Chapter 6 attempts to show that the risk interpretation is 
compatible with the presumptions of defamation law and the defences. Chapters 7 and 8 show 
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that the risk interpretation is compatible with the remedial response, namely, damages. Chapter 
7 unpacks the idea of public vindication, while Chapter 8 unpacks the idea of damages for hurt 
feelings. These chapters also consider recent developments in Anglo-American tort theory and 
explain why the new concepts of vindicatory damages and substitutive damages – although 
prima facie good explanations of the function of damages in defamation – are not preferable to 
the orthodox ideas of public vindication and hurt feelings. So, while these chapters aim to show 
that the risk interpretation is compatible with the standard remedial response, these discussions 
should also help to shed light on the nature of these remedial responses in general, in a way 
that would be relevant to a more standard interpretation of the law of defamation. 
As noted above, this thesis adds to the existing jurisprudential controversies 
surrounding the law of defamation, but, in so doing, hopes also to shed new light on those 
controversies. In order to understand the new position or how it might shed light on existing 
controversies, it is helpful to have a historical overview of these controversies. The rest of this 
chapter therefore presents an historical introduction to the law of defamation and its doctrinal 
disputes. 
II AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF 
DEFAMATION 
South Africa’s colonial history has had a significant impact on the legal system that exists 
today. As an area that was under Dutch and then English control, Roman-Dutch and English 
legal principles found their way to southern Africa. These legal principles were then 
interwoven with one another by the courts of the early southern African colonies, and the courts 
of the later political entities such as the Union of South Africa and the Republic of South 
Africa.5 As a result of this colonial history, South Africa’s common law has three traditional 
primary sources: Roman-Dutch law, English law, and South African judicial precedents.6 In 
the mid-twentieth century, the law of defamation was the subject of a fierce debate between 
those who wanted to embrace English principles and those who wanted to affirm a more 
                                                 
5 For an overview of South African legal history and the influence of Roman-Dutch and English sources, see H R  
Hahlo and Ellison Kahn The Union of South Africa. The development of its laws and constitution (1960) ch 2; 
Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser ‘South African law as a mixed legal system’ in R Zimmermann & D 
Visser (eds) Southern Cross. Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996); and Eduard Fagan ‘Roman-
Dutch law in its South African historical context’ in R Zimmermann and D Visser Southern Cross op cit. For an 
historical overview of the protection of personality interests in particular in South Africa, see J Neethling, JM 
Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 2ed (2005). 
6 Francois du Bois ‘Sources of law: Common law and precedent’ in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 9 ed (2007) 65. 
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Roman-Dutch or Civilian approach to defamation.7 More recently, the end of white minority 
rule in South Africa and the advent of constitutional democracy in 1994 has led to a tendency 
on the part of the courts to re-examine existing common law principles and rules in the light of 
the new Constitution and its binding bill of rights (such as the right to freedom of expression 
and the right to dignity), rather than being strictly bound by historical sources of law like 
judicial precedent.8 The law of defamation has never been codified in South Africa, moreover, 
and so, in order to understand the law, one needs to engage with the case law and the competing 
interpretations of that law. 
As noted above, the law of defamation was an important battleground in the academic 
conflict now known as the Bellum Juridicum. In general, this ‘jurisprudential war’ was a debate 
between those who supported the incorporation of English principles into the South African 
law, sometimes just out of respect for the doctrine of precedent, and those who thought that the 
elegant principles of Roman-Dutch law were preferable to seemingly chaotic English case law.9 
In the context of defamation, this debate centred to a large degree on the ways in which one 
could escape liability. The debate was about whether the defendant was restricted to the closed 
list of defences offered by English law, such as truth, privilege and fair comment, or, whether, 
perhaps because of a fault requirement, there were other ways to exclude liability, such as 
pointing to the fact that one had made a mistake.10 
 In Maisel v van Naeren,11 the Cape High Court appeared to side with the advocates of 
Roman-Dutch law when it allowed a defendant to escape liability due to a mistaken belief that 
his defamatory statement was privileged. The court argued that the sophisticated, flexible 
principles of Roman-Dutch law were superior to the casuistic and rigid English principles: the 
adoption of English law in the place of Roman-Dutch law would ‘amount to the sacrifice of 
the fruits of centuries of evolution from primitive rigidity and formalism to the refined 
principles of a developed system of law.’12 
                                                 
7 Discussed in more detail below. 
8 F du Bois ‘Sources of law’ op cit note 6 65; see Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) for an 
example of common law principles of defamation being subjected to constitutional analysis. 
9 See the exchanges between Roger McKerron ‘Fact and fiction in the South African law of defamation’ (1931) 
48 SALJ 154, and Melius de Villiers ‘Animus injuriandi: an essential element in defamation’ (1931) 48 SALJ 308. 
For an overview of the debate see PQR Boberg ‘Defamation South African Style – the odyssey of animus 
injuriandi’ in Coenraad Visser (ed) Essays in honour of Ellison Kahn (1989) 35; and Proculus ‘Bellum Juridicum: 
two approaches to South African law’ (1951) 68 SALJ 306. 
10 See references in footnote 9. 
11 1960 (4) SA 836 (C). 
12 Ibid at 846C-847. 
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 In a sense, the decision in Maisel v van Naeren has since been vindicated, as South 
Africa generally did not follow English law in adopting strict liability in the context of 
defamation,13 except for a period when media defendants were held strictly liable.14 It is now 
well-established that animus injuriandi or fault is an essential feature of liability for defamation 
in South Africa.15 On the other hand, it would be too simple to claim that Maisel v Van Naeren 
paved the way for a simple or wholesale vindication of Roman-Dutch law in the place of 
English law. After Maisel v van Naeren, commentators went on to note that the law of 
defamation is a mixture of Roman-Dutch and English principles that is more properly described 
as South African than Roman-Dutch or English. Paul Boberg states that ‘today it can fairly be 
said that we have our own, unique brand of defamation,’16 and Reinhard Zimmermann argues 
that ‘what has emerged, over the years, is a truly hybrid system that has emancipated itself 
from the Roman-Dutch and English roots and has, instead, acquired a distinctive flavour of its 
own’.17 Judicial recognition that the law is, in general, mixed pre-dated the seemingly one-
sided decision in Maisel v van Naeren (which had so eagerly embraced Roman-Dutch law). In 
Ex parte de Winnaar,18 Holmes J had stated the following: 
Our country has reached a stage in its national development when its existing law can 
better be described as South African than Roman-Dutch [...] No doubt its roots are 
Roman-Dutch, and splendid roots they are. But continuous development has come 
through adaptation to modern conditions, through case law, through statutes, and 
through the adoption of certain principles and features of English law, such as 
procedure, and the law of evidence. The original sources of the Roman-Dutch law are 
important, but exclusive preoccupation with them is like trying to return an oak tree to 
its acorn. It is looking ever backwards.19 
                                                 
13 See E Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20. 
14 This position was explained by the Supreme Court of Appeal in National Media Ltd and others v Bogoshi 1998 
(4) SA 1196 (SCA) as follows: ‘The effect of the judgment [in Pakendorf en Andere v De Flamingh 1982 (3) SA 
146 (A)] was that, unlike ordinary members of the community - and, for that matter, also unlike distributors - 
newspaper owners, publishers, editors and printers are liable without fault and, in particular, are not entitled to 
rely upon their lack of knowledge of defamatory material in their publications or upon an erroneous belief in the 
lawfulness of the publication of defamatory material’ (at 1205G). 
15 Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 18 (‘At common law, the elements of the delict of 
defamation are: (a) the wrongful and (b) intentional (c) publication of (d) a defamatory statement (e) concerning 
the plaintiff'); Le Roux and others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as amici 
curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 85 (‘All the plaintiff has to prove at the outset is the publication of defamatory 
matter concerning himself or herself. Once the plaintiff has accomplished this, it is presumed that the statement 
was both wrongful and intentional’). There is some controversy whether intention is always required in order for 
media defendants to be liable after National Media Ltd and others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). See 
Jonathan Burchell ‘Media freedom of expression scores as strict liability receives the red card: National Media 
Ltd v Bogoshi’ (1999) 116 SALJ  1; JR Midgley ‘Media liability for defamation (1999) 116 SALJ  211; and Anton 
Fagan ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict’ (2005) 122 SALJ 90 at 101-106. 
16 Boberg ‘Defamation South African Style’ op cit note 9 at 35. 
17 Reinhard Zimmermann The law of obligations: Roman foundations of the civilian tradition (1996) at 1080. 
18 1959 (1) SA 837 (N). 
19 Ibid at 839. 
15 
 
In many ways, contemporary jurisprudential controversies affecting the law of 
defamation resonate with these historical debates. Even if the mixed nature of the legal system 
is accepted, the nature of various aspects of the law of defamation still appear open to question. 
As noted above, the traditional debate about the Civilian or English nature of the law 
of defamation centred largely on fault and the flexibility of the means of excluding liability. 
The significance and role of fault is still a subject of debate, however, particularly whether fault 
in the form of intentional conduct requires ‘consciousness of the wrongfulness’ of one’s 
actions, and whether such a fault standard is compatible with the defences borrowed from 
English law.20 
The nature of the wrong also appears open to question. There is still dispute about 
whether the wrong is essentially a form of aggravated insult, or whether it is essentially about 
an infringement of a right to reputation, regardless of whether or not the conduct is insulting. 
Tied to this debate about the nature of the wrong, the losses for which one is being compensated 
also sometimes appears to be open to question.21 If the law of defamation is going to be 
reconceptualised as being about the wrong of having increased the risk of reputational harm, 
however, then it must at least be established that the law is concerned with reputation rather 
than insult. An overview of this dispute in particular is therefore presented below. 
In National Media Ltd and others v Bogoshi, the Supreme Court of Appeal states that 
‘it is trite that the law of defamation requires a balance to be struck between the right to 
reputation, on the one hand, and the freedom of expression on the other.’22 This sentiment has 
been endorsed by that court subsequently,23 as well as by the Constitutional Court. In Khumalo 
v Holomisa, for example, the Constitutional Court states that ‘the law of defamation seeks to 
                                                 
20 See Helen Scott ‘Contumelia and the South African law of defamation’ in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott 
(eds) Iniuria and the common law (2013) at 119. Fault will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
21 In Media 24 v Taxi Securitisation op cit note 4, the SCA struggled to explain the function of damages for 
defamation, even though it was clear that they were not for patrimonial loss. See the discussion in Chapter 8. 
22 Supra note 15 at 1207C. 
23 Van der Berg v Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd and others 2001 (2) SA 242 (SCA) para 23 (‘In National 
Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1207D Hefer JA stated: “It is trite that the law of 
defamation requires a balance to be struck between the right to reputation, on the one hand, and the freedom of 
expression on the other.” He went on to observe (at 1207E) that “(i)t would be wrong to regard either of the rival 
interests with which we are concerned as more important than the other”, a matter on which he then proceeded to 
elaborate. This is particularly so where the Constitution in terms seeks to protect both the dignity of the individual 
and freedom of speech (see ss 10 and 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996)’); 
Delta Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Van der Merwe 2004 (6) SA 185 (SCA) para 12 (‘The Constitutional Court 
has held in Khumalo and Others v Holomisa that the principles of the common law as recently developed in 
National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and maintain a 
proper balance between the right to reputation and the right to freedom of expression. It remains to apply those 
principles to the facts’). 
16 
 
protect the legitimate interest individuals have in their reputation’.24 One way to understand 
these comments about ‘a right to reputation’ is that the law of defamation exists to protect one’s 
reputation against unlawful injury. There is an alternative view of the law of defamation, 
however, which characterises defamation as a form of aggravated insult. This idea that the law 
of defamation is really about a wrong of insult extends back at least to the nineteenth century. 
F.G. Gardiner, for example, argued that publication to a third party should not be a requirement 
of defamation in South Africa given that the gist of the Roman and Roman-Dutch action was 
insult.25 The argument was that if the wrong was about the insult, then it should not be a 
necessary condition that it be communicated to third parties. It should be enough if the 
statement was communicated to the defamed individual herself, for that would still be a form 
of insulting conduct. The idea that insult is the gist of the action still sometimes finds expression 
in modern case law. In Le Roux and others v Dey,26 the Supreme Court of Appeal was 
considering the question whether a plaintiff has to institute a separate action for infringement 
of dignity when also suing for defamation. Harms DP gave the following reasons for his 
conclusion that one does not need to institute a separate action: 
I am unaware of any instance in the history of the actio injuriarum where a particular 
defamatory act gave rise to two causes of action. (I exclude the cases where patrimonial 
damages are also claimed.) The reason is in my view that any defamation is in the first 
instance an affront to a person’s dignity which is aggravated by publication. Someone 
who is not affronted by a publication and who does not feel humiliated will not sue for 
defamation. That is why the award of damages compensates “the plaintiff for injured 
feelings and for the hurt to his or her dignity and reputation”. As FP van den Heever J 
once said, “an action on defamation has several purposes: to kill libel, to recover a 
solatium for injured feelings and to recover a penalty from the slanderer”. In other 
words, in assessing compensation in a defamation case a court must have regard to the 
effect the publication had on the plaintiff. In Gelb v Hawkins this court’s determination 
of compensation in a defamation case was said to relate “in the main to contumelia, but 
does not overlook the elements of loss of reputation, and penalty”, which means that 
on the facts of the case the plaintiff’s humiliation, and not loss of reputation, was the 
major factor in deciding quantum.27 
 Rather than insulting conduct and subsequent hurt feelings being a potential, perhaps 
exceptional, harmful consequence of a statement that injured one’s reputation, hurt feelings are 
presented as the natural consequence of a wrong of insult. From the above, one might interpret 
the wrong as essentially being about insult (albeit an insult aggravated by publication) rather 
                                                 
24 Supra note 15 para 28. 
25 F G Gardiner ‘Is publication essential to an action for defamation?’ (1897) 14 Cape Law Journal 184. 
26 2010 (4) SA 210 (SCA). 
27 Ibid para 23. Emphasis added. 
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than essentially being about one’s reputation (with publication to a third-party being an 
essential rather than an aggravating feature of the wrong). 
 It might seem as if the focus on insult comes directly from the Roman-Dutch sources. 
Harms DP refers to the ‘actio injuriarum’ and to ‘contumelia’, for example, and these are 
Roman concepts that do relate to insulting conduct. As Peter Birks explains, the harm typically 
suffered by someone who had suffered an iniuria, in the sense relevant to the Roman actio 
iniuriarum, was outrage or feelings of distress.28 The wrong that one committed when one 
committed an iniuria was the wrong of holding another in contempt, hence the description of 
the frame of mind of the defendant as ‘contumelious’, meaning hubris or ‘a kind of arrogance 
or pride, an over-confident exaltation of the self, manifested in violence or other misbehaviour 
towards others’.29 The best English word for contumelia, Birks argues, is ‘contempt: when a 
man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself’.30 In summary, then, iniuria was 
‘the contemptuous harassment of another, calculated to cause distress in the nature of anger 
and humiliation (the desire for revenge, joined with grief) but violating, not an interest in 
emotional calm, but the victim’s right to his or her proper share of respect’.31 Another example 
of the link between Roman law and insult can be seen in Schreiner JA’s judgment in Die 
Spoorbond and another v South African Railways,32 where Schreiner JA assumed that the 
South African law had a Romanistic historical pedigree, with the concept of insult that it 
brought with it, even if he did so only to discredit the idea that it still represented the modern 
law: 
Our action for defamation is derived ultimately from the Roman actio injuriarum which 
“rested on outraged feelings, not economic loss” (Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law, 
sec. 202). Even in the early days of recorded Roman law mention was specifically 
made, in this connection, of public insults, but the gist of the action was the intentional 
and unjustified hurting of another’s feelings and not the damage to his reputation 
considered as something that belonged to him. In our modern law, as often happens, 
the wide old delict of injuries has split up into different delicts, each with its own name, 
leaving a slight residue to bear the ancient title. The particular delict now known as 
defamation has lost a good deal of its original character since it is no longer regarded 
primarily as an insulting incident occurring between the plaintiff and the defendant 
personally, with publicity only an element of aggravation by reason of the additional 
pain caused to the plaintiff.33 
                                                 
28 Peter Birks ‘Harassment and hubris. The right to an equality of respect’ (1997) 32 Irish Jurist 1 at 12. 
29 Ibid at 11. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid at 14. 
32 Die Spoorbond and another v South African Railways; van Heerden and others v South African Railways 1946 
AD 999. 




The influence of Roman-Dutch law probably is one reason why the courts do sometimes link 
defamation with insult and the feelings that come from being insulted. But English law is 
actually another important source of this idea. Following his description in Le Roux v Dey of 
defamation as ‘an affront to a person’s dignity which is aggravated by publication,’34 Harms 
DP also refers to the Common Law tradition in support of the idea that damages are a form of 
solatium or compensation for outraged feelings: 
Risking the wrath of those who believe that our law of defamation has not been 
contaminated by the common law, I believe that the following statement by Windeyer 
J encapsulates what I wish to say: “It seems to me that, properly speaking, a man 
defamed does not get compensation for his damaged reputation. He gets damages 
because he was injured in his reputation, that is simply because he was publicly 
defamed. For this reason, compensation by damages operates in two ways: as a 
vindication of the plaintiff to the public and as consolation to him for a wrong done. 
Compensation is here a solatium rather than a monetary recompense for harm 
measurable in money. The variety of the matters which, it has been held, may be 
considered in assessing damages for defamation must in many cases mean that the 
amount of a verdict is the product of a mixture of inextricable considerations.”35 
 
The idea that the South African law of defamation might have something to do with insulting 
conduct has two potential sources, then, namely, the Common Law tradition and the Roman 
tradition. This idea, moreover, sometimes clashes with the idea that the law of defamation 
protects a right to reputation that is capable of existing regardless of whether or not the 
infringement of the right happened in an insulting way. The fact that an infringement of a right 
to reputation could also be insulting and so could aggravate the wrong or provide a reason for 
increasing the damages adds to the potential for confusion of the ideas of damaging one’s 
reputation and insulting one. 
Chapter 2 will provide reasons for preferring the view that defamation protects a right 
to reputation, rather than insult, and why our reputations are something that we might value 
and want the state to protect. This will also be a step towards the establishment of an alternative 
interpretation of the wrong of defamation, namely, that it is about having increased the risk of 
reputational harm, rather than having caused reputational harm. The controversies surrounding 
fault and the function of damages will also be picked up again in later chapters.
                                                 
34 Supra note 26 para 23. 
35 Supra note 26 para 24. Square brackets in the original. The reference is to Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd 
(1966) 117 CLR 118 (HCA) at 150. 
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CHAPTER 2: A RIGHT TO REPUTATION 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we saw that there are two competing ways to characterise the wrong 
of defamation in South Africa. The one view characterises the wrong as an infringement of a 
right to reputation while the other characterises the wrong as an aggravated insult. This chapter 
will endorse the former view, namely, that defamation is an infringement of a right to 
reputation. The chapter will elaborate on that view by discussing what reputation is and why 
we would value reputation and want to protect it. It will then provide reasons for why the South 
African law of defamation is best seen as protecting a right to reputation rather than a right to 
be free from insult. 
II DEFINING REPUTATION 
Reputation is generally recognised as being an under-theorised aspect of the law of defamation. 
Lawrence McNamara, in one of the major recent contributions to the legal literature that deals 
with the nature of reputation, notes that ‘[t]he literature on reputation consists, perhaps 
surprisingly, of only a few key works’.1 Robert Post, moreover, in a well-known article that 
often stands centre-stage in discussions of reputation and defamation,2 states that ‘[i]t is all too 
easy to assume that everyone knows the value of reputation, and to let the matter drop with the 
obligatory reference to Shakespeare’s characterization of a “good name” as the “immediate 
jewel” of the soul’.3 
I will adopt one of the definitions of reputation put forward by Lawrence McNamara, 
namely, that ‘[a]n individual’s reputation is a social judgment of the person based upon facts 
which are considered relevant by a community.’4 McNamara, however, expands upon this 
definition in a very specific way, which I think undermines its usefulness as a general 
definition. McNamara’s theory ties reputation to moral judgements, but, while assertions of 
immorality are the primary form of defamatory statement, they are not the only type of 
defamatory statement. I think that McNamara’s more general definition (which he later 
transforms into something too specific) is capable of accommodating the various kinds of 
                                                 
1 Lawrence McNamara Reputation and Defamation (2007) 19. 
2 McNamara op cit note 1 states that ‘Post’s work is without question the benchmark in contemporary commentary 
and critique’ (at 37 fn 5). 
3 Robert C Post ‘The social foundations of defamation law: Reputation and the constitution’ (1986) 74 California 
Law Review 691 at 692. 
4 McNamara op cit note 1 at 21. 
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statements that have been found to be defamatory and which can be understood to pose a threat 
to one’s ‘reputation’.  So, I will endorse the more general definition. 
 I do not engage with Post’s work on reputation because the concern here is whether a 
general, abstract account of reputation can be articulated. Post, however, thinks that the nature 
of reputation varies depending on the kind of society in which one lives. His argument is that 
the Anglo-American law of defamation has developed in accordance with different conceptions 
of reputation, namely, reputation as property, honour, and dignity, which he thinks explains 
some of its oddities.5 It was never his intention to give a general account of reputation, then, 
because he thinks that the nature of reputation varies as societies change.6 Contrary to Post’s 
hesitance to present a general account of reputation, McNamara thinks that a general account 
can be given, and I also think that McNamara’s general definition of reputation has value in 
explaining what reputation is in the context of the South African law of defamation. 
III LAWRENCE MCNAMARA’S THEORY OF REPUTATION AND ITS FOCUS 
ON MORAL JUDGEMENTS 
McNamara begins his argument by providing a basic definition of reputation: ‘An individual’s 
reputation is a social judgment of the person based upon facts which are considered relevant 
by a community.’7 This definition, which does seem to accord with a common-sense 
understanding of reputation, is derived from two sources. First, McNamara relies on the 
reasonable person test that is used by Common Law courts to see what the courts understand 
‘defamatory’ to mean and thus what reputation (the thing being injured by defamatory 
statements) means. 
According to the courts, one’s reputation is ‘the view of a person that is held by ordinary 
decent or right-thinking folk in the community’.8 After all, defamatory statements caused right-
thinking people to think less of one, so the thing being protected must be the view of a person 
that is held by right thinking people. This definition only takes into account right-thinking 
people, however. And, McNamara reasons, it might be too soon to exclude other people in the 
very definition of reputation itself. Therefore, he turns to Thomas Gibbons’ view of reputation,9 
which is different to the courts’ view because it focuses on one’s actual or real reputation, 
rather than on one’s reputation among right-thinking people. As McNamara explains, 
                                                 
5 Post op cit note 3 at 692-693. 
6 Ibid at 699-700. 
7 McNamara op cit note 1 at 21. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Thomas Gibbons ‘Defamation reconsidered’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 587. 
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‘[r]eputation, according to Gibbons, is “the outcome of [others’] judgments [about a person]” 
where “an external assessment has been made of the person’s behaviour and characteristics, 
and that...represents the views of a community of interests”’.10 According to Gibbons, ‘the law 
does not have the function of protecting reputation because it is not concerned with real 
reputations’.11 
In order to retain the possibility of addressing both of these understandings of reputation 
- the courts’ view which focuses on the opinions of right-thinking people, and a more general 
view that tries to define one’s real or actual reputation - McNamara introduces the following 
definition of reputation, which can encompass both: ‘An individual’s reputation is a social 
judgment of the person based upon facts which are considered relevant by a community.’12 In 
the case of the courts, the community being focused on is right-thinking members of society, 
while in the case of one’s actual reputation it might be whatever community one finds relevant, 
regardless of whether or not they are right-thinking or decent members of the wider community. 
 This is just a starting point for McNamara, however, for he thinks that this definition 
can be elaborated upon to shed further light on the concept of reputation. In order to expand 
this definition, McNamara turns his attention to the concept of community, and it is his 
understanding of community that leads him to draw a strong link between moral judgements 
in particular and reputation. 
Drawing on sociology, a community, for McNamara, is a ‘moral construct’, because 
communities define themselves in terms of shared values. Judging if someone possesses those 
values, or if they transgress them, is a way of determining who is part of the community and 
who is not. An assessment of whether someone possesses the right values is a means of 
determining insiders from outsiders: 
 
A community is a group of people that see themselves united by the values that they 
consider they share. It is both an inclusive and exclusive concept. Just as those who 
share the values are bound together and recognize their equivalent moral goodness, a 
failure to share those values means that one is, necessarily, not a part of the 
community.13 
 
Using studies of honour in Mediterranean communities, McNamara derives a general 
proposition that communities are constituted by, and rely on, ‘moral taxonomies (or ethical 
                                                 
10 McNamara op cit note 1 at 21. Square brackets and ellipsis by McNamara. 
11 Gibbons op cit note 9 at 589. 
12 McNamara op cit note 1 at 21. 
13 Ibid at 26. 
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rules)’.14 These ethical rules contain ‘the criteria for moral judgement’, which form ‘the bases 
for judgments of social worth and self-worth in a community.’15 These rules ‘consist of criteria 
that are recognized by a community as constituting and being evidence of moral goodness or 
moral badness’.16 These criteria get their important status either because they are ‘the 
characteristics of those who have social power’, or they are regarded as significant just because 
the community views them as significant, i.e., they are based on ‘tradition’: ‘some things are 
virtues for no other reason than that the community regards them as virtues’.17 
It seems, then, that McNamara thinks that one’s reputation is based on moral 
judgements specifically, for it is moral judgments that matter when a community is assessing 
one’s membership of the community. One can see this in his frequent use of the word ‘moral’ 
in the quotations above. There are times, however, when his theory has the potential to include 
judgements other than moral judgements, such as when he says that ‘[a] community is a group 
of people that see themselves united by the values that they consider they share,’18 or when he 
refers to ‘judgements of social worth’,19 or ‘virtues’.20 These terms are not necessarily restricted 
to moral judgements. A human being can have the virtue of being friendly or cool-headed. A 
society can value commerce and thus ascribe high social worth to skilled businesspeople. It 
seems clear, however, that McNamara is interested in specifically moral judgements. If we are 
dealing with values that refer to inclusion or exclusion in a community, then the stakes seem 
quite high. Even if one thought that someone lacks the virtues of being friendly or cool-headed 
and that she is a terrible businessperson, one would probably still regard them as being a 
member of the wider community. It is true that certain smaller communities or social groupings 
– such as a network of businesspeople – might start to exclude such a person. In any event, if 
McNamara’s theory is restricted to moral judgments in particular, then this is a problem for his 
account of reputation, given that the courts do not restrict claims of defamation to assertions of 
immoral behaviour. So, unless his references to morality are interpreted to include a wider set 
of values, McNamara seems to make a wrong turn when he ties the concept of reputation 
closely to moral judgements. In the next section, we will see what kinds of statements the South 
African courts have found to be defamatory and that McNamara’s initial definition of 
                                                 
14 Ibid at 53. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid at 54. 
17 Ibid at 55. 
18 Ibid at 26. 
19 Ibid at 55. 
20 Ibid at 49-50, 55. 
23 
 
reputation is broad enough to include these other instances where reputation is not based on 
moral judgements specifically. 
IV THE KINDS OF STATEMENTS THE COURTS HAVE FOUND TO BE 
DEFAMATORY 
In Le Roux and others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre 
as Amici Curiae),21 Brand AJ stated the following for the majority of the Constitutional Court: 
 
Examples of defamatory statements that normally spring to mind are those attributing 
to the plaintiff that he or she has been guilty of dishonest, immoral or otherwise 
dishonourable conduct. But defamation is not limited to statements of this kind. It also 
includes statements which are likely to humiliate or belittle the plaintiff; which tend to 
make him or her look foolish, ridiculous or absurd; and which expose the plaintiff to 
contempt or ridicule that renders the plaintiff less worthy of respect by his or her peers.22 
 
A similar idea had previously been expressed by the Appellate Division. In Die Spoorbond v 
South African Railways,23 Watermeyer CJ stated the following: ‘a man’s reputation […] 
includes in an appropriate case not only his moral and social reputation but also his professional 
or business competence and his financial credit’.24 
The Constitutional Court and the Appellate Division clearly think that one’s reputation, 
and the kind of statement that can damage it, encompasses more than one’s moral character, 
and that it also includes one’s professional competence and financial credit. At first, it might 
be tempting to conclude that allegations of professional incompetence really boil down to 
accusations of immorality. As Jonathan Burchell notes, ‘[t]here are many instances in which 
the courts have held that the plaintiff has been defamed by the defendant impugning his fitness 
for his occupation or profession. Such an allegation exposes the plaintiff to ignominy or 
degradation. Usually such an imputation affects his moral character, but an aspersion on his 
competence alone may be sufficient to constitute defamatory matter’.25 Indeed, many cases of 
alleged professional incompetence26 do involve allegations of immorality. In May v Udwin,27 
for example, an attorney was accused of dishonesty and being professionally unethical. In 
                                                 
21 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC). 
22 Ibid at para 91. 
23 Die Spoorbond and another v South African Railways; van Heerden  and others v South African Railways 1946 
AD 999. 
24 Ibid at 1007. 
25 Jonathan M Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa (1985) 125. 
26 See the cases cited by Burchell op cit note 25 at 125 fn 277. 
27 1981 (1) SA 1 (A). 
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South African Associated Newspapers Ltd v Yutar,28 the Attorney-General had been accused 
of deliberately misleading the court, which suggests deceitfulness or immoral conduct. In 
Borgin v De Villiers,29 the allegation was summarised as largely being one of dishonesty, which 
rendered the plaintiff ineligible for an academic position.30 As Burchell also points out, 
however, there have been cases that seem to be focused on professional competence per se, 
without any reference to immoral conduct. In Jordaan v Van Biljon,31 the allegation was that a 
teacher took no interest in the progress of his pupils and was thus unsuited to be a teacher. In 
Craig v Voortrekkers Bpk,32 the allegation amounted to incompetence in the management of a 
veterinary clinic. There have also been judgments in the High Courts that support this idea. 
One of the clearest is Yates v MacRae,33 where the allegation was that the plaintiff performed 
his work inefficiently and poorly. In Gluckmann v Holford,34 the allegation was that the 
plaintiff’s reputation as an attorney was poor in general. And in Kritzinger v Perskorporasie 
van Suid-Afrika,35 it was held that it can be defamatory to say that someone is bankrupt even if 
he is not a businessman. 
 One can summarise this in the following way. Defamatory assertions often relate to 
one’s moral character. But, in some cases, defamatory assertions relate to personal attributes, 
such as professional skill or competence, that are not necessarily a concern about one’s moral 
character. Finally, in some cases defamatory assertions relate to claims about one’s 
creditworthiness in particular. McNamara’s initial definition of reputation, before he elaborates 
on his conception of community and places emphasis on moral judgements, is capable of 
capturing these different elements: ‘An individual’s reputation is a social judgment of the 
person based upon facts which are considered relevant by a community.’36 
 If this is what reputation means, the next section will elaborate on why reputation 
matters and why it is worthwhile protecting it using the law of delict. 
V WHY WE VALUE REPUTATION 
There are two well-established ways to explain the function of rights, namely, will theories and 
interest theories. Will theories point to the way in which rights give people control over the 
                                                 
28 1969 (2) SA 442 (A). 
29 1980 (3) SA 556 (A). 
30 Ibid at 571. 
31 1962 (1) SA 286 (A). 
32 1963 (1) SA 149 (A). 
33 1929 TPD 480. 
34 1940 TPD 337. 
35 1981 (2) SA 373 (O). 
36 McNamara op cit note 1 at 21. 
25 
 
duties of others. You can waive your rights and so allow others to act in ways that otherwise 
would not be permitted, such as use your property. Interest theories focus on the ways in which 
rights are good for those who hold them; that rights further the right-holder’s interests.37 In 
what follows I adopt an interest-based account of the function of the right to reputation, namely, 
that we should protect people’s reputations because doing so furthers their interests. 
 The legal literature on reputation generally acknowledges two interests that are 
furthered by protecting reputation, which we can call ‘internal’ interests and ‘external’ 
interests. Internal interests relate to one’s sense of self-esteem and personal identity. On this 
account, attacking people’s reputations is wrong because it hurts their feelings and confuses 
the image they have of themselves. External interests, on the other hand, relate to the way in 
which reputations help us achieve things in the world. Our reputation, like our property and 
our bodily integrity, is a tool that we use to pursue opportunities and further our life’s projects. 
These two reasons for valuing reputation are explained in what follows. 
 Thomas Gibbons notes that one’s reputation can be valued for various reasons, 
including both one’s sense of self and one’s relations with the world: 
 
In one sense, the desire to control our public image is an assertion of autonomy, 
whereby we retain power over the transition from a private world, where others do not 
have knowledge about us and do not demand reasons for our actions, to a social world 
where others’ attitudes and responses can have unpredictable effects. It may also 
manifest our own sense of self or our personal history and identity, and it may 
incorporate a claim about our integrity, implying that we are consistent in espousing 
and implementing our values and aims. Another important reason for wanting to control 
the public presentation of our personal image relates to the social benefits that it may 
bring. The commercial advantages of a good reputation are obvious. Professionals and 
traders, for example, will foster a reputation that secures repeated business and most 
individuals will be interested in their creditworthiness. In addition, favourable 
assessments of our behaviour bring social advantages. They include friendship and 
association, respect and admiration, and being part of a group or community. These 
advantages may be invaluable, even if they cannot always be financially quantified.38 
 
Eric Barendt focuses on self-esteem as an aspect of dignity, in conjunction with economic loss: 
 
it is surely more common today to see the value of reputation in its connection with the 
fundamental right of all individuals to respect for their personal dignity […] 
Sociologists and psychologists would, I imagine, agree that the esteem in which we are 
held by others is an integral aspect of our own dignity and self-esteem. As a matter of 
                                                 
37 Leif Wenar ‘Rights’ in Edward N Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition). 
Accessible online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/. 
38 Gibbons op cit note 9 at 589-590. 
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commonsense, to allege that someone is, say, seriously incompetent or dishonest may 
well damage the esteem in which he, or she, is held by others and consequently wound 
his (or her) self-esteem. Such allegations may additionally cause significant economic 
damage. Any civilized legal system should be prepared to provide redress in these 
circumstances. It is this argument which persuades me that there is a point to libel law.39 
 
Lawrence McNamara also notes the temporal advantages of a good reputation, even though he 
argues that it should be seen as a form of personality interest, rather than a form of property. 
And in arguing for why it should be seen as a personality interest, he, like Eric Barendt, notes 
the role that reputation plays in one’s sense of self-worth: 
 
There is no doubt that a good reputation may in the ordinary course of events carry 
some material advantage. […] To that extent, it seems entirely appropriate to recognize 
through the remedy of pecuniary damages the loss that may accompany a diminution 
of reputation. However, to say that we have ‘worldly interests’ in reputation, and to say 
that the law will recognize that those interests carry material consequences is far from 
saying that reputation is property. Rather, it is simply to say that: “Reputation is 
regarded by the law in the same light as that in which it is regarded by the common 
understanding of mankind, viz as carrying with it, if good, temporal advantages . . .” 
[…T]here is broadly based agreement that an individual’s sense of self-worth is 
intimately related to how other people see them, and that means reputation matters.40 
 
The two groups of reasons for valuing reputation that these authors identify can be called 
external benefits and internal benefits. External benefits are those social benefits and temporal 
advantages that a good reputation can generate, and the internal benefits are those relating to 
one’s sense of self-esteem and personal identity. 
The capacity to generate these external and internal benefits are what makes reputation, 
like property and bodily integrity, an important ‘welfare interest’. In other words, reputation is 
a particularly important thing to protect. 
The idea of a welfare interest has featured in some attempts to define the nature of harm. 
John Kleinig defines ‘welfare interests’ as 
 
those interests which are indispensable to the pursuit and fulfilment of characteristically 
human interests… Being foundational, their satisfaction is not to be identified with a 
person’s happiness or well-being so much as the conditions which make happiness and 
well-being possible […] Obvious candidates are bodily and mental health, normal 
intellectual development, adequate material security, stable and non-superficial 
                                                 
39 Eric Barendt ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ (1999) Current Legal Problems 110 at 116-117. 
40 McNamara op cit note 1 at 42, 46. Emphasis by McNamara. 
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interpersonal relationships, and a fair degree of liberty  […] It is with welfare interests 
that  rights are primarily concerned.41 
 
For Kleinig, harm is best understood as an ‘impairment of a being’s welfare interests’.42 An 
impairment is more than a mere interference; it is ‘to make something worse or cause it to 
deteriorate. Impairment is thus an interference which has substantial deleterious effects’.43 
 Joel Feinberg also acknowledges the importance of welfare interests in his discussion 
of harm, even though he would not restrict the concept of harm to invasions of welfare interests: 
 
a person’s most important interests […] are rather his interests, presumably of a kind 
shared by nearly all his fellows, in the necessary means to his more ultimate goals, 
whatever the latter may be, or later come to be. In this category are the interests in the 
continuance for a foreseeable interval of one’s life, and the interests in one’s own 
physical health and vigor, the integrity and normal functioning of one’s body, the 
absence of groundless anxieties and resentments, the capacity to engage normally in 
social intercourse and to enjoy and maintain friendships, at least minimal income and 
financial security, a tolerable social and physical environment, and a certain amount of 
freedom from interference and coercion […] These minimal but non-ultimate goods can 
be called a person’s “welfare interests” […] an invasion of a welfare interest is the most 
serious, but not the only kind of harm a person can sustain.44 
 
 There are a number of ways in which one could defend the moral significance of welfare 
interests and why one should not violate them, depending on one’s preferred moral theory. A 
consequentialist, for example, could point to the social benefits of allowing people to act freely 
and the personal benefits like happiness and fulfilment. Another justification would be to rely 
on the value of autonomy. Stephen Perry, for example, argues that ‘the harm involved in 
damaging or destroying tangible property also constitutes an interference with autonomy. The 
use-value and exchange-value of property both represent opportunities for the owner, and 
adversely affecting either type of value harms the owner precisely because it diminishes her 
opportunities’.45 Stephen Perry is relying here on Joseph Raz, who makes a similar argument: 
 
Respect for the autonomy of others largely consists in securing for them adequate 
options, i.e. opportunities and the ability to use them. Depriving a person of 
opportunities or of the ability to use them is a way of causing him harm. Both the use-
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value and the exchange-value of property represent opportunities for their owner. Any 
harm to a person by denying him the use or the value of his property is a harm to him 
precisely because it diminishes his opportunities. Similarly injury to the person reduces 
his ability to act in ways which he may desire. Needless to say a harm to a person may 
consist not in depriving him of options but in frustrating his pursuit of the projects and 
relationships he has set upon. Between them these cases cover most types of harm.46 
 
Reputation also seems like one of those things that makes further projects and opportunities 
possible, and it too could be defended on the basis of autonomy, if one preferred a non-
consequentialist approach. 
 To summarise, Perry and Raz highlight the way in which property damage and injury 
to one’s body affect one’s options and one’s ability to fulfil one’s plans, yet it is clear that 
reputation also plays an important role in providing opportunities and achieving the goals one 
has set oneself. The way in which other people see you can play an important role in their 
further dealings with you, and the opportunities extend from commercial opportunities to 
relationships pursued for non-commercial reasons. Feinberg was right to include ‘the capacity 
to engage normally in social intercourse’ in his list of welfare interests, which is affected when 
one’s reputation is tarnished, and Kleinig also refers to ‘stable and non-superficial interpersonal 
relationships’. I think that this capacity of reputation to make one’s further projects possible 
weighs heavily in explaining why reputation matters. One could also rely on the fact that 
reputation plays a role in constituting one’s sense of self-esteem and personal identity. 
It is the fact that having a good reputation is a welfare interest that explains why the 
law should be concerned to protect it. This is the same reason underlying the desire to protect 
property and bodily integrity; these things matter because of the role that they play in the pursuit 
of one’s other goals and projects. As a welfare interest, reputation clearly deserves protection. 
VI A RIGHT TO REPUTATION VERSUS A RIGHT NOT TO BE INSULTED: 
CONSIDERATIONS BASED ON THE CASE LAW 
Even if there are reasons to protect a right to reputation, what reason is there to think that the 
South African law of defamation protects a right to reputation rather than a right not to be 
insulted? The first reason is the repeated reference to a right to reputation in the case law. 
 In National Media Ltd and others v Bogoshi,47 the Supreme Court of Appeal states that 
‘it is trite that the law of defamation requires a balance to be struck between the right to 
                                                 
46 Joseph Raz The Morality of Freedom (1988) 413. 
47 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). 
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reputation, on the one hand, and the freedom of expression on the other.’48 This sentiment has 
been endorsed by that court subsequently,49 as well as by the Constitutional Court. In Khumalo 
and others v Holomisa,50 the Constitutional Court states that ‘the law of defamation seeks to 
protect the legitimate interest individuals have in their reputation’.51 In other words, it appears 
right that the majority in Media 24 v SA Taxi Securitisiation52 chose to endorse Schreiner JA's 
statement in Die Spoorbond that the modern law is different to its Roman ancestor.53 As 
Schreiner JA put it: 
[t]he particular delict now known as defamation has lost a good deal of its original 
character since it is no longer regarded primarily as an insulting incident occurring 
between the plaintiff and the defendant personally, with publicity only an element of 
aggravation by reason of the additional pain caused to the plaintiff. [...T]he delict of 
defamation has come to be limited to the harming of the plaintiff by statements which 
damage his good name. The opinion of other persons is of value to him and . . . it has 
become in some degree assimilated to wrongs done to property.54 
We can understand the idea that it has become assimilated to wrongs done to property by 
referring to the fact that both property and reputation are welfare interests that play a role in 
furthering one’s ends, as we saw above. 
 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court of Appeal points out in Media 24 v Taxi 
Securitisation, damages can be recovered regardless of whether or not one suffered hurt 
feelings (whether one is a natural person or an artificial person) and the emphasis of the court 
in that case is on a corporation’s right to reputation per se and the need to provide means for 
remedying infringements of that right in particular: 
                                                 
48 Ibid at 1207C. 
49 Van der Berg v Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd and others 2001 (2) SA 242 (SCA) para 23 (‘In National 
Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) at 1207D Hefer JA stated: “It is trite that the law of 
defamation requires a balance to be struck between the right to reputation, on the one hand, and the freedom of 
expression on the other.” He went on to observe (at 1207E) that “(i)t would be wrong to regard either of the rival 
interests with which we are concerned as more important than the other”, a matter on which he then proceeded to 
elaborate. This is particularly so where the Constitution in terms seeks to protect both the dignity of the individual 
and freedom of speech (see ss 10 and 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996)’); 
Delta Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Van der Merwe 2004 (6) SA 185 (SCA) para 12 (‘The Constitutional Court 
has held in Khumalo and Others v Holomisa that the principles of the common law as recently developed in 
National Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and maintain a 
proper balance between the right to reputation and the right to freedom of expression. It remains to apply those 
principles to the fact’). 
50 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC). 
51 Ibid para 28. 
52 Media 24 Ltd and others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd (Avusa Media Ltd and others as Amici Curiae) 2011 
(5) SA 329 (SCA). 
53 Ibid paras 37-38: ‘As to the historical argument based on the original scope and purpose of the actio iniuriarum 
it was pointed out by Schreiner JA in Spoorbond how the law had since changed [...]Though traditionally the 
function of the actio iniuriarum was to provide a solatium or solace money (satisfaction or “genoegdoening” in 
Afrikaans) for injured feelings, the position has become more nuanced in modern law.’ 




The only remedy available at present that can serve to protect the reputation worthy of 
protection, is damages. A legal system which acknowledges an interest worthy of 
protection, but provides no remedy to afford that protection fails in the performance of 
its function. And, as I see it, the same must be said about a legal system that says to a 
plaintiff in the position of the present respondent that, although it should have a remedy, 
the nature of that remedy is unclear; that although an award of damages has been 
regarded as the only appropriate remedy for nearly a century, we now hold that it is no 
longer the case, without offering a firm alternative; and that because the respondent is 
seeking a remedy which we now decide to exclude, its claim based on the protection of 
its reputation is dismissed with costs. All I can say is that I find myself unable to 
subscribe to this conclusion.55 
 
 Another feature of the law suggesting that defamation is concerned with reputation per 
se is the fact that publication is a necessary element of the wrong.56 As F.G. Gardiner 
postulated, if the gist of the wrong is insult, then publication to a third person should not be 
essential for liability.57 It also seems strange, if defamation did principally protect one from 
insult, to make a merely aggravating feature essential for actionability. It is true that someone 
might feel more outraged in the face of defamation than a private insult, but why do we need a 
distinct legal wrong of defamation to take that into account? Why not simply take publication 
into account when determining the quantum of damages for the delict of insult?58 We do need 
a distinct legal wrong of defamation, however, if we are dealing with a distinct kind of social 
wrong, that is, a wrong that is distinct from the wrong of insult. An attack on one’s reputation 
would be such a wrong. 
 That is not to say that insult or hurt feelings are irrelevant to defamation, however. It 
only means that they are not necessarily implicated in the nature of the wrong (in the way that 
hurt feelings seems to be naturally associated with insulting conduct) or in the justification for 
why damages are being provided. Harms DP’s point in Le Roux v Dey (SCA)59 about not 
needing to institute a separate action for insult can be explained on the alternative basis of hurt 
feelings or insult aggravating damages in cases where one’s right to reputation has been 
infringed (as discussed in Chapter 8). This kind of approach would still be consistent with the 
                                                 
55 Media 24 v SA Taxi Securitisation supra note 52 para 54. 
56 Khumalo and others v Holomisa supra note 50 (‘At common law, the elements of the delict of defamation are: 
(a) the wrongful and (b) intentional (c) publication of (d) a defamatory statement (e) concerning the plaintiff’ 
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57 FG Gardiner ‘Is publication essential to an action for defamation?’ (1897) 14 Cape Law Journal 184. 
58 See Delange v Costa 1989 (2) SA 857 (A). 
59 Le Roux and others v Dey 2010 (4) SA 210 (SCA). 
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claim by the majority in Le Roux v Dey (CC),60 that ‘according to established principle, an 
award of damages for defamation should compensate the plaintiff for both wounded feelings 
and loss of reputation’ and that ‘it is also accepted that in some cases the former may outweigh 
the latter’.61 Insult can be a feature of some cases of defamation, if the conduct was also 
insulting or contumelious. The point is that attacks on reputation are not necessarily insulting 
or contumelious. A newspaper that fails the Bogoshi (reasonable publication) test62 because it 
intentionally published a defamatory statement in the negligent belief that it was true and in 
the public interest, does not necessarily hold one in contempt. Such media defendants could 
just be bad at their job, rather than disrespecting one’s dignity. It is difficult to see how 
publication in these circumstances could be an affront to one’s dignity. Failure to comply with 
an objective negligence standard does not suggest that one personally disrespects the humanity 
of the person whom one has wronged in failing to meet that standard. 
 There is, however, a feature of the law of defamation that might make one think that 
disrespect and insult are, in fact, intimately wound up with injuries to reputation, at least in the 
case of natural persons. This feature is the frequent references to ‘dignity’ in cases of 
defamation involving natural persons. In Khumalo v Holomisa,63 the Constitutional Court 
states the following: 
In the context of the actio injuriarum, our common law has separated the causes of 
action for claims for injuries to reputation (fama) and dignitas. Dignitas concerns the 
individual’s own sense of self-worth, but included in the concept are a variety of 
personal rights including, for example, privacy. In our new constitutional order, no 
sharp line can be drawn between these injuries to personality rights. The value of human 
dignity in our Constitution is not only concerned with an individual’s sense of self-
worth, but constitutes an affirmation of the worth of human beings in our society. It 
includes the intrinsic worth of human beings shared by all people as well as the 
individual reputation of each person built upon his or her own individual achievements. 
The value of human dignity in our Constitution therefore values both the personal sense 
of self-worth as well as the public’s estimation of the worth or value of an individual. 
It should also be noted that there is a close link between human dignity and privacy in 
our constitutional order. The right to privacy, entrenched in s 14 of the Constitution, 
recognises that human beings have a right to a sphere of intimacy and autonomy that 
should be protected from invasion. This right serves to foster human dignity. No sharp 
lines then can be drawn between reputation, dignitas and privacy in giving effect to the 
value of human dignity in our Constitution. [...] The law of defamation seeks to protect 
the legitimate interest individuals have in their reputation. To this end, therefore, it is 
                                                 
60 Le Roux and others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as amici curiae) 
2011 (3) SA 274 (CC). 
61 Ibid para 151 per Brand AJ. 
62 National Media Ltd and others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). 
63 Supra note 50. 
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one of the aspects of our law which supports the protection of the value of human 
dignity. When considering the constitutionality of the law of defamation, therefore, we 
need to ask whether an appropriate balance is struck between the protection of freedom 
of expression on the one hand, and the value of human dignity on the other.64 
 In this extract, the Court is attempting to found the right to reputation on the right to 
human dignity. Does this mean that we care about reputations because infringing someone’s 
reputation is disrespectful? And is this an explanation for why defaming someone might be 
insulting, i.e. disrespectful and therefore insulting? This connection of reputation and human 
dignity occurs in a number of other appellate level cases.65 One reason for this, perhaps, is that 
the right to reputation is not given special protection in the South African Constitution’s Bill 
of Rights.66 As the Supreme Court of Appeal noted, reputation is ‘not protected eo nomine as 
a fundamental right’ in the Bill of Rights,67 unlike freedom of expression,68 the interest against 
which reputation is most frequently contrasted, and also unlike the right to privacy.69 It was 
perhaps easier, then, to institute a balancing act between reputation and freedom of expression 
when one was able to balance two fundamental rights in the form of dignity and freedom of 
expression. Yet, the mere fact that a link is drawn between reputation and human dignity does 
not mean that the one simply collapses into the other. There are reasons to draw such a link 
                                                 
64 Ibid paras 27-28. 
65 Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd and another 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 98 (‘Even though the 
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Modiri v Minister of Safety and Security and others 2011 (6) SA 370 (SCA) para 22 (‘As explained by the 
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fundamental rights of freedom of expression, including freedom of the press, on the one hand, and the rights to 
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66 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
67 Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd and another 2004 (6) SA 329 (SCA) para 98. 
68 s 16 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
69 s 14 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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without also accepting that a concern about injuring someone’s reputation is in itself a concern 
about dignity or insult. The rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights are, in the first instance, a 
means of protecting private individuals from the actions of the state and a means of guiding 
state action. In light of this, and the interest that people have in their reputations being 
protected, it seems to follow that if the state did not protect our reputations, then it would be 
failing to respect our constitutionally entrenched right to dignity. Given the ways in which 
having a good reputation can allow us to fulfil our life projects and the harms that can follow 
attacks on our reputation, it seems plausible to say that a failure on the part of the state to 
protect one’s reputation in some way would amount to a failing to take our right to dignity 
seriously. It does not follow from this, however, that every infringement of one’s right to 
reputation necessarily involves disrespect for one’s dignity, as we saw above in the example of 
a negligent newspaper that fails the reasonable publication test. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Reputation, then, can be understood as ‘a social judgment of the person based upon facts which 
are considered relevant by a community’. These judgements often relate to one’s moral 
character. But, in some cases, defamatory assertions relate to other personal attributes, such as 
professional skill or competence, that are not necessarily a concern about one’s moral character. 
Finally, in some cases defamatory assertions relate to claims about one’s creditworthiness in 
particular. 
 Reputation deserves protection because, like property and bodily integrity, it is a 
welfare interest: it is the sort of thing that enables people to live a flourishing life. More 
specifically, reputation has both internal benefits (like allowing one to maintain a sense of self, 
and self-esteem) and external benefits (like the pursuit of relationships that have commercial 
and non-commercial benefits). 
 It has been controversial, however, whether the South African law of defamation does 
protect one’s reputation, rather than one’s right to be free from insult. There are reasons to 
think that it in fact protects one’s reputation, such as the many references to a right to reputation 
in the case law, the requirement of publication, the fact that hurt feelings are not essential for 
liability, and the existence of alternative explanations for the link that is frequently drawn 
between reputation and dignity. The most descriptively accurate account of the South African 
law of defamation appears to be that it protects one’s reputation as an interest in and of itself.
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CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE OF THE WRONG: SOME 
PROBLEMS WTH THE ORTHODOX CAUSATION-OF-HARM 
HYPOTHESIS 
I INTRODUCTION 
Even if one accepts the value of reputation, and that it is an interest worth protecting, one might 
still wonder about the manner in which it is being protected, and the way in which that 
protection is justified by the state. 
Delicts are typically understood as wrongful acts that cause harm. It is sometimes 
stated, for example, that ‘[a] delict is a wrongful and culpable act which has a harmful 
consequence.’1  If delicts concern conduct that has a harmful consequence, and if defamation 
law protects one’s reputation, then it seems to follow that the delict of defamation concerns 
(wrongful and culpable) conduct that has resulted in harm being caused to one’s reputation. 
However, given what a plaintiff has to establish to receive compensation - the ‘elements of 
liability’ and the evidence one has to bring to establish them - this is not actually the best way 
to characterise the injury (or the wrong) for which one is being compensated. 
The orthodox interpretation of the wrong of defamation does seem to be that the delict 
of defamation concerns conduct that has harmed one’s reputation. But it appears to be more 
justifiable to view the compensation being meted out as compensation for someone 
unjustifiably increasing the risk of reputational harm occurring, rather than for the probable 
causation of reputational harm. The core of this argument will be constructed in the next few 
chapters (Chapters 4 - 6). This chapter will discuss the elements of liability for defamation and 
some of the differences between defamation and Aquilian delicts. By contrasting the elements 
of liability for Aquilian delicts with the elements of liability for defamation, one can see that it 
is much harder to justify the claim that the defendant probably has caused harm to the protected 
interest in the case of defamation as compared to Aquilian delicts. The next two chapters will 
then present an alternative interpretation of the practice of defamation, which is that defamation 
concerns unjustifiable increases in the risk of reputational harm, rather than the causation of 
reputational harm. Liability for merely increasing risk is in itself a controversial idea, but I 
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think that it is more justifiable in the case of defamation than it is in the case of the English tort 
of negligence or Aquilian liability, as the next two chapters explain. 
The argument will begin in this chapter, then, with a critique of the orthodox 
interpretation of defamation (the causation of harm hypothesis). It will present this critique by 
contrasting defamation with Aquilian cases to help demonstrate why the causation of harm 
hypothesis is weaker in the case of defamation than in Aquilian cases. 
II JUDICIAL SUPPORT FOR THE ORTHODOX CAUSATION OF HARM 
HYPOTHESIS 
In Le Roux v Dey (CC),2 Brand JA states the following for the majority of the Constitutional 
Court (CC): 
our courts accept that a statement is defamatory of a plaintiff if it is likely to injure the 
good esteem in which he or she is held by the reasonable or average person to whom it 
had been published. [...] The test is whether it is more likely, that it is more probable 
than not, that the statement will harm the plaintiff. The view of Neethling that a mere 
tendency or propensity — as opposed to a likelihood — of harm would suffice, does 
not appear to be supported by any authority in our law.3 
 
Froneman J and Cameron J present a similar argument in their judgment: 
The conventional test for determining whether a statement is defamatory is if it would 
probably lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society 
generally. [...] This test is useful and practically expedient if it is understood properly 
as an objective test to determine whether the reputation of a person has been objectively 
infringed, on a balance of probabilities. The Supreme Court of Appeal appears to have 
taken this test to mean that likelihood is not a requirement, but that it is sufficient if a 
statement merely has the “tendency” to undermine the status, good name or reputation 
of a person, to qualify as defamatory. In our view this approach does not take sufficient 
account of constitutional values and norms, nor the practice in our courts even before 
the advent of the Constitution.4 
 
From these comments, it appears accurate to say that the orthodox interpretation of 
defamation is that it is concerned with the causation of reputational harm, albeit the causation 
of harm in the eyes of the reasonable person, rather than in the eyes of any particular, real-life 
audience. This seems to be a natural way to interpret the statement by the CC that ‘a statement 
                                                 
2 Le Roux and others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae) 
2011 (3) SA 274 (CC). 
3 Ibid para 91. 
4 Ibid paras 168-169. 
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is defamatory of a plaintiff if it is likely to injure the good esteem in which he or she is held by 
the reasonable or average person to whom it had been published’.5 
 Nevertheless, there is also some disagreement here between the CC and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (SCA), and the SCA’s judgment could potentially support something more 
like a risk interpretation than a causation of harm reputation. But the CC does not consider this 
interpretation, perhaps because it would be so unusual. I do not think that the SCA intended 
such an unusual interpretation of the law either: In Le Roux and others v Dey (SCA),6 the SCA 
stated the following about the nature of the injury involved in defamation: 
 
A publication is defamatory if it has the “tendency” or is calculated to undermine the 
status, good name or reputation of the plaintiff. It is necessary to emphasise this because 
it is an aspect that is neglected in textbook definitions of defamation because it is 
usually said that something can only be defamatory if it causes the plaintiff's reputation 
to be impaired. That is not the case, as Neethling explains with reference to authority: 
“It is notable that the question of a factual injury to personality, that is, whether 
the good name of the person concerned was actually injured, is almost 
completely ignored in the evaluation of wrongfulness of defamation. In fact, 
generally a witness may not even be asked how he understood the words or 
behaviour. In addition, it is required only that the words or behaviour was 
calculated or had the tendency or propensity to defame, and not that the 
defamation actually occurred. In short, probability of injury rather than actual 
injury is at issue. It can be concluded, therefore, that the courts are not at all 
interested in whether others’ esteem for the person concerned was in fact 
lowered, but only, seen objectively, in whether, in the opinion of the reasonable 
person, the esteem which the person enjoyed was adversely affected. If so, it is 
simply accepted that those to whom it is addressed, being persons  of ordinary 
intelligence and experience, will have understood the statement in its proper 
sense”.7 
 
There are at least three possible interpretations of what is being claimed here, one of 
which is evident in the CC’s own interpretation of the SCA, offered above. First, the CC 
interprets the SCA to be saying that the fact that a defamatory statement had a less than 50% 
chance of causing reputational harm is sufficient for liability for defamation. This is how they 
interpret the SCA’s statement that ‘[a] publication is defamatory if it has the “tendency” or is 
calculated to undermine the status, good name or reputation of the plaintiff’’. The CC interprets 
this to mean that something less than probable reputational harm is required. On this 
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interpretation, the wrong is still arguably about having caused reputational harm, but something 
less than a 50% chance of harm is sufficient for liability. 
A second interpretation is that the SCA was just emphasising the fact that the test for 
defamation involves an objective test about the impact the statement would have on a 
reasonable person, rather than it being an enquiry into the effect the statement had on particular, 
real-life individuals. This explains the emphasis on the fact that witnesses need not be called, 
and the references to the reasonable person test. The statement that that a publication can be 
defamatory if it merely has a tendency, or is calculated, to defame could then be interpreted to 
mean that the impact on a reasonable person is all that matters, rather than the impact on 
particular individuals, or the plaintiff’s actual community. Moreover, this could be interpreted 
as being consistent with the idea that the nature of the wrong is still the probable causation of 
reputational harm. The caveat is simply that in establishing probable causation of reputational 
harm, the only evidence required in support is that one’s reputation would have been lowered 
in the eyes of a reasonable person. 
A third, more radical, interpretation is that the SCA is really adopting a risk 
interpretation of the law of defamation. The Court could be saying that the legal injury in 
question is really about having caused an increase in the risk of reputational harm, rather than 
having caused reputational harm. This interpretation is supported by the following statement: 
‘it is usually said that something can only be defamatory if it causes the plaintiff’s reputation 
to be impaired. That is not the case […]’. But a risk interpretation is so unusual that one would 
expect the Court to say something more by way of defence of that position. Liability for merely 
increasing the risk of harm, rather than causing harm, is highly controversial in the law of delict 
(as Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate). A risk interpretation is so unorthodox that the Constitutional 
Court does not even consider it when it interprets the above statement by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. 
For our purposes, the correct interpretation of what the SCA meant is less important 
than what the Constitutional Court’s comments suggest about how the law of defamation is 
normally interpreted by the courts. The CC claims that ‘a statement is defamatory of a plaintiff 
if it is likely to injure the good esteem in which he or she is held by the reasonable or average 
person to whom it had been published’.8 This seems to align with the general understanding of 
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the nature of delicts outlined above, that ‘[a] delict is a wrongful and culpable act which has a 
harmful consequence.’9   
The CC’s interpretation of defamation seems similar to the way in which the lex Aquilia 
is typically understood, which is that proof of harm needs to be established on a balance of 
probabilities. For example, in the Aquilian case of Jowell v Bramwell-Jones and others,10 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal stated that ‘[w]hether a plaintiff has suffered damage or not is a fact 
which, like any other element of his cause of action and subject to what is said below, must be 
established on a balance of probabilities’.11 
Even though, on the orthodox interpretations, there seems to be agreement in Aquilian 
cases and defamation cases that delicts require proof of harm on a balance of probabilities, 
there are in fact differences in the nature of the evidence that needs to be tendered by the 
plaintiff to prove his or her case. And, upon closer inspection of this evidence, it appears that 
liability for the causing of harm is not, in fact, the best way to explain liability for defamation. 
This fact might explain why the SCA’s account of the law of defamation does seem to lend 
itself quite naturally to competing interpretations. The causation-of-reputational-harm 
interpretation seems to be the approach favoured by the CC, but I do not think that that is the 
most defensible interpretation of the rules underlying the practice. The rest of this chapter 
attempts to demonstrate the differences between defamation cases and Aquilian cases, paving 
the way for the alternative interpretation of defamation as being concerned with a probable 
increase in the risk of reputational harm, rather than the probable causing of reputational harm. 
 
III PHYSICAL CHANGES IN THE WORLD AND PATRIMONIAL LOSS VERSUS 
THE INTERPRETATION OF WORDS 
To succeed in a civil case, the plaintiff has to convince the court that his or her version of events 
is the more probable one. The classical South African discussion of this idea is found in West 
Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd,12 where the Appellate Division stated the 
following: 
The learned judge in the court below has examined very fully and carefully into this 
matter. He found that the probabilities are very strongly in favour of the correctness of 
the theory put forward by the witnesses for the insurance company [...] The learned 
judge, having come to the conclusion that the probabilities in regard to the origin of the 
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fire are strongly in favour of the theory of the insurance company, emphasized that he 
was accordingly justified in acting on such probabilities and making them the basis of 
his decision. [...] No doubt such a method, rightly understood and applied, is a correct 
mode of procedure, for the principle invoked by the court below is well-established, 
and so far as the English law is concerned, it dates back to the reign of Elizabeth [...] 
The rule that a judge may, in his discretion, act on the probabilities of the case, in other 
words that a reasonable presumption or a strong probability may shift the onus 
probandi, and, if not rebutted, may form the basis of judicial decision, is traceable to 
the civil law, and is fully recognized by the Roman-Dutch jurists. [...] The probability 
must be of sufficient force to raise a reasonable presumption in favour of the party who 
relies on it. It must be of sufficient weight to throw the onus on the other side to rebut 
it. If he cannot do so satisfactorily then, according to the jurists I have mentioned and 
the commentators generally, the party in whose favour such a probability or 
presumption exists will be entitled to judgment. It must needs be so, for presumption is 
founded on probability and human experience, and consequently the rule above stated 
is very necessary and essential in the due administration of justice.13 
 
 This judgment is quite striking in that it correctly identifies the kind of probabilistic 
reasoning at work, namely, that a judge is assessing whether the probabilities favour ‘the 
correctness of the theory put forward by [the plaintiff]’. The focus on ‘theory’ is correct, 
because the assessment being made by the judge is of what probability scholars call ‘epistemic 
probability’.14 Unlike, say, the 50/50 probability that an atom of radium will decay within 1600 
years, which is a feature of the world that is independent of what human beings think about it, 
epistemic probability is not a feature of the world in this sense. Epistemic probability is, 
instead, an assessment of the extent to which the evidence before one supports a particular 
theory. For example, epistemic probability is at work when one considers ‘how far evidence 
confirms or disconfirms hypotheses about the world’ such as the hypothesis that ‘the butler did 
it.’15 When courts decide something on a balance of probabilities, then, they are simply trying 
to determine whether the evidence before them makes it appear more probable than not that 
the plaintiff’s version of events is true. As the Appellate Division also points out, it has to be a 
‘reasonable presumption or a strong probability’, but not quite as high as in a criminal case. 
This is sometimes expressed by saying that ‘the “balance of probabilities” is satisfied once a 
degree of belief in a proposition (such as, the defendant’s breach caused the injury) just exceeds 
50 per cent.’16 Essentially, in the judge’s opinion it must be more likely than not that the 
plaintiff’s version of events is correct. 
                                                 
13 Ibid at 262-263. 
14 DH Mellor Probability: A Philosophical Introduction (2005) 11-12. 
15 Ibid. 




 If one examines the elements of liability in Aquilian cases and defamation cases, one 
can see that there is a difference in the nature of the evidence the plaintiff has to tender to 
convince the court that his or her point of view is the most probable one. This difference might 
partly be the result of the different interests at stake (property/bodily integrity vs reputation), 
but it remains true that the requirements are different, and they are different to the extent that 
the hypothesis of ‘causation of harm’ is much more firmly founded in Aquilian cases than in 
defamation cases. In other words, there seems to be ample reason to think that the defendant 
probably has caused the plaintiff harm in successful Aquilian cases, and reason to doubt that 
the defendant probably has caused the plaintiff reputational harm in successful defamation 
cases. Given that court orders involve the exercise of state power, moreover, they need to be 
properly justified.17 I think that this difference in Aquilian cases and defamation cases results 
in defamation law being an unjustifiable exercise of state power, so long as one adopts the 
causation of harm interpretation. At the same time, there are reasons why an effort should be 
made to protect people’s reputations. 
In response to these concerns, one can either adjust the current practice to bring 
defamation law more in line with Aquilian cases (by changing the nature of the evidence 
required to prove one’s case) or attempt to justify the current practice of defamation in some 
other, more justifiable, way. I favour the latter approach, in which the current practice of 
defamation law is provided with an alternative justification, one which makes it a justifiable 
exercise of state power. The details of this argument will be provided in the following chapters. 
In the rest of this chapter, we will first examine the different types of evidence that plaintiffs 
need to tender to succeed in defamation and Aquilian cases, and why this makes the causation 
of harm hypothesis less defensible in the case of defamation than the lex Aquilia. 
IV THE ELEMENTS OF AQUILIAN LIABILITY 
Anton Fagan’s analysis of a number of South African Aquilian cases shows that the lex Aquilia 
generally requires proof of two types of harm: physical harm to persons or property, and 
patrimonial loss. The exception to this is cases of pure economic loss, which do not require 
harm to people’s bodies or property, but these cases still require proof of patrimonial loss. He 
states the following: 
                                                 
17 This idea is elaborated upon in Chapter 5. 
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For about a hundred years now, the central case of Aquilian liability for negligently 
caused loss in South African law has been one in which liability is justified by the 
following two rules: 
(1) If a person commits a wrong against another by breaching the duty, which every 
person owes to every other, not to cause physical harm to his person or property by a 
negligent positive act and, by committing such wrong, causes the victim of the wrong 
to suffer patrimonial loss, then he owes the victim of the wrong a duty to compensate 
him for that loss. 
(2) A positive act causing physical harm to another’s person or property is negligent if 
and only if a reasonable person in the position of the harm-causer would have foreseen 
that the act might cause such harm and for that reason would have refrained from 
performing it.18 
From this analysis one can see that two of the essential elements for Aquilian liability are the 
following: that the defendant has to ‘cause physical harm to [the plaintiff’s] person or property’, 
and the defendant must also cause ‘patrimonial loss’. 
These two requirements - a physical change in the world (harm to person or property) 
and patrimonial loss - provide a good foundation for thinking that the defendant probably has 
damaged a protected interest of the plaintiff. Cases of pure economic loss do not require that 
the plaintiff prove a physical change in the world, but they still require proof of patrimonial 
loss. This is still a tangible change in the world that has to be proven by the plaintiff before he 
or she has any hope of shifting the onus to the defendant to rebut one of the elements of liability. 
 The relationship between these two forms of harm (persons/property, and patrimonial 
loss) is controversial. According to Fagan, the interests protected by Aquilian liability are not 
patrimonial interests. If one looks at the first of the two rules above, liability does not simply 
turn on the causing of patrimonial loss. Liability also requires some other kind of harm, such 
as ‘physical harm to his person or property’. According to Fagan, the lex Aquilia is really trying 
to undo certain non-patrimonial harms, but that undoing the patrimonial consequences of these 
harms is often the best and the only way to attempt to undo the non-patrimonial harms: 
The wrongs which the rules justifying Aquilian liability in the central case are seeking 
to undo are non-patrimonial in nature. That is, they are wrongs committed by the breach 
of duties the content of which can be specified without any reference to actual or 
foreseeable patrimonial loss. However, they are also wrongs which often, even 
typically, have negative patrimonial consequences for their victims. Persons who are 
physically injured frequently suffer a loss of income. The destruction or damaging of 
property usually reduces its monetary value. When that happens, the best, and often the 
only, way to undo the non-patrimonial wrong (the bodily injury, the destruction of the 
                                                 
18 Anton Fagan ‘Aquilian liability for negligently caused pure economic loss - Its history and doctrinal 
accommodation’ (2014) 131 South African Law Journal 288 at 288. 
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property) is by undoing its negative patrimonial consequences (the loss of income, the 
reduction in monetary value). In sum, the purpose of the rules justifying Aquilian 
liability in the central case is not to undo certain patrimonial wrongs, but to undo certain 
non-patrimonial wrongs by undoing their patrimonial effects.19 
Whether one characterises the wrong as a wrong against a non-patrimonial interest or 
as a wrong against a patrimonial interest, no one denies that Aquilian liability requires (1) some 
kind of harm to persons or property, or, in exceptional cases, pure economic loss, as well as, 
(2) in all cases, patrimonial loss. 
One way to explain the requirement of patrimonial loss is to say, as Fagan does, that 
undoing the patrimonial consequences of the wrong is the best way to undo or correct the 
wrong. This seems to be the explanation favoured by the Constitutional Court as well. In Van 
der Merwe v Road Accident Fund,20 the Court stated the following: 
The notion of damages is best understood not by its nature but by its purpose. Damages 
are “a monetary equivalent” of loss “awarded to a person with the object of eliminating 
as fully as possible [her or] his past as well as future damage.”
 
The primary purpose of 
awarding damages is to place, to the fullest possible extent, the injured party in the same 
position she or he would have been in, but for the wrongful conduct. Damages also 
represent “the process through which an impaired interest may be restored through 
money.”
 
To realise this purpose our law recognises patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
damages. Both seek to redress the diminution in the quality and usefulness of a legally 
protected interest.21 
 
This argument is a convincing explanation of the utility and function of monetary 
damages in many cases, but it does fully explain why patrimonial loss is a requirement of 
Aquilian liability. It may be true that undoing the patrimonial consequences is the best way to 
undo the harm, but one does not need to make patrimonial loss a requirement of liability in 
order to award monetary damages. Monetary damages are also the standard remedial response 
in cases involving personality interests22 and yet there is no need to prove patrimonial loss in 
those cases in order to establish liability or to get damages. This is one reason why people 
might be tempted to characterise the interests protected by the lex Aquilia as patrimonial 
interests: by making patrimonial loss a necessary feature of liability, the lex Aquilia makes 
one’s patrimony a central concern in a way that is different to other delicts. 
                                                 
19 Ibid at 313. 
20 Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund and another (Women’s Legal.Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae) 2006 (4) 
SA 230 (CC). 
21 Ibid para 37. Square brackets in original. 
22 Neethling & Potgieter op cit note 1 at 234 (‘In delict, damages (compensation) are the primary remedy’). 
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 It is not my objective, however, to answer the question of why the lex Aquilia focuses 
on patrimonial loss in this way, but rather to explain one of the consequences of this 
requirement, which is that it helps make findings of harm or damage in these cases more certain 
or probable. By requiring proof of physical changes to persons or property, as well as requiring 
proof of patrimonial loss, the court seems to be in a good position to find that there has probably 
been harm done to a protected interest (such as property or one’s bodily integrity). In other 
words, these are quite firm grounds upon which to say that the plaintiff’s hypothesis that the 
defendant caused damage to a protected interest is more probable than not. If one is concerned 
about ‘damage’ in the sense of a ‘detrimental impact’ upon an ‘interest deemed worthy of 
protection by the law,’23 then a physical change in the protected interest, along with proof of 
patrimonial loss, is one way of proving that it is more probable than not that there has been a 
reduction in the utility or quality of that interest. Besides a physical change to the interest, 
patrimonial loss helps to indicate that there has been a reduction in utility or quality. 
Patrimonial loss essentially quantifies the damage that was done. There is little room to argue 
that something has not been reduced in utility or quality if there is a proven repair cost, for 
example. Proof of patrimonial loss is probably a robust rule of thumb indicating that the 
physical changes really do indicate a change in the utility or quality of the interest, as well as 
being a means of quantifying the damage done. 
 It may be that the recovery of all of one’s consequential patrimonial losses also speaks 
to an attempt to protect patrimony in some way, but the requirement of patrimonial loss 
nevertheless plays a role in establishing proof of damage to a protected interest. Along with a 
physical change to a protected interest - such as one’s person or property - proof of patrimonial 
loss helps to establish that the defendant has reduced the value or utility of the protected 
interest. 
V THE ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION 
The requirement of proof of patrimonial loss is not a feature of liability for defamation, 
however. Moreover, while there must be harm to a protected interest, ‘physical harm’ is not 
one of the requirements of defamation. It is generally accepted that ‘the elements of the delict 
of defamation are: (a) the wrongful and (b) intentional (c) publication of (d) a defamatory 
statement (e) concerning the plaintiff.’24 There is no requirement of patrimonial loss. One might 
                                                 
23 Neethling & Potgieter op cit note 1 at 212. 




claim that the requirement of proving that a statement is defamatory is tantamount to proving 
a physical change in the world (a change in people’s thoughts, which might amount to a 
physical change in the world), but the evidence that one needs to bring to prove such a change 
is far more tenuous than when one proves that one’s property or one’s body has been changed. 
One cannot present something as clear as a damaged piece of property or an injured body, for 
example.  It should therefore be a lot harder for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant has in 
fact wronged him or her, at least if the wrong is thought of as the wrong of having caused 
reputational harm. Let us look more closely at what is needed to prove the alleged change in 
people’s thoughts about the plaintiff. 
 In order to establish that a statement is defamatory the courts first establish the meaning 
of the statement and then determine if that meaning is defamatory. None of this involves a 
serious attempt to prove reputational harm, however. The Constitutional Court explains this 
process as follows: 
Where the plaintiff is content to rely on the proposition that the published statement is 
defamatory per se, a two-stage enquiry is brought to bear. The first is to establish the 
ordinary meaning of the statement. The second is whether that meaning is defamatory. 
In establishing the ordinary meaning, the court is not concerned with the meaning which 
the maker of the statement intended to convey. Nor is it concerned with the meaning 
given to it by the persons to whom it was published, whether or not they believed it to 
be true, or whether or not they then thought less of the plaintiff. The test to be applied 
is an objective one. In accordance with this objective test the criterion is what meaning 
the reasonable reader of ordinary intelligence would attribute to the statement. In 
applying this test it is accepted that the reasonable reader would understand the 
statement in its context and that he or she would have had regard not only to what is 
expressly stated but also to what is implied. 
The reasonable reader or observer is thus a legal construct of an individual utilised by 
the court to establish meaning. Because the test is objective, a court may not hear 
evidence of the sense in which the statement was understood by the actual reader or 
observer of the statement or publication in question. 
At the second stage, that is whether the meaning thus established is defamatory, our 
courts accept that a statement is defamatory of a plaintiff if it is likely to injure the good 
esteem in which he or she is held by the reasonable or average person to whom it had 
been published. [...] Because we are employing the legal construct of the “reasonable”, 
“average” or “ordinary” person, the question is whether the statement was “calculated 
to expose a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule”. Evidence of whether the actual 
observer actually thought less of the plaintiff is therefore not admissible. The test is 
whether it is more likely, that it is more probable than not, that the statement will harm 
the plaintiff.25 
                                                 
25 Le Roux v Dey (CC) supra note 2 at paras 89-91. Square brackets, except for the ellipsis, in the original. 
45 
 
As in the case of Aquilian liability, there is a prima facie attempt to establish that the protected 
interest has probably been damaged, but the grounds upon which this determination is based 
seem more tenuous here. In fact, in the above quote, it is not clear what the court really means 
when it says that, on the one hand, no attempt is made to determine what effects the statement 
actually had, but that, on the other hand, the court is attempting to test whether it is ‘more 
probable than not that the statement will harm the plaintiff’. If no attempt is being made to 
determine the consequences of the conduct, then in what sense is an attempt being made to 
determine likely harm? One has more reason to think that the plaintiff has been harmed in 
Aquilian cases, given that Aquilian cases involve readily observable physical changes to 
persons or property, and/or readily observable changes to one’s patrimony. In the case of 
defamation, one just needs to establish that the words have a defamatory meaning. But, in and 
of itself, that does not go very far in establishing whether anyone believed those words or will 
believe them in the future, or whether those words have adversely affected the plaintiff. It is 
true that the courts include ‘likely harm’ in the definition of defamatoriness, but they do not 
test this likelihood in any tangible way. This is not a plea for absolute certainty in the standard 
of proof as opposed to probability, but interpreting text seems a significantly less convincing 
basis to found the proposition of probable injury to a protected interest than observing actual 
changes in the protected interest and/or observing some further proof of harm, such as 
consequential patrimonial loss. 
 Others have expressed disquiet, in other legal systems, about the tenuous basis upon 
which findings of reputational harm are based. English tort scholars, for example, have raised 
objections against the English law of libel which would also apply to the South African law of 
defamation. When these arguments were made, the English law of libel required little in the 
way of evidence proving that the publication has probably harmed the plaintiff’s reputation.26 
The rule was that upon proof of publication of a written defamatory statement, damage was 
presumed, and so one did not need to call witnesses or provide evidence (other than the bare 
publication) that one had been harmed. This seemed to some tort scholars to be an unusual and 
unjustifiable feature of the tort of libel, as compared with other torts that did require proof of 
harm (typically proof of patrimonial loss), especially when one noted that similar torts like 
                                                 
26 Arguably, this remains the case, even after the promulgation of the Defamation Act 2013. Section 1(1) of that 
Act does state that ‘[a] statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious 
harm to the reputation of the claimant,’ but this requirement of ‘seriousness’ does not seem to change the nature 
of the evidence that the plaintiff needs to tender. 
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slander and malicious falsehood did (typically) require proof of patrimonial loss.27 After noting 
that some instances of slander, and malicious falsehood, do require proof of patrimonial loss, 
Eric Barendt states the following: 
A plaintiff in a libel action should, in my view, be required to prove that his reputation 
has been injured, just as he is in those cases of slander which are not actionable per se. 
In other words, a plaintiff should be asked to show how he has suffered some loss of 
standing or esteem and that the publication was probably responsible for the loss. [...] 
There are a number of ways in which the plaintiff could show harm to reputation. In 
the first place, he might call evidence indicating that existing social and professional 
relationships have been damaged as a result of the defamatory publication. Secondly, 
he might be able to show that he has lost opportunities which prior to publication he 
had reasonably anticipated.28 
Thomas Gibbons also dislikes the presumption of damage in certain cases of defamation, and 
imposing liability without substantial evidence of harm: 
Once it is ascertained that the offending statement has a defamatory tendency, the next 
step is to determine what harm it may have caused. Again, the actual effect of the 
statement is not taken into account. Instead, it is presumed that damage has occurred, 
because it is presumed that the plaintiff enjoys a good reputation; the speculative 
exercise is transformed into a empirical assumption. It is an unfounded assumption, 
however, insofar as it stipulates what the causal impact of the statement will be. 
Contemporary media research rejects the idea that the effects of communication can be 
easily predicted, especially in isolation from the context in which they are received. 
[…] Various suggestions have been offered to explain the law’s position on this issue. 
One view is that the law recognizes the human mind’s propensity to believe evil on the 
slightest evidence, but there is no support for this reason in the law itself, nor is it clear 
that the mind does work in that way. Another suggestion is that it would be 
impracticable to measure the actual effects of a statement; this may be true, and may be 
the most likely explanation, but it points equally against presuming that damage will be 
caused by the statement. Yet another suggestion is that, even if the plaintiff’s reputation 
is not diminished, the element of harm which justifies the tort, is the obvious 
proposition that needs no proof, that plaintiff suffers “annoyance or worse” when he 
learns of the statement, but this indicates possible confusion about the nature of 
reputation itself.29 
 
 The difficulty in tracking the causal impact of statements has also been recognised by 
English judges, but that did not deter them from awarding damages. In Ley v Hamilton,30 Lord 
Atkin stated the following: 
 
                                                 
27 Slander was a slightly complicated case as some instances of slander, like libel, were actionable without proof 
of patrimonial loss. Section 14 of the Defamation Act of 2013 has altered this position somewhat as some instances 
of slander that did not require proof of patrimonial loss do now require proof of patrimonial loss for liability. 
28 Eric Barendt ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ (1999) Current Legal Problems 110 at 123-124. 
29 Thomas Gibbons ‘Defamation reconsidered’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 587 at 599. 
30 (1935) 153 LT 384. 
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[Damages] are not arrived at as the Lord Justice seems to assume by determining the 
“real” damage and adding to that a sum by way of vindictive or punitive damages. It is 
precisely because the “real” damage cannot be ascertained and established that the 
damages are at large. It is impossible to track the scandal, to know what quarters the 
poison may reach: it is impossible to weigh at all closely the compensation which will 
recompense a man or a woman for the insult offered or the pain of a false accusation. 
No doubt in newspaper libels juries take into account the vast circulations which are 
justly claimed in present times. The “punitive” element is not something which is or 
can be added to some known factor which is non-punitive.31 
 
Relatedly, English courts have noted that it is also hard to track the future impact of 
defamatory assertions (over and above the difficulty in tracking the causal impact the statement 
might already have had). In Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome,32 Lord Hailsham noted the need to 
point to a convincing award if the matter were to come to the public’s attention again in the 
future: 
 
In actions of defamation and in any other actions where damages for loss of reputation 
are involved, the principle of restitutio in integrum has necessarily an even more highly 
subjective element. Such actions involve a money award which may put the plaintiff in 
a purely financial sense in a much stronger position than he was before the wrong. Not 
merely can he recover the estimated sum of his past and future losses, but, in case the 
libel, driven underground, emerges from its lurking place at some future date, he must 
be able to point to a sum awarded by a jury sufficient to convince a bystander of the 
baselessness of the charge.33 
 
I believe that these English judicial statements noting the difficulty of tracking the causal 
impact of defamatory assertions, as well as the disquiet voiced by Barendt and Gibbons are 
correct, and applicable to the South African law. Especially when compared with Aquilian 
liability, the basis for saying that the defendant has probably harmed the plaintiff’s reputation 
is more tenuous, and there is less reason to think that damage probably has been done. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, this is problematic if we would like exercises of state power, such as 
court orders, to be justified by clear and persuasive arguments. 
 At this point, there are two options available. Either one can adjust the current 
practices so that better evidence is required in order to found the claim of causation of harm. 
Or one can provide an alternative interpretation and justification of the existing rules, such that 
the practice amounts to a more justifiable instance of state power. 
                                                 
31 Ibid at 386. 
32 [1972] AC 1027. 




The orthodox interpretation of the law of defamation is that it involves the causing of 
reputational harm. The problem with the orthodox interpretation is that even though causing 
harm to someone’s reputation would justifiably be a delict, the current practice does not require 
enough in the way of evidence to support the plaintiff’s position that such an injury has 
materialised. The lack of evidence that an injury of that sort has been committed calls the 
practice into question, for its justifiability as an exercise of state power is questionable. This 
can be contrasted with Aquilian delicts that do require proof of physical harm to a protected 
interest and/or proof of patrimonial loss, both of which go some way to establishing that the 
quality or utility of a protected interest has in fact been diminished on a balance of probabilities. 
 One could attempt to bring defamation law in line with the apparently more 
justifiable Aquilian practices by requiring the plaintiff to tender more substantial proof of harm. 
This is the approach favoured by some English tort scholars in the context of English law. An 
alternative approach to the problem would be to reconceptualise the injury such that the current 
practice, and the evidence that currently gets tendered, does amount to a justifiable exercise of 
state power. In the case of defamation, I think that this kind of alternative justification of the 
current practice can be provided, by conceptualising the injury as a probable increase in the 
risk of reputational harm, rather than the probable causing of reputational harm. The challenge 
with this approach is that imposing liability for merely increasing the risk of harm is highly 
contentious. One might wonder, in this case, whether imposing liability for risk is, in fact, a 
justifiable instance of state power, even if the evidence that gets tendered is sufficient to prove 
that the defendant probably did cause an increase in the risk of harm. 
 In the chapters that follow, I will show why the risk-as-injury interpretation of the 
law of defamation is justifiable, and more justifiable than the causation-of-reputational harm 
interpretation. 
 Chapter 4 will examine the concept of risk in more detail and discuss instances from 
the law of negligence where the idea of risk as damage has ostensibly been advanced. That 
chapter will also explain why risk-as-injury is a bad idea in the law of negligence. Chapter 5 
will then explain why the objections against risk as damage in the law of negligence are 
overcome in the context of the South African law of defamation. The subsequent chapters will 
then demonstrate that the current rules of defamation law are in fact consistent with the risk-
as-injury interpretation. Specifically, they will explain how the defences for defamation and 
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damages for defamation are currently understood by the courts, and that one does not need to 
change those understandings much to reconcile them with the risk-as-injury interpretation of 
the wrong of defamation.
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CHAPTER 4: RISK-AS-INJURY IN THE LEX AQUILIA AND 
THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the orthodox interpretation of defamation is that it involves 
liability for probably having caused harm to the plaintiff’s reputation. We also saw that there 
was reason to doubt whether the evidence that the plaintiff needs to produce to succeed in his 
or her claim provides sufficient reason to say that it is more probable than not that the defendant 
has harmed the plaintiff’s reputation. 
If the state is to exercise its power in imposing liability for defamation, then it needs to 
be able to present a convincing argument that the exercise of force is justifiable. When one 
considers the basis upon which the courts find that liability has been established, then there is 
reason to doubt whether the practice really is justifiable. If the wrong really is about having 
caused harm to the plaintiff’s reputation, then more should be required in order to establish 
liability. As noted in the previous chapter, there are two possible responses to this concern. One 
could either change the rules in order to require more evidence, as some English tort scholars 
advocate in relation to the English law of libel, or one can justify the existing rules in some 
other way. This thesis (in the argument developed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5) takes the latter route, 
and presents an alternative justification. The alternative justification is that the defendant is 
liable, not for probably having caused harm to the plaintiff’s reputation, but for probably having 
increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff’s reputation. 
The concept of imposing liability for mere risk raises its own concerns, however. In 
order to address those concerns, this chapter begins by elaborating on the concept of risk, and 
how that concept has been employed in the lex Aquilia and the English law of negligence. 
These areas of law need to be considered both because they will demonstrate some of the 
different ways in which risk can feature in the law of delict (some of which are more 
controversial than others), and because the idea of risk-as-injury has been explored by some 
English judges as a viable idea. While this shows that risk-as-injury is not a completely 
untenable idea, the primary benefit of this analysis is to show that the arguments that speak 
against adopting risk-as-injury in the law of negligence or the lex Aquilia do not apply as 
forcefully to the law of defamation. There are crucial differences between Aquilian liability 
and defamation that make risk-as-injury more tenable in the case of defamation as compared 
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to the lex Aquilia or the English law of negligence. Therefore, in order to tease out these 
differences and ultimately to explain why liability for risk-creation is justified in the case of 
defamation, this chapter will elaborate on the concept of risk and why imposing liability for 
risk is not justifiable in the case of Aquilian liability. Having noted the objections against 
imposing liability for risk in Aquilian cases, the next chapter will then demonstrate why those 
objections are overcome in the case of defamation. 
II THE MEANING OF RISK 
Risk is a central concept in the alternative justification for defamation that is being proposed 
in this thesis, so it is necessary to unpack the meaning of risk. 
 There is academic disagreement about when the word ‘risk’ should be used. Some think 
it should be reserved for scenarios when one can mathematically assess the probability of the 
outcome occurring, such as an actuarial or statistical assessment of the likelihood of harm 
occurring.1 But the word is also sometimes used to denote ‘threats’, rather than only referring 
to mathematically determined probabilities.2 In fact, risk can mean various things, depending 
on the relevant discipline or area of enquiry, but, at the same time, there does appear to be 
something that underlies most conceptions of risk, namely, that ‘we are faced with a situation 
of “risk” when circumstances may (or importantly, may not) turn out in a way that we do not 
wish for.’3 This general definition of risk identifies that assessments of risk are concerned with 
how things might turn out in the future, and the possibility that things might not turn out well. 
This general definition of risk aligns with attempts to define risk in legal contexts. In a 
survey of the role of risk in the law of civil wrongs of various legal systems, including South 
Africa, Matthew Dyson explains that ‘[o]ur systems seem to employ a working definition of 
risk: the probability of a negative outcome in the future’.4  Similarly, Stephen Perry states that 
‘[i]n ordinary language conduct is typically said to be risky when it gives rise to a chance of a 
bad outcome of some kind. The concept thus involves two main elements: first, a notion of 
chance or probability, and second, a notion of harm.’5 
                                                 
1 See Jenny Steele Risks and Legal Theory (2004) 6 for a discussion of this view. 
2 Ibid at 6-7. 
3 Ibid at 6. 
4 Matthew Dyson ‘What Does Risk-Reasoning Do in Tort Law?’ (July 29, 2017) Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 52/2017 at section 1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3010696 (Advance access to 
Matthew Dyson (ed) Regulating Risk Through Private Law (2017)). 
5 Stephen R Perry ‘Risk, harm and responsibility’ in David G Owen (ed) The Philosophical Foundations of Tort 
Law (1997) 322. See also Gemma Turton ‘Risk and the damage requirement in negligence liability’ (2015) 35(1) 
Legal Studies 75 for discussion of these views of risk in the legal context. 
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Risk involves an assessment of probability, then, but it is not synonymous with 
probability. Jenny Steele explains that risk is generally concerned with the probability that 
some harmful event will occur in the future, yet assessments of probability as such can also 
apply to the past, and are not necessarily concerned with harmful events. For example, the 
statement ‘the probability that X caused Y’ is concerned with some past event and Y need not 
be something harmful or unwelcome. So, risk involves probability, but is not synonymous with 
probability. For our purposes, we can say that risk is concerned with the chance of a harmful 
event occurring in the future, but this is not necessarily being determined with statistical or 
actuarial accuracy in legal contexts. 
In the context of the law of delict or tort, Matthew Dyson explains that risk can feature 
in different ways in a law of civil wrongs. When considering whether risk should be construed 
as a harm in and of itself, we are interested in what he calls risk’s ‘normative function’, i.e., 
when ‘it justifies and limits liability’.6 However, as he explains, the concept of risk can justify 
and limit liability in various ways: 
It most commonly does so as a test for fault, by asking what risks were unreasonable to 
take. It is also often a claim that taking/generating/imposing particular risks which then 
eventuate can generate liability without regard to fault. Risk-reasoning can also have 
effects on tort law, typically by reconceptualising what has been done to the victim 
(causation and damage/harm/loss), such as by treating loss of a chance or the imposition 
of a risk as a harm in themselves.7 
 
The alternative explanation of defamation that I will present is using risk in the last-mentioned 
way: treating the imposition of a risk as a harm in itself. This is probably the most controversial 
type of risk-reasoning, however. Liability for exposing someone to a risk of reputational harm 
probably falls into the category that Dyson calls ‘liability for endangerment’,8 but this is a kind 
of liability that does not find much recognition in the surveyed legal systems: 
Our systems do not recognise that D endangering C is itself an actionable tort. Criminal 
law across our systems very commonly does prohibit endangerment, but tort liability 
requires some kind of actionable harm not just endangerment.9 
 
There have, in fact, been instances of liability for negligence where English courts have, 
at first glance, at least, imposed liability for the creation of risk, but even in these cases there 
needed to be proof of a physical change in the world. Moreover, upon closer inspection, the 
                                                 
6 Dyson op cit note 4 at Introductory section. 
7 Ibid. 




best interpretation of these cases is that the creation of risk is not the actionable injury. It is 
good that this is so, for there are reasons why treating risk as the actionable injury is not a good 
idea in negligence or Aquilian cases. 
In the rest of the chapter I will unpack the various ways in which risk can feature in the 
law delict, such as its uncontroversial application in the test for fault, as well as its more 
controversial application as the actionable harm. This discussion will focus on the law of 
negligence, which will not only help to demonstrate how risk can feature in the law of delict, 
but also why the concept of risk-as-injury is defensible in the case of defamation, even if it is 
not defensible in the case of Aquilian liability or Negligence. 
III AN UNCONTROVERSIAL APPLICATION OF RISK IN THE LEX AQUILIA: 
FAULT 
A relatively uncontroversial application of risk in the law of delict is its application in the test 
for negligence. As Dyson states, the ‘normative function’ of risk is to ‘justify and limit 
liability’, and one of the most common ways in which it does that is ‘as a test for fault, by 
asking what risks were unreasonable to take’.10 One can see this use of risk in the negligence 
fault standard in South African Aquilian cases. 
The test for negligence requires one to ask whether a reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant would have foreseen a risk of harm and would have taken steps to guard 
against that risk materialising. The classical statement of this principle is in Kruger v Coetzee,11 
where the Appellate Division stated the following: 
For the purposes of liability culpa arises if - 
    (a)   a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the defendant - 
(i)   would foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in 
his person or property and causing him patrimonial loss; and 
      (ii)   would take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; and 
    (b)   the defendant failed to take such steps.12 
 
 In this test, the court asks whether a reasonable person would have foreseen a 
reasonable possibility of harm and would have guarded against it. This involves an assessment 
of risk, as well as an assessment of the pros and cons of guarding against that risk materialising. 
                                                 
10 Dyson op cit note 4 at Introductory section. 
11 1966 (2) SA 428 (A). For a more specific, modern version of this test, see Mukheiber v Raath 1999 (3) SA 1065 
(SCA) at 1077E-F. For more detailed discussion, see Anton Fagan ‘Negligence’, in R Zimmermann, K Reid and 
D Visser (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South 
Africa (2005). 
12 Kruger v Coetzee supra note 11 at 430E-F. 
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So, the test for negligence involves a risk assessment, but it also involves more than that, such 
as a weighing up of the costs of guarding against that risk. This is just a determination of 
whether the defendant acted negligently, however. Usually, more than negligent conduct is 
required in order for the defendant to be liable. In other words, simply having acted in a risky 
or negligent manner is not sufficient for liability. As we saw in the previous chapter, typically, 
there must also have been physical damage to persons or property, and patrimonial loss.13 As 
the Supreme Court of Appeal put it in Jowell v Bramwell-Jones and others,14 ‘[t]he element of 
damage or loss is fundamental to the Aquilian action and the right of action is incomplete until 
damage is caused to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.’15 
Lord Atkin’s statement in Donoghue v Stevenson16 on the English law of negligence 
indicates that something similar is true for the English law of Negligence: ‘[t]he law takes no 
cognizance of carelessness in the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness only where there 
is a duty to take care and where failure in that duty has caused damage.’17 
In the typical case of Aquilian liability, then, it appears as though risk features in the 
fault enquiry as one aspect of the enquiry into the defendant’s liability, but increasing the risk 
of harm is not sufficient for liability. One also needs to have caused physical damage and to 
have caused patrimonial loss. 
IV UNUSUAL NEGLIGENCE CASES WHERE RISK COULD, 
CONTROVERSIALLY, BE CONSTRUED AS DAMAGE 
Risk features uncontroversially as one aspect of the test for negligence, but there are some 
unusual types of tort cases where one might be tempted to view the increase in risk as the 
damage or harm for which one is being compensated. This idea of risk-as-injury is the position 
being advocated for here in the context of defamation, but I do not think it is a good idea to 
view an increase in the risk of harm as a wrong in the context of the lex Aquilia. In order to see 
why risk-as-injury is justifiable in the law of defamation but not in the lex Aquilia or what one 
might call the Law of Negligence generally, one needs to survey these unusual types of 
negligence. This survey will bring to light crucial differences between the tort of Negligence 
(and the similarly structured lex Aquilia) and the South African law of defamation. These 
                                                 
13 Anton Fagan ‘Aquilian liability for negligently caused pure economic loss - Its history and doctrinal 
accommodation’ (2014) 131 South African Law Journal 288 at 288. 
14 2000 (3) SA 274 (SCA). 
15 Ibid para 22. 
16 [1932] AC 562. 
17 Ibid at 618 (Lord Macmillan). 
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differences mean that the objections against risk-as-injury in the Law of Negligence do not 
apply as forcefully to defamation. 
There have been controversial cases in England that could be interpreted as treating an 
increase in risk as the damage for which the plaintiff is being compensated. These are cases 
where factual causation cannot be established using the traditional ‘but-for test’ due to gaps in 
scientific knowledge, but where the courts still think it would be reasonable to impose liability. 
This lack of scientific knowledge impeding the establishment of factual causation has come to 
be known as the problem of the ‘evidentiary gap’.18 It is necessary to explore this problem here 
in order to contextualise the discussion in these cases around whether an increase in risk could 
be construed as an actionable harm. 
In Barker v Corus UK plc,19 the majority of the House of Lords, according to one 
interpretation, approached the problem of the evidentiary gap by suggesting that the injury for 
which one is being compensated is the injury of having been exposed to a risk of harm. This 
interpretation was later rejected by the UK Supreme Court in BAI (Run Off) v Durham, 
however.20 Nevertheless, the risk-interpretation was ostensibly embraced by some members of 
the House of Lords in Barker. 
In South Africa, Lee v Minister of Correctional Services21 has the potential to be 
interpreted in a similar way to these English cases, as it too involved a substitution of the but-
for-test for causation in favour of culpability based on increasing the risk of a harm that then 
eventuated.22 It is possible, therefore, that Lee could be subjected to a risk-as-injury 
interpretation in the future, similar to what happened in Barker v Corus UK plc. 
It is a useful exercise to review the risk-as-injury interpretation in the English 
negligence cases because they provide insight into why risk-as-injury is a bad idea in the law 
of negligence (or the lex Aquilia) and why it is nonetheless justified in the South African law 
                                                 
18 Gemma Turton Evidential Uncertainty in Causation in Negligence (2016) 168. 
19 Barker v Corus UK Ltd [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572. 
20 BAI (Run Off) Ltd v Durham [2012] UKSC 14, [2012] 1 WLR 867. 
21 2013 (2) SA 144 (CC). 
22 Alistair Price ‘Factual Causation after Lee’ (2014) 131 South African Law Journal 491 at 492 states the 
following: ‘the majority appeared to accept (see paras 58 and 62) that the requisite factual causal link may 
exceptionally be established simply if a defendant’s negligent conduct increased the risk of the plaintiffs harm, 
so that a smaller risk of that harm would have existed had the defendant acted reasonably’. The court in Lee supra 
note 21 states the following in para 58, for example: ‘It would be enough, I think, to satisfy probable factual 
causation where the evidence establishes that the plaintiff found himself in the kind of situation where the risk of 
contagion would have been reduced by proper systemic measures’. For further discussion, see Anton Fagan 




of defamation. Due to the apparent embrace of risk-as-injury in Barker and the rejection of that 
position in BAI (Run Off) v Durham, the English cases provide more detailed arguments and 
reasoning on the idea of risk-as-injury than the South African case of Lee. There has also been 
more extensive academic scrutiny of the English cases. Therefore, the discussion of risk-as-
injury in the law of negligence below will focus on the English cases, but the principles derived 
from this discussion about why risk-as-injury in the law of negligence is not a good idea are 
just as applicable to the South African lex Aquilia. 
(a) An evidentiary gap versus unsatisfactory theories of causation 
In ordinary cases of negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s negligent 
conduct is a factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The usual test for this is the but-for test for 
factual causation, which requires one to ask the following: But for the defendant’s negligent 
conduct, would the injury still have occurred? If the injury still would have occurred, then the 
negligent conduct was not a factual cause of the injury. Corbett JA puts it the following way in 
the South African case of Siman and Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd:23   
The enquiry as to factual causation generally results in the application of the so-called 
“but-for” test, which is designed to determine whether a postulated cause can be 
identified as a causa sine qua non of the loss in question. This test is applied by asking 
whether but for the wrongful act or omission of the defendant the event giving rise to 
the loss sustained by the plaintiff would have occurred. [...] In order to apply this test 
one must make a hypothetical enquiry as to what probably would have happened but 
for the unlawful act or omission of the defendant. In some instances this enquiry may 
be satisfactorily conducted merely by mentally eliminating the unlawful conduct of the 
defendant and asking whether, the remaining circumstances being the same, the event 
causing harm to plaintiff would have occurred or not. If it would, then the unlawful 
conduct of the defendant was not a cause in fact of this event; but if it would not have 
so occurred, then it may be taken that the defendant's unlawful act was such a cause. 
[...] In many instances, however, the enquiry requires the substitution of a hypothetical 
course of lawful conduct for the unlawful conduct of the defendant and the posing of 
the question as to whether in such case the event causing harm to the plaintiff would 
have occurred or not; a positive answer to this question establishing that the defendant's 
unlawful conduct was not a factual cause and a negative one that it was a factual cause. 
This is so in particular where the unlawful conduct of the defendant takes the form of a 
negligent omission.24 
In the Anglo-American context, Richard Wright sums up the but-for test in the following way: 
 
                                                 
23 1984 (2) SA 888 (AD). 
24 Ibid at 914-915 
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The most widely used test of actual causation in tort adjudication is the but-for test, 
which states that an act (omission, condition, etc.) was a cause of an injury if and only 
if, but for the act, the injury would not have occurred. That is, the act must have been a 
necessary condition for the occurrence of the injury. The test reflects a deeply rooted 
belief that a condition cannot be a cause of some event unless it is, in some sense, 
necessary for the occurrence of the event. This view is shared by lawyers, philosophers, 
scientists, and the general public.25  
The but-for-test can run into difficulty even in cases that do not involve an evidentiary 
gap, such as cases of over-determined causation, and the usual response to this is to advocate 
for a more sophisticated account of causation. In cases of over-determined causation, the but-
for test returns the result that the conduct in question is not a cause of the injury even though it 
is clear that the conduct played a role in causing the injury. These are cases of supervening (or 
pre-emptive) causation and concurrent (or duplicative) causation.26 An example of supervening 
causation is when A shoots and kills P, just as P is about to drink a cup of tea that has been 
poisoned by B. An example of concurrent causation is when A and B both start fires which 
converge on P’s house and destroy it. In both of these cases, the but-for test fails to say that 
either A or B’s conduct was a cause of the injury, because it is not true that but for A’s conduct, 
the injury would not have occurred, nor is it true that but for B’s conduct, the injury would not 
have occurred.27 The result is that liability cannot be established even though it is clear that A’s 
conduct caused the death of P in the first case and that either A or B’s conduct, or both, caused 
the destruction of the house. An attempt to deal with these difficulties using a more 
sophisticated account of causation is the Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set (NESS) test, 
developed by Richard Wright,28 building on the work of Tony Honore and HLA Hart.29 Instead 
of asking one to imagine what would have happened if the defendant’s negligent conduct had 
been replaced with non-negligent conduct, the NESS test asks whether the conduct ‘was a 
necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence 
of the consequence’.30 This test captures the idea that ‘causes’ are conditions that are sufficient 
for the occurrence of some outcome. The test also attempts to focus only on the conditions that 
are causally relevant. Hence, the focus is on conditions that are necessary for the set to be 
sufficient.31 
                                                 
25 Richard W Wright ‘Causation in Tort Law’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1735 at 1775. 
26 HLA Hart and Tony Honore Causation in the Law 2ed (1985); Wright op cit note  25. 
27 Wright op cit note 25 at 1775-1776. 
28 Wright op cit note 25. 
29 Honore and Hart op cit note 26; Wright op cit note 25 at 1788. 
30 Wright op cit note 25 at 1774. 
31 Ibid at1789-1790 
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 The NESS test appears to be able to deal with the problem of causal over-determination 
but we do not need to get into the details of how it does that here, as the crucial point for us is 
that the NESS test, and any other account of causation, is incapable of dealing with cases 
involving an evidentiary gap. Gemma Turton explains that the problem posed by the 
evidentiary gap is not one that can be overcome simply by having a more accurate and 
sophisticated understanding of causation. No test for causation can cope with the evidentiary 
gap because the evidentiary gap arises precisely in those circumstances where there is a deficit 
in knowledge as to how the outcome was caused. The problem is not with our theory of 
causation but with a lack of factual knowledge as to the causes of certain things.32 Nevertheless, 
the English courts have gone on to impose liability in cases involving an evidentiary gap, and 
the solution that they adopted is capable of different interpretations. The two major competing 
interpretations of the solution that was devised to overcome the evidentiary gap are, first, that 
it involves a weakening or relaxing of the requirement of causation, or, second, that the solution 
reconceptualises the injury as the causing of an increase in risk, rather than the causing of 
physical injury. We will see that there are reasons to prefer the first interpretation in this 
instance, but that this does not prevent us from seeing risk as the gist of the injury in defamation. 
(b) Cases involving an evidentiary gap: relaxation of causation versus risk-as-injury 
Cases that have given rise to the problem of an evidentiary gap are those in which (a) physical 
harm to the claimant has occurred in the form of a disease (e.g., contracting mesothelioma), (b) 
the claimant was exposed to a substance that is known to play a causal role in the development 
of the disease (e.g., asbestos) but (c) due to scientific uncertainty as to how the disease develops 
and (d) the fact of multiple exposures to the harmful substance, it is (e) impossible to say that 
any particular exposure was the cause of the injury.33 
The solution developed by the House of Lords in response to this uncertain chain of 
causation means that claimants can succeed in claiming damages despite the fact that causation 
cannot be established in the usual way using the but-for test. The solution is ‘to hold the 
defendant liable on the basis that his negligence had materially increased the risk of the harm 
suffered’.34 
                                                 
32 Turton op cit note 18 ch 5. 
33 Turton op cit note 18 at 166-167. 
34 Ibid at 169. 
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This rule was first adopted, arguably, in McGhee v National Coal Board35 and then 
applied again in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.36 It has also been implemented, 
or re-interpreted, in Barker v Corus (UK) Plc,37 Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd38 and BAI (Run 
Off) Ltd v Durham.39 The nature of the rule has been controversial and judicial opinions in 
these cases often involve close textual analysis of previous judgments, which makes any 
attempt to summarise these cases susceptible to error.40 However, while there has been serious 
disagreement, some features of the rule are clear. First, none of the opinions in these judgments 
thought that the McGhee/Fairchild principle was itself unjust, i.e., none of the opinions thought 
that causation in the usual sense was absolutely essential to the law of tort. Second, none of the 
opinions suggested that proof of physical harm was not a necessary requirement for liability. 
Even when risk began to be construed as the injury for which one is being compensated, rather 
than simply as a means of relaxing the causation requirement, it was still held that proof of 
physical harm was essential to liability. As we will see, risk-as-injury was actually devised as 
a way of overcoming the problem of how to apportion damages fairly, rather than as a means 
of overcoming the need to prove physical injury. The risk-as-injury interpretation, moreover, 
which ostensibly formed the ratio of the majority decision in Barker v Corus, has since been 
rejected by the majority in BAI (Run Off) Ltd v Durham. While this seems like the correct 
decision for the law of negligence, we will also see that these developments do not undermine 
the risk-as-injury interpretation of the law of defamation. 
(c) An analysis of the findings in these cases 
We have already noted that the factual scenario that brings the McGhee/Fairchild principle into 
play is that an employee was exposed to a substance while at work that is known to play a 
causal role in the development of a disease, and the employee then went on to develop that 
disease. There were multiple exposures to the substance, however, either at the hands of other 
employers or during a period of self-employment, such that it cannot be said that the exposure 
that actually played a role in the development of the disease happened while working for a 
                                                 
35 [1972] 3 All ER 1008 (HL), 1 WLR 1. There is some debate about whether the McGhee/Fairchild rule is 
different from an earlier rule in Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 (HL) concerning a ‘material 
contribution to harm’, but that is not relevant for our purposes here. See Turton op cit note 18 at 65-77, 170-172 
for an explanation of why the Fairchild principle is different from the Wardlaw principle, due to the different 
problems regarding causation in these two cases. 
36 [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32. 
37 Supra note 19. 
38 [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 WLR 523. 
39 Supra note 20. 
40 For critical analysis of these cases, see Turton op cit note 18 ch 5. 
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particular employer. One of the reasons why the causal development of the disease cannot be 
traced more accurately is because we lack the scientific knowledge to make that determination. 
As Lord Rodger put it in Fairchild, 
[b]ecause of the current state of medical knowledge about the aetiology of 
mesothelioma, it was impossible for the claimants to prove on the balance of 
probabilities that the men’s illness had been triggered by a fibre or fibres inhaled while 
working with any particular employer and, more especially, while working with the 
particular defendants whom they had sued. For that reason the Court of Appeal rejected 
their claims. The claimants thus failed because of the particular stage which medical 
science has reached.41 
The difficulty, then, was with establishing causation in circumstances where the current state 
of scientific knowledge could not provide enough information to answer the question of which 
employer had caused the disease. The question of law in Fairchild was whether liability should 
be refused due to a failure to satisfy the causation requirement or whether a different approach 
to causation should be taken which allowed the claimants to succeed despite the impossibility 
of proving causation in the usual way. The court ultimately viewed this as a question of fairness 
and justice; they had to balance the injustice of an employer being held liable when it was 
possible that he had not caused the injury, with the injustice of an employee not being able to 
recover compensation when he had been negligently exposed to a harmful substance that had 
increased the risk of developing a disease that he in fact contracted.42 
The answer to this dilemma, according to the House of Lords in Fairchild, was to follow 
the rule in McGhee, which the majority interpreted as providing an exception to the usual 
causation requirement. Instead, one could hold the employers liable on the ground that they 
had materially increased the risk of the injury developing. According to Lord Hoffmann, ‘the 
law should treat a material increase in risk as sufficient to satisfy the causal requirements for 
liability’.43 
 There are at least three ways to interpret the McGhee/Fairchild rule. First, one can claim 
that the court is still inferring causation, albeit in circumstances where there is no scientific 
certainty as to the causal process. One could perhaps try to argue that this inference is based 
                                                 
41 Supra note 36 para 124. 
42 Ibid para 33. Lord Bingham stated the following: ‘It can properly be said to be unjust to impose liability on a 
party who has not been shown, even on a balance of probabilities, to have caused the damage complained of. On 
the other hand, there is a strong policy argument in favour of compensating those who have suffered grave harm, 
at the expense of their employers who owed them a duty to protect them against that very harm and failed to do 
so, when the harm can only have been caused by breach of that duty and when science does not permit the victim 
accurately to attribute, as between several employers, the precise responsibility for the harm he has suffered.’ 
43 Ibid para 67. 
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on the balance of probabilities, which is different to scientific certainty, but this is not a good 
view to take.44 Second, one can view the rule as doing away with any pretence of a normal 
causal link and view it as a means of attributing culpability for materially increasing the risk 
of physical injury, rather than causing the physical injury. Third, one can attempt to 
reconceptualise the injury for which one is being compensated as the increase in the risk itself, 
rather than physical harm in the form of a disease being the injury. In this way, causation is 
still preserved because by increasing the risk of injury one is causing the injury of exposing 
another to a risk of harm.45 
 This third interpretation is the most relevant for our purposes here, as it supports the 
idea of risk-as-injury in the law of negligence. Lord Hoffmann adopted this third option in 
Barker v Corus, and it appears, at first glance, as though he spoke for the majority. On closer 
inspection, however, it is less clear that the majority actually adopted the risk-as-injury 
approach, even though they expressly stated that they agreed with Lord Hoffmann’s 
reasoning.46 The risk-as-injury interpretation was then subsequently rejected in BAI v Durham. 
As I am advocating the idea of risk-as-injury in the law of defamation, let us look closer at why 
the idea of risk-as-injury was adopted in Barker and why the Supreme Court was right to reject 
it in Durham. 
 The primary issue in Barker was the potential unfairness of holding all of the defendants 
jointly and severally liable under the Fairchild principle. Joint and several liability is the norm 
when the injury in question is ‘indivisible’, i.e., when it is impossible to identify discrete 
injuries for which particular defendants can be held liable. Divisible injuries, on the other hand, 
are capable of being divided up among the different defendants, holding each defendant liable 
only for his portion of the injury. The classical statement of this rule is that of Lord Devlin in 
Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd:47 
Where injury has been done to the plaintiff and the injury is indivisible, any tortfeasor 
whose act has been a proximate cause of the injury must compensate for the whole of 
it. As between the plaintiff and the defendant it is immaterial that there are others whose 
                                                 
44 Gemma Turton makes the point well: ‘For a court to find that causation has been established on the balance of 
probabilities when the scientific evidence is that causation cannot be established because of an evidentiary gap, 
is to make a deliberately misinformed judgment based on intuition both as to causation and as to overall 
responsibility for the loss. It is one thing for the court to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities where there is 
some degree of doubt or uncertainty in the expert evidence because the law requires only probability not certainty, 
but it is entirely different for a court to resort to intuition about what probably happened where the expert evidence 
clearly states that causation cannot be established’ (op cit note 18 at 174 - 175). 
45 Turton op cit note 18 at 182. 
46 See BAI (Run Off) v Durham supra note 20 paras 59-65 (Lord Mance); Turton op cit note 18 at 182-191. 
47 [1961] 2 QB 162. 
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acts also have been a cause of the injury and it does not matter whether those others 
have or have not a good defence. These factors would be relevant in a claim between 
tortfeasors for contribution, but the plaintiff is not concerned with that; he can obtain 
judgment for total compensation from anyone whose act has been a cause of his injury. 
If there are more than one of such persons, it is immaterial to the plaintiff whether they 
are joint tortfeasors or not. If four men, acting severally and not in concert, strike the 
plaintiff one after another and as a result of his injuries he suffers shock and is detained 
in hospital and loses a month’s wages, each wrongdoer is liable to compensate for the 
whole loss of earnings. If there were four distinct physical injuries, each man would be 
liable only for the consequences peculiar to the injury he inflicted, but in the example I 
have given the loss of earnings is one injury caused in part by all four defendants. It is 
essential for this purpose that the loss should be one and indivisible; whether it is so or 
not is a matter of fact and not a matter of law. If, for example, a ship is damaged in two 
separate collisions by two wrongdoers and consequently is in dry dock for a month for 
repairs and claims for loss of earnings, it is usually possible to say how many days’ 
detention is attributable to the damage done by each collision and divide the loss of 
earnings accordingly. These are elementary principles and readily recognisable as such 
in the law of damage for physical injury. It is not so easy to distinguish and apply them 
in the law of damage for loss of reputation.48 
 
Mesothelioma is regarded as an indivisible injury. One either contracts the disease or one does 
not. So, the normal rule of joint and several liability would seem to apply. As Lord Hoffmann 
put it in Barker, ‘[t]he disease is undoubtedly an indivisible injury’, and so it would seem as 
though the ‘reasoning of Devlin LJ in Dingle's case [1961] 2 QB 162 would have been 
applicable.’49 The problem with this, however, was that it meant that someone who made a 
material, yet comparatively small, contribution to the risk of contracting the disease would be 
liable for the losses in their entirety, and in a situation where they might not, in fact, have 
caused the disease. The injustice of this was recognised in Fairchild, but it was made more 
acute in Barker, where the claimant himself was responsible for exposing himself to asbestos 
during a period of self-employment. In Fairchild, all of the exposures were at the hands of 
employers. Another issue raised in Barker was that some of the defendants who were 
responsible for a significant period of exposure to the harmful substance, e.g., more than 80% 
of the exposure, were no longer solvent. Their insurers were also insolvent. This meant that 
defendants who were still solvent or who were still insured would be liable for the entire 
damages claim, even though they made a comparatively small contribution to the risk of the 
                                                 
48 Supra note 47 at 188–189. 
49 Supra note 19 para 31. 
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harm.50 As in Fairchild, the House of Lords took itself to be grappling with questions of 
fairness and justice with respect to both the claimants and the defendants.51 
 The solution by the majority in Barker to the problem of apportionment, at least at first 
glance, was to re-construe the injury as being the exposure to risk itself, rather than the physical 
harm in the form of mesothelioma. Risk, after all, is a divisible injury. One could work out the 
extent to which each party had increased the risk of mesothelioma developing, such as by 
analyzing the length of employment and the intensity of the exposure. As risk was a divisible 
injury, each defendant would only be liable for the particular injury that he had caused. In other 
words, each defendant would only be liable for his personal contribution to the chance of the 
employee developing mesothelioma.52 This allowed a fairer distribution of liability in 
circumstances which already involved a delicate balancing act between the interests of 
claimants and the interests of defendants. This is certainly the approach taken by Lord 
Hoffmann, but it is less clear that those who claimed to endorse his reasons actually relied on 
those reasons in their own judgments.53 
 The primary motivation for interpreting Fairchild in this way, then, was to overcome 
the problem of apportionment. In any event, the British Parliament reversed this decision in the 
Compensation Act of 2006,54 declaring that liability for mesothelioma in these circumstances 
has to be joint and several.55 
 The question of the correct interpretation of Fairchild then came up again in BAI (Run 
Off) v Durham. In this case, the Supreme Court rejected the risk-as-injury interpretation of 
Fairchild. 
 The issue in Durham was whether liability under Fairchild was the kind of liability that 
would trigger an employer’s liability insurance. The insurers argued that mesothelioma must 
have manifested itself during the insurance period, while the employers and employees argued 
that all that was necessary was an exposure to asbestos during the insurance period under 
circumstances which gave rise to liability under Fairchild. Part of the problem was how to 
interpret the words ‘sustained’ and ‘contracted’ in the insurance clauses, i.e. whether these 
                                                 
50 Supra note 19 paras 3-4 (Lord Hoffmann). 
51 Ibid para 117 (Lord Walker). See also paras 124-127 (Baroness Hale) and para 86 (Lord Rodger). 
52 Ibid paras 31-48 (Lord Hoffmann); Turton op cit note 18 182-185. 
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55 See BAI (Run Off) v Durham supra note 20 paras 57-67 (Lord Mance) for discussion of the Compensation Act 
and its consequences. 
64 
 
words suggested that a disease needs to have manifested during the insurance period or whether 
one needs just to have been exposed to a harmful substance.56 Fairchild and its possible 
interpretations also gave rise to various questions about whether they would fall under the 
insurance contract. If an increase in risk was the actual damage being considered, then this 
might not be covered by a policy covering accidents or diseases. Moreover, even if the damage 
was physical injury in the form of disease, it was not clear that Fairchild cases involved 
causation of a disease, as liability was being imposed for increasing the risk of injury, rather 
than causing injury in the usual sense. 
 The court began by holding that the insurance policies were triggered by exposure to a 
harmful substance or event during employment, rather than requiring a disease to actually 
manifest itself during the employment period.57 So, if one was exposed to radiation at work 
that only later developed into cancer once one had left employment, the insurance liability 
would still be triggered. The next question was whether an employer’s liability under Fairchild 
could be said to be liability for having caused a disease and thus trigger the employer’s liability 
insurance. Lord Phillips, in a dissenting judgment, held that the correct interpretation of 
Fairchild and Barker was that the injury was the risk, rather than the causing of a disease, and 
so the insurance liability would not be triggered. His main concern was to avoid radical judicial 
law-making and a departure from precedent.58 The majority declined to follow the risk-as-
injury interpretation of Fairchild that was put forth in Barker, however. Lord Mance stated that 
even though the majority in Barker ‘were at pains to reject any analysis of Fairchild as 
proceeding upon a fiction that each exposure had caused or materially contributed to the 
disease’, the distinction the majority in Barker attempted to draw between ‘materially 
contributing to increasing the risk of, and causing, a disease’ proved ‘elusive’ on closer 
analysis.59 In other words, no clear distinction could be drawn between increasing the risk of a 
disease and causing a disease. Moreover, ‘no cause of action at all exists unless and until 
mesothelioma actually develops’.60 So that would seem to imply that it is wrong to say that the 
gist of the injury is the risk, rather than the disease itself: 
In reality, it is impossible, or at least inaccurate, to speak of the cause of action 
recognised in Fairchild and Barker as being simply “for the risk created by exposing” 
someone to asbestos. If it were simply for that risk, then the risk would be the injury; 
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damages would be recoverable for every exposure, without proof by the claimant of 
any (other) injury at all. That is emphatically not the law.61 
The majority stated that the best way to describe the ‘legal responsibility’ created in Fairchild, 
then, is ‘responsibility for the mesothelioma, based on a “weak” or “broad” view of the “causal 
requirements” or “causal link” appropriate in the particular context to ground liability for the 
mesothelioma.’62 In the context of employers’ liability insurance, this was a sufficient causal 
connection to trigger liability under the insurance policies as well.63 
V CRITIQUING RISK-AS-INJURY IN THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE: FROM 
BARKER TO GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The cases outlined above in which the Fairchild principle is applied raise a number of issues. 
Our purpose here is to understand the role that risk played in these cases, whether the idea of 
risk as damage is justifiable in the law of negligence, and what lessons we can glean for a risk-
as-injury interpretation of the law of defamation. 
There are good reasons to reject the idea of risk-as-injury that Lord Hoffmann proposed 
in Barker. The judgment itself actually undermines a risk as injury interpretation, on a closer 
analysis. More important for our purposes, however, is that a discussion of these cases will also 
provide more general reasons for thinking that risk-as-injury is almost always going to be a bad 
idea for the law of negligence. This is due to the fact that negligence protects a variety of 
interests and the negligence standard encompasses a variety of forms of conduct. Allowing risk 
to be the injury in this context will expose one to liability in far too many circumstances. The 
law of defamation manages to avoid these concerns, however. 
(a) Why Barker does not really support a risk-as-injury interpretation. 
Gemma Turton provides a compelling argument for why Lord Hoffmann is not really making 
risk the injury, despite his express claims to the contrary. This has to do with the nature of risk 
and the role he has it play in apportioning liability. 
Turton notes that risk is a forward-looking concept; it relates to the future. More 
specifically, it is a product both of the magnitude of the possible harm and the probability of 
that harm occurring.64 As risk is a product both of the probability of harm occurring and the 
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magnitude of the harm, it is possible to determine the risk that you have exposed someone to 
before the risk materialises (if it ever does) and the quantification of the risk (if it is correct) 
remains settled. For example, based on the duration and intensity of an employee’s exposure 
to asbestos at the hands of an employer, that employer would have increased the probability of 
her developing mesothelioma by, say, 18%, in relation to the rest of the population. If the 
employee starts to work for a subsequent employer, this would not change the fact that the 
original employer had increased her risk of mesothelioma by 18%. If liability in Barker was 
being based on risk, then an employer’s liability would not change in response to the behaviour 
of other employers. The fact that some other employer exposed the employee to a risk of 
mesothelioma would not change the fact that the original employer increased her risk by 18%. 
Yet, that is not how Lord Hoffmann approaches the issue of apportionment. Lord Hoffmann 
varies each employer’s liability in proportion to the extent to which they probably caused the 
disease.65 In other words, if someone worked for someone for 20 years and someone else for 5 
years, the first employer would be responsible for a proportionally higher amount of damages, 
once one has also taken into account things like the intensity of the exposure. Lord Hoffmann 
puts it the following way: 
The damages which would have been awarded against a defendant who had actually 
caused the disease must be apportioned to the defendants according to their 
contributions to the risk. It may be that the most practical method of apportionment will 
be according to the time of exposure for which each defendant is responsible, but 
allowance may have to be made for the intensity of exposure and the type of asbestos.66 
In reality, then, Lord Hoffmann is not basing liability on risk nor apportioning liability 
based on risk. He is instead apportioning liability based on the statistical probability that the 
particular employer was the cause of the disease. If P worked for A for 20 years and B for 5 
years, then, other things being equal, it is more likely that A caused the disease than B.67 What 
this approach amounts to is ‘to make the defendant liable for the mesothelioma itself, but to 
discount the extent of his liability to reflect the uncertainty over whether the risk he created 
was the risk that actually materialised. The method used to calculate the appropriate discount 
is the probability that it was the defendant’s risk rather than another source of risk that 
materialised’.68 
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So, it is questionable whether Lord Hoffman actually made risk the injury in Barker, 
despite claiming that he was. But this does not end the insight that can be gained from these 
cases about the idea of risk-as-injury. The majority in BAI (Run off) v Durham expressly 
rejected the idea of risk-as-injury. Let us turn next to some of their reasons for doing so and 
whether there are good reasons to reject the idea of risk-as-injury in its entirety. We will see 
that while risk as injury does not sit well with the law of negligence, that does not prevent it 
from being a justifiable approach to the law of defamation. 
(b) Why risk-as-injury is a bad idea in the law of negligence: a consequentialist approach. 
In Durham, Lord Mance notes that 
[i]n reality, it is impossible, or at least inaccurate, to speak of the cause of action 
recognised in Fairchild and Barker as being simply “for the risk created by exposing” 
someone to asbestos. If it were simply for that risk, then the risk would be the injury; 
damages would be recoverable for every exposure, without proof by the claimant of 
any (other) injury at all. That is emphatically not the law.69 
An implicit concern here, perhaps, is that if an increase in risk was the injury, then every 
(negligent) exposure would be actionable. Note that in none of the cases involving the Fairchild 
principle did any of the opinions hold that proof of physical harm in the form of mesothelioma 
was not required. Why, one might ask, was there unanimity on this even when some of their 
Lordships preferred to view the risk as the injury? One answer is derived from the realisation 
that much of the law of torts seems to involve a rudimentary kind of cost-benefit analysis. In 
other words, the law of torts proceeds on a consequentialist basis, and in light of 
consequentialist considerations, it would be bad to make risk per se actionable, at least in the 
law of negligence. 
 One can see the courts openly engaging in cost-benefit analysis in their discussions 
about the fairness of imposing liability in Fairchild-type cases. It seems clear that they are 
weighing up the costs and benefits to both parties of holding an employer liable. This is what 
they mean when they say that the imposition of liability and the apportionment of damages is 
a question of justice and fairness; they are weighing up the costs and benefits of imposing 
liability. In fact, this is recognised by those who reject consequentialism. Gemma Turton, who 
endorses a particular conception of corrective justice as a means of explaining the law of torts, 
states that ‘[s]ince the defendant is liable in circumstances where she may not have been a 
cause of the loss, corrective justice is abandoned in these cases in favour of the pursuit of 
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consequentialist goals. The effect has been to throw negligence into the state of incoherence 
that is inherent in the pursuit of consequentialist goals within the bipolar framework of the tort 
action’.70 It seems undeniable, however, that much of the law of tort does proceed on a 
consequentialist basis, both in the sense of taking into account the interests of society at large 
but also when assessing what would be fair between the parties. 
Consequentialism has had its advocates in the context of tort law. Barbara Fried, for 
example, has argued that some form of cost-benefit analysis is required if we are to have 
anything meaningful to say about when negligent injuries should be wrongful or when they 
should be permitted.71 Her primary target is non-consequentialist theories of tort, by which she 
means any theory that holds that an individual’s right to be free from harm always trumps an 
analysis that attempts to aggregate the costs and benefits of the conduct.72 Others, such as HLA 
Hart,73 and Neil MacCormick, following Hart,74 have interpreted the objective test for negligent 
conduct as a mechanism by which competing interests are balanced. This, too, looks like an 
interpretation of a feature of tort law that takes it to be a rudimentary form of cost-benefit 
analysis; we are weighing up the costs and benefits to the defendants, and sometimes to society 
at large, in prohibiting or allowing certain forms of conduct. Hart, for example, states that 
‘[w]hat we are striving for in the application of standards of reasonable care is to ensure (1) 
that precautions will be taken which will avert substantial harm, yet (2) that the precautions are 
such that the burden of proper precautions does not involve too great a sacrifice of other 
respectable interests’.75 In the South African context, Van den Heever JA interpreted aspects 
of the law of negligence in a similar way to Hart, prior to the publication of Hart’s The Concept 
of Law. Van den Heever JA seems to have the question of duty or wrongfulness in mind, 
however, rather than the question of negligent conduct. In Herschel v Mrupe,76 he stated that  
[w]hatever the scope of the moral duty, not to cause foreseeable harm to others in their 
persons or estates, may be, in law this duty is restricted in the interests of the 
individual’s freedom of action and legitimate initiative. After all, law in a community 
is a means of effecting a compromise between conflicting interests and it seems to me 
that according to the principles of Roman-Dutch law the Aquilian action in respect of 
damnum injuria datum can be instituted by a plaintiff against a defendant only if the 
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latter has made an invasion of rights recognised by the law as pertaining to the plaintiff; 
apart from that, loss lies where it falls.77 
Anton Fagan has also shown how the courts use the wrongfulness standard to determine when 
it would be reasonable to impose liability for negligently causing harm, and that, when 
wrongfulness is in issue, this will frequently involve an evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
imposing liability.78 Wrongfulness ‘is there to rein in negligence when the cost of letting 
negligence run loose would exceed the benefit.’79 For example, in those cases where delictual 
liability is imposed in order to give effect to the constitutional principle of public 
accountability, such as in Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden,80 liability is 
being imposed to foster the ‘public good’81 of an ‘open, uncorrupt and responsive 
government’.82 There are also costs attached to imposing liability, however, such as uncertainty 
due to the vagueness of the negligence standard, which can lead to over-insurance, an inability 
to plan one’s affairs properly, and an increase in the likelihood of litigation.83 Another cost is 
that of undermining the autonomy of other state institutions, such as municipalities, by holding 
them to have breached a duty not to act negligently.84  
If one interprets the decisions that have dealt with the Fairchild rule through a 
consequentialist lens that takes into account the costs and benefits of imposing liability, then 
one can see that there are reasons not to impose liability for risk per se. The insistence on 
concrete injury in the law of negligence is a balancing act, as Van den Heever JA recognised, 
that occurs prior to the balancing act that takes place in the test for fault and reasonableness 
described by Hart. One reason for this is that negligence is a ‘transversal’ tort and this plays a 
role in explaining why liability for risk is a bad idea in the law of negligence. 
As some commentators note, the English law of torts is ‘bi-focal’: some torts are defined 
in terms of the interests they protect (or the right that is infringed) while the tort of negligence 
is defined in terms of the fault of the defendant, without reference to any specific interest being 
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protected or right being infringed.85 In line with this method of categorising torts, Eric 
Descheemaeker describes negligence as a ‘transversal wrong’, as opposed to a ‘vertical’ wrong 
(which would be centred, like a column, on a particular interest), for negligence cuts across 
various protected interests, being defined instead by a degree of fault.86 This feature of 
negligence means that the kind of conduct that it encompasses is theoretically limitless, so long 
as the conduct is also negligent. For a great many activities that one can carry out, it will be 
possible to do it negligently. How, then, does the law limit the scope of liability? It does so by 
insisting on particular, albeit still quite general, types of conduct, such as causing physical 
injury. If such a general, transversal wrong like negligence were to make risk per se actionable, 
it would err too far on the side of security,87 prohibiting a variety of conduct that is simply a 
part of life, and thus imposing too high a cost on our interest in freedom of action. The costs of 
imposing liability for risk, then, would be too high. It is recognised in scholarship dealing with 
risk regulation that an unqualified right against being exposed to risk would be unmanageable. 
Madeleine Hayenhjelm and Jonathan Wolff note that ‘[v]irtually every action carries with it 
some risk, however small, of serious harm to others, and so assigning individuals the right not 
to be subjected to risk, without their consent, is an impossible position.’88 This concern would 
still be real even if one restricted the right to negligent increases in risk, and even if one 
restricted it to something even more specific, such as negligently increasing the risk of another 
person developing a disease like mesothelioma. Even this kind of restriction would probably 
impose too high a cost on employers, insurers and the courts. Lord Mance was probably alive 
to this kind of concern when he stated that ‘it is emphatically not the law’ that someone could 
be liable merely for increasing the risk of disease, making damages ‘recoverable for every 
exposure, without proof by the claimant of any (other) injury at all’.89 The cost of imposing 
liability for risk using a transversal tort provides a good moral reason for why the law does not 
construe risk-as-injury in the law of negligence. 
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In order to develop the idea that liability for defamation is based on increasing the risk of harm, 
this chapter began by elaborating on the concept of risk. Risk can be defined as a concern about 
the possibility that an unwelcome event will materialise in the future; it is a product both of the 
magnitude of the possible harm and the probability of that harm occurring. In the context of 
the law of delict, this concept is typically used to either justify or limit liability, but it can do 
this in various ways. An uncontroversial application of the concept is in relation to fault, where 
foresight of the risk of harm is used to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was culpable. 
Risk could also be used, more controversially, as a way to hold someone liable simply for 
having increased the risk of harm occurring, even in the absence of a finding that the risky 
conduct caused some other, more tangible harm. This application has been used and understood 
in various ways in the English tort of negligence, either as a way of relaxing the requirement 
of causation or as a new way to understand the harm for which one is being compensated. It 
appears, however, that even though the courts sometimes understood themselves to be 
construing risk-as-injury, there is reason to doubt that they actually were doing that. 
Nevertheless, the consideration of those cases presented more general reasons for thinking that 
risk-as-injury is a bad idea in the law of negligence. If one takes a consequentialist approach, 
then one can see that imposing liability for mere risk in the context of a transversal tort like 
negligence would err too far on the side of security and impose too high a cost on freedom of 
action (and negatively affected related matters, like the costs of insurance and litigation). 
Understanding why risk-as-injury is problematic in the context of negligence provides 
a foundation to assess its applicability in the context of defamation. In the next chapter, we will 
see that these objections against viewing risk as damage in the law of negligence are attenuated 
in the context of defamation in South Africa.
72 
 
CHAPTER 5: WHY RISK-AS-INJURY IS A SUPERIOR 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE RULES UNDERLYING DEFAMATION 
I INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we saw that there are strong objections against viewing an increase in 
risk as the compensable injury for a transversal tort like negligence or the lex Aquilia. In this 
chapter, we will see that these same concerns do not apply as strongly to defamation law in 
South Africa. Viewing an increase in risk as the compensable injury would be justifiable in the 
law of defamation, and probably more justifiable than viewing the injury as the causation of 
reputational harm. 
The argument takes the following form: According to the current rules, the plaintiff 
does not need to produce much evidence in order to establish her claim. When one compares 
this to the nature of Aquilian liability, where the protected interests allow for a ready 
observance of damage, alongside a requirement of patrimonial loss that also helps to establish 
and quantify that damage, the unsatisfactory nature of the requirements for defamation 
becomes clear. A major reason for the difficulty in establishing damage is that it is hard to track 
the causal impact of defamatory publications. Nevertheless, one’s reputation matters and 
deserves protection, and, rather than just declaring the law of defamation unjustifiable, one can 
attempt to amend or justify the practice in some way. For example, one can amend the practice 
by requiring the plaintiff to tender better evidence that reputational harm was caused, or one 
can justify the practice in an alternative way by reinterpreting the nature of the wrong, such 
that the current evidential requirements are sufficient to establish that this other type of harm 
was caused by the defendant. Reinterpreting the harm as causation of an increase in the risk of 
reputational harm is an example of this latter option. 
Viewing risk-as-injury is controversial, however, and arguably unjustifiable in the case 
of some delicts, like the lex Aquilia. But the objections that apply to the concept of risk-as-
injury in the context of the lex Aquilia do not apply as strongly to defamation. First, as we will 
see, defamation is a vertical tort, rather than a transversal tort: it protects a particular interest 
from very particular types of conduct. This limits the scope of conduct that can attract liability, 
and therefore does not unduly limit freedom of action. Second, defamation in South Africa has 
a non-negligible fault standard, which makes risk-as-injury a more justifiable interpretation 
than it might be in a place like England, where liability for libel and slander is strict. The non-
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negligible fault standard helps to limit the scope of liability-attracting conduct. The view taken 
in this thesis, then, is that the risk interpretation, all things considered, is more justifiable than 
the causation-of-reputational-harm interpretation. The justification of the rules matters, 
moreover, because the law of defamation is an instance of force being applied by the State. 
The different evidential requirements between defamation and the lex Aquilia was 
discussed in Chapter 3, while the importance of reputation was discussed in Chapter 2. The 
concept of risk and reasons for not accepting risk-as-injury in the context of the tort of 
Negligence and the lex Aquilia was discussed in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we will see why 
the objections against risk-as-injury that were raised in Chapter 4 do not apply as strongly in 
the context of defamation in South Africa, due to it being a vertical tort that has a non-negligible 
fault standard. We will also see why it matters that the rules constituting defamation receive 
appropriate justification. 
II REPUTATION MATTERS BUT IT IS HARD TO TRACK THE CAUSAL 
IMPACT OF DEFAMATORY PUBLICATIONS 
In Chapter 2, value of reputation was established. It was noted that scholarly perspectives on 
the value of reputation could be placed into two camps: sometimes the external benefits of 
reputation are highlighted and sometimes the internal benefits are highlighted. External 
benefits are those social benefits and temporal advantages that a good reputation can generate, 
and the internal benefits are those relating to one’s self-esteem and personal identity. The 
capacity to generate these internal and external benefits makes reputation, like property and 
bodily integrity, an important welfare interest, i.e., something that is foundational to the pursuit 
of other interests. It was also noted that the moral significance of welfare interests, and the 
reason why one should not violate them, depends on one’s preferred moral theory. A 
consequentialist, for example, could point to the social benefits of allowing people to further 
their interests, and the individual utility or happiness that generates. While a deontologist might 
point to the value of autonomous decision-making. Joseph Raz and Stephen Perry, for example, 
argue that interfering with property and bodily integrity diminishes the owner’s opportunities 
(their scope for autonomous decision-making),1 and the same could be said for damaging 
someone’s reputation. Since reputation is a welfare interest, it clearly deserves protection; the 
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reasons supporting the protection of reputation seem to be the same reasons underlying the 
protection of bodily integrity and property. 
 We saw in Chapter 3, however, that it is difficult to observe reputational harm or to 
track the causal impact of defamatory assertions, and that the courts currently rely on slender 
evidence when declaring that reputational harm has been caused. Unlike in Aquilian cases, 
there are no readily observable physical changes in the world, nor is there a call for indirect 
proof of a reduction in quality or utility like patrimonial loss. Instead, a plaintiff merely alleges 
that a defamatory statement concerning herself has been published. There is no need to provide 
any further evidence about the causal impact the publication has had. 
One might argue that the difficulty in tracking the causal impact of statements is a 
reason simply to presume that damage has been done. However, as Thomas Gibbons argues, 
that is equally a reason to presume that damage was not done.2 At this point, one can either 
change the rules of defamation law and ask the plaintiff to provide more compelling evidence 
that harm was caused, or one can attempt to justify the established practice in some other way. 
Due to the difficulty in tracking the causal impact of statements, and proving reputational harm, 
this work prefers the latter option of justifying the current practice in some other way. 
Reputation does need protection, but the rules protecting it require better justification. The 
alternative explanation preferred here is that liability is not for having caused reputational 
harm, but for having increased the risk of reputational harm. 
III DEFAMATION AS AN EXERCISE OF STATE POWER 
We saw in Chapter 3 that when a judge is assessing a case according to the balance of 
probabilities, the judge is trying to determine if the evidence before her makes it seem as if the 
plaintiff’s hypothesis is more probable than not. If the evidence succeeds in doing that, then, 
all things considered, the plaintiff is successful, and the defendant is liable. This process is an 
exercise of state power, however. The judge does not simply decide whose theory is correct for 
the sake of knowledge, but rather to make an enforceable judgment that has practical 
implications for the plaintiff and the defendant. If the defendant is ordered to compensate the 
plaintiff by paying damages, then the defendant is under a legal obligation to do so, an 
obligation backed up by the authority and might of the state. Robert Cover put the point 
dramatically when he argued that ‘[l]egal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition 
of violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, 
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somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.’3 This is true in the context 
of South African civil cases too. First, the judgment will typically require the payment of 
money in the form of damages (see Chapters 8 and 9), which is a sanction or hardship imposed 
by the state. Second, court orders, such as the order to pay compensation, are backed up with a 
threat of criminal proceedings should the order be ignored. In South Africa, disobeying a civil 
court order is an instance of the crime of contempt of court. Contempt of court consists in 
‘unlawfully and intentionally violating the dignity, repute or authority of a judicial body, or 
interfering in the administration of justice in a matter pending before it’.4 One of the ways in 
which one can commit this crime is to disobey court orders, thereby threatening ‘the integrity 
of judicial orders and instructions.’5 As Jonathan Burchell puts it, 
[i]t is clear that in our law both ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ contempt are species of the same 
criminal offence. ‘Civil’ contempt is accordingly committed by failing to obey an order 
of court (provided the definition of the crime is satisfied) and it does not matter that the 
court order which is disobeyed was made in a civil case.6 
 
 These instances of state power need to be justified and supported by compelling reasons 
if they are to be justifiable in a constitutional democracy. As Etienne Mureinik explains, legal 
culture under the apartheid government was essentially a culture of authority: ‘The leadership 
of the ruling party commanded Parliament, Parliament commanded its bureaucracy, the 
bureaucrats commanded the people.’7 The new constitutional order, on the other hand, is 
supposed to instantiate a move away from this culture of authority and towards a culture of 
justification. A culture of justification is ‘a culture in which every exercise of power is expected 
to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case 
offered in defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command. The new 
order must be a community built on persuasion, not coercion.’8 
 Considering this ideal of a culture of justification, in a civil case where the plaintiff is 
attempting to establish his case on a balance of probabilities, and where the court’s finding in 
that regard has practical implications for people’s well-being and freedom, it is not sufficient 
that the courts simply say that they are persuaded that the plaintiff’s version of events is the 
                                                 
3 Robert M Cover ‘Violence and the word’ (1986) 95 The Yale Law Journal 1601 at 1601. 
4 Jonathan Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3ed (2006) 945. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid at 955. See also S v Beyers 1968 (3) SA 70 (A). 
7 Etienne Mureinik ‘A bridge to where? Introducing the interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10(1) South African Journal 
on Human Rights 31 at 32. See reference to Mureinik’s article by Ackermann J in Ferreira v Levin NO and others 
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para 51. 
8 Mureinik op cit note 7 at 32. 
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more probable one. It must also be clear that there were good reasons for making that 
determination. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, even in successful defamation cases, there 
are compelling reasons to doubt that the defendant has caused harm to the plaintiff, especially 
when compared to successful Aquilian cases. In Aquilian cases, the plaintiff has to tender proof 
of patrimonial loss, which is a good indicator that there probably has been damage to the utility 
or usefulness of a protected interest, given that there has been consequential patrimonial loss. 
Moreover, damage to property or persons is usually readily observable, given that these will 
typically involve observable physical changes in the protected interest. In the case of 
defamation, however, all that needs to be proven is the publication of words that the court then 
deems to be likely to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of right-thinking people. The 
plaintiff does not need to tender any other evidence in support of that finding of likely harm. 
English tort scholars have rightly questioned whether the mere fact of publication is really 
sufficient reason to believe that there has been probable causation of reputational harm. For 
one thing, the causal impact of statements is hard to track; moreover, one cannot simply observe 
a physical change in the world. Instead, whatever change that might occur as a result of an 
assertion happens inside people’s minds. One is also not required to bring indirect proof of 
harm, such as proof of consequential patrimonial loss. All in all, the finding of probable 
causation of harm seems to be based on slender evidence, and it is highly questionable that the 
orthodox understanding of defamation law amounts to a sufficient justification for the use of 
state power. 
 One possible response is to call for better evidence to be produced, as favoured by Eric 
Barendt, who argues that ‘[a] plaintiff in a libel action should, in my view, be required to prove 
that his reputation has been injured.’9 Rather than restructuring the law, however, an alternative 
approach would be to justify current practices in a different way, a way that overcame the 
problem of proof of harm in a context where there is an important threatened interest, but where 
actual harm is hard to prove. After all, it can be difficult to track the causal impact of statements 
in a way that does not appear to be true in the case of property and bodily interests where harm 
can more readily be observed. The alternative justification here would be to view the 
compensable injury not as the causation of reputational harm, but as the causation of an increase 
in the risk of reputational harm. Even if it not probably true that the defendant has caused the 
plaintiff reputational harm just by publishing a defamatory assertion, it is probably true that the 
defendant has increased the risk of reputational harm by publishing a defamatory assertion. It 
                                                 
9 Eric Barendt ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ (1999) Current Legal Problems 110 at 123. 
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might be hard to track the causal impact of defamatory assertions, but, by publishing a 
defamatory assertion, the defendant has, more probably than not, increased the risk of 
reputational harm. It seems safe to say that there is a greater risk of harm to the plaintiff’s 
reputation after the publication of the statement than there was before the publication of the 
statement. 
 As we saw in Chapter 5, however, viewing an increase in risk as an injury for which 
one can be compensated is controversial, and there are good reasons not to adopt that idea in 
the tort of Negligence or the lex Aquilia. What reason is there for thinking that those same 
objections do not apply to the law of defamation? The following sections attempt to answer 
this question by explaining how the objections that were levelled against risk-as-injury in the 
law of negligence do not apply as strongly to the law of defamation in South Africa. When one 
couples the fact that these objections do not apply as strongly to defamation with the legitimate 
interest we have in protecting people’s reputations, the result is that imposing liability for risk 
in the case of defamation would be justifiable. 
IV HOW DEFAMATION LAW OVERCOMES THE USUAL OBJECTIONS TO 
VIEWING AN INCREASE IN RISK AS THE COMPENSABLE INJURY 
We saw in Chapter 4 that risk-as-injury would not be a good addition to the law of negligence, 
so why might it be justifiable in the law of defamation? 
 One of the reasons for disallowing risk liability in the case of negligence was that 
negligence is a transversal tort, meaning that it protects a variety of different interests from a 
variety of different harm-causing conduct. This meant that the tort encompassed a plenitude of 
conduct, and imposing liability for increasing a risk of harm in these multitudinous ways would 
err too far on the side of security and impose too many costs, either limiting our freedom of 
action or increasing economic costs like insurance prices and increased litigation. 
 The law of defamation is not a transversal tort, however. It is a vertical tort, as it is 
defined by a particular protected interest. This singular interest means that it can only be 
infringed by very particular types of conduct. The South African law of defamation also has 
the advantage of requiring fault of some kind, which further limits the types of conduct that 
can attract liability. This makes the imposition of risk-liability more justifiable in South Africa 
than it would be in England, for example. The following sections unpack these features of 
defamation that help to explain why risk-as-injury is more justifiable in the case of defamation 
than the lex Aquilia. 
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(a) A vertical tort 
While the lex Aquilia protects a number of interests, such as property, bodily integrity, and, 
arguably, patrimony (and, perhaps, autonomy),10 the South African law of defamation only 
protects one’s reputation. We saw in Chapter 2 that the interest being protected is best 
characterised as an interest in one’s reputation, rather than, say, freedom from insult. The law 
of defamation also does not allow for the recovery of consequential patrimonial losses; these 
losses need to be recovered under the lex Aquilia.11 It is harder to argue, therefore, that the 
South African law of defamation is an ‘economic tort’ that largely protects one’s patrimony, 
which is an argument sometimes made about the interests being protected by the English law 
of defamation. J.H. Baker, for example, sees the English tort of defamation as an economic 
tort, albeit one that has been narrowed down to protecting patrimonial losses caused by 
defamatory words.12 Eric Descheemaeker, on the other hand, argues that, while the English law 
of defamation is indeed sometimes concerned with patrimony, this is a mistake that should be 
reformed as the predominant interest being protected is really reputation.13 A similar debate 
took place in the nineteenth century. William Blake Odgers, whose Digest of the Law of Libel 
and Slander (1881) was one of the first attempts to describe the English law of defamation 
using general principles,14 argued that injury to reputation was the gist of the action, as opposed 
to financial loss.15 Yet, he spent some time objecting to John Townshend’s position in 
Townshend’s American treatise on slander and libel, for Townshend ‘devote[ed] a whole 
chapter to maintaining “that pecuniary loss to the plaintiff is the gist of the action for slander 
or libel”’.16 Since at least the nineteenth century, then, it has been controversial whether the 
                                                 
10 See Anton Fagan ‘Aquilian liability for negligently caused pure economic loss - Its history and doctrinal 
accommodation’ (2014) 131 South African Law Journal 288 for an argument that cases of pure economic loss 
involve the protection of the non-patrimonial interest of autonomy. 
11 Matthews and others v Young 1922 AD 492 at 498 (‘Damages for patrimonial loss can only be claimed under 
the Lex Aquilia’); Media 24 Ltd and others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd (Avusa Media Ltd and others as 
amici curiae) 2011 (5) SA 329 (SCA) para 8 (‘the rule of our law, in principle, is that patrimonial damages must 
be claimed under the actio legis Aquiliae, while the actio iniuriarum and its derivative actions, including the 
action for defamation, are only available for sentimental damages. In theory, the person injured by a defamatory 
publication would therefore have to institute two actions: a defamation action for general damages and the actio 
legis Aquiliae for special damages. But, as further explained by De Villiers JA, even at the time when Matthews 
was decided, two actions were no longer required by our practice. Accordingly, so De Villiers JA held, if one 
suffers an injury to your reputation, you can claim both kinds of redress in the same action, provided, of course, 
that the requirements of both actions are satisfied’). 
12 John H Baker An introduction to English legal history 4ed (2002) 448. 
13 Eric Descheemaeker ‘Defamation outside reputation: proposals for the reform of English law’ Tort Law Review 
(2010) 18(3) 133. 
14 See Blake Odgers’ own comments in this regard in his preface to A digest of the law of libel and slander (1881) 
vii. Available online at https://archive.org/details/digestoflawoflib00odge. 
15 Ibid at 4: ‘The mischief complained of is the injury to the plaintiff's reputation and not the pecuniary damage 
he has suffered’. 
16 Ibid at 18-19. 
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Anglo-American law of defamation is primarily protecting one’s wealth or one’s reputation. 
The South African law, by contrast, seems squarely focused on one’s reputation. 
 This limited range of protected interests is coupled with a similarly limited range of 
conduct that can give rise to liability. One’s reputation is not protected from any and all 
diminishments, but only from conduct that takes the form of publication of a defamatory 
assertion. 
There are a number of ways in which one’s reputation can be diminished. A company’s 
reputation can be diminished by a hacker breaching their security and stealing customers’ 
data,17  for example, but that is not covered by the law of defamation. The range of actionable 
conduct is limited to the specific form of publication of a defamatory assertion. 
 So, there is a limited range of interests, coupled with a limited range of liability-
inducing conduct. Even if one did contend that the law of defamation does, directly or 
indirectly, protect other interests, like dignity, privacy or patrimony, the scope of actionable 
conduct is still far narrower than the scope covered by the modern lex Aquilia. Aquilian liability 
not only protects various interests, but also protects them from virtually unlimited forms of 
conduct, so long as that conduct is negligent. In defamation, because the conduct is defined so 
specifically (i.e., as the publication of an assertion) the problem of over-prohibition, and of 
imposing too high a cost on freedom of action, is largely avoided. One is prohibited from doing 
something (publishing a defamatory assertion) that is not a part of everyday life, and which 
does not constrain one’s behaviour in a general way. It is usually not a regular part of life to 
publish defamatory things about people. Journalists are perhaps the group whose everyday 
conduct is most affected by defamation law, which is one reason why they deserve special 
consideration, like the defence of reasonable publication.18 Unlike the transversal tort of 
negligence, the vertical delict of defamation does not succumb to the objection of over-
prohibition of conduct. In other words, imposing liability for increasing the risk of harm in 
these circumstances would not err too far on the side of security or impose undue costs, either 
in the form of unduly limiting freedom of action or increasing economic costs like insurance 
premiums and litigation. 
  
                                                 
17 See, for example, Doug Drinkwater ‘Does a data breach really affect your firm’s reputation?’ (2016) CSO. 
Available online at: https://www.csoonline.com/article/3019283/data-breach/does-a-data-breach-really-affect-
your-firm-s-reputation.html 
18 National Media Ltd and others v Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). 
80 
 
(b) Fault in the form of intention is required in many cases, and liability is never strict 
The limited range of protected interests and the limited range of liability-inducing conduct are 
not the only reasons why the net of liability would not be cast too wide if an increase in risk 
was to be regarded as the injury. The South African fault standard helps to further limit the 
range of actionable conduct. This is something that sets the South African law apart from a 
system like the English law of defamation, and which helps to make the risk-as-injury 
interpretation more acceptable in South Africa than it might be in England. 
One of the most controversial features of the English law of defamation is that liability 
is strict in the sense that, unless one can raise one of the stereotypical defences, one cannot 
excuse oneself from liability by saying that one did not intend to injure the plaintiff’s reputation 
or that one did not act negligently. This is different to the South African law where fault of 
some kind is required. Admittedly, it is not easy to determine what the exact fault standard is 
for defamation, as it is complicated by at least two ongoing debates. But, whatever position 
one takes in these debates, it is undeniable that more is required in the way of fault in South 
Africa than in England. The English law is discussed here as a counterpoint, helping to explain 
what it means to say that the South African law of defamation has a fault standard that helps to 
limit the range of actionable conduct. 
(i) Fault in the English law of defamation 
The role of fault in the English law of defamation is complicated when one gets into the details. 
Paul Mitchell explains that the English approach to fault shifted during the nineteenth century. 
He argues that, until the early nineteenth century, liability for defamation required subjective 
malice in the sense of a spiteful intention to injure the plaintiff. ‘Spiteful’ intention was required 
in the sense that, if one acted intentionally, but for motives other than injuring the plaintiff, 
then one was not liable, such as if one was repeating the defamatory words out of sorrow in 
sympathy with the plaintiff.19 This changed with the judgment in Bromage v Prosser (1825),20 
however. In that case, the court held that malice in the legal sense is ‘a wrongful act, done 
intentionally, without just cause or excuse’.21 So, instead of requiring the intention to do harm, 
all that was required was intention in the form of voluntary conduct. This was an adoption of 
the criminal law’s definition of malice. 
                                                 
19 Paul Mitchell ‘Malice in Defamation’ 114 LQR (1998) 639 at 639. 
20 (1825) 107 ER 1051. 
21 Mitchell op cit note 19 at 641. 
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This was not in itself a transition to liability without fault, however.22 Mitchell 
maintains that liability was still based on fault in the sense that this inference of legal malice 
was still rebuttable if a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have been 
unaware that the publication could cause injury.23 The transition in Bromage v Prosser, then, 
was not one from fault to strict liability, but rather from being able to avoid liability by pointing 
to non-malicious motives, to being liable, regardless of motive, if one causes that person injury, 
provided that a reasonable person would have been aware that they would probably injure 
someone’s reputation.24 That final caveat maintained a fault standard. 
A second shift then occurred in the twentieth century in E Hulton & Co v Jones 
(1910),25 where the requirement of reasonable foreseeability was eroded. In that case, it was 
held that the author of a fictional narrative was liable for defaming someone who happened to 
have the same name as the fictional character. This decision resulted in liability even in 
circumstances where it was not foreseeable that one probably would injure either that person’s, 
or anyone else’s, reputation. Mitchell argues that this judgment was a response to the rise in 
literacy levels and the advent of the tabloid press, whose scandalous articles about public 
figures led to a dislike of newspapers on the part of juries and judges. Being held strictly liable 
for defamation was a response to their profiting from fictitious gossip.26 
(ii) Fault in the South African law of defamation 
The South African law of defamation certainly seems to require more in the way of fault than 
the fault standard implicit in E Hulton & Co v Jones, although the nature of the fault standard 
is highly controversial. The controversy is caused by two debates: The first is about the fault 
standard applicable to media defendants, namely, whether intention is required or whether 
negligence is sufficient. The second debate is about the meaning of intention and whether 
intention requires that one be conscious of the wrongfulness of one’s actions. 
As we will see, regardless of one’s position in either of these debates, the South African 
law still requires fault of some kind, which helps to restrict the scope of liability for defamation. 
                                                 
22 Mitchell ‘Malice in defamation’ op cit note 19 at 641-642. 
23 Mitchell ‘Malice in defamation’ op cit note 19 at 643-645; Paul Mitchell The Making of the Modern Law of 
Defamation (2005) 106-109. 
24 It is not perfectly clear whether abstract or relative foreseeability was required. That is, whether probable harm 
to the plaintiff in particular had to be foreseeable or whether probable harm to some or other person had to be 
foreseeable.  For a discussion of these concepts in the context of negligence law, see Anton Fagan ‘Negligence’, 
in R Zimmermann, K Reid and D Visser (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and 
Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2005). 
25 [1910] AC 20. 
26 Mitchell The Making of the Modern Law op cit note 23 at 118-120. 
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In the case of media defendants, however, accepting that negligence is sufficient would cast 
the net of liability wider than if they were required to have acted intentionally. 
Media defendants 
As we have seen, the Constitutional Court has stated that ‘the elements of the delict of 
defamation are: (a) the wrongful and (b) intentional (c) publication of (d) a defamatory 
statement (e) concerning the plaintiff.’27 It is controversial, however, whether media defendants 
need only to have published the assertion negligently rather than intentionally. 
  Media defendants have been treated differently to other defendants in the past, having 
once been held strictly liable.28 This strict liability was then removed in National Media v 
Bogoshi.29 But, whether the court reintroduced the traditional fault standard of intention in that 
case, or replaced strict liability with negligence liability, remains controversial. 
The state of the law before the judgment in Bogoshi was explained by that court as 
follows: 
The effect of the judgment [in Pakendorf en Andere v De Flamingh 1982 (3) SA 146 
(A)] was that, unlike ordinary members of the community - and, for that matter, also 
unlike distributors - newspaper owners, publishers, editors and printers are liable 
without fault and, in particular, are not entitled to rely upon their lack of knowledge of 
defamatory material in their publications or upon an erroneous belief in the lawfulness 
of the publication of defamatory material.30 
 
In Bogoshi, the Supreme Court of Appeal overruled its predecessor’s (the Appellate Division’s) 
earlier judgment in Pakendorf and rejected strict liability for the press. This was done in light 
of the need for information to flow freely in a democracy.31 The Supreme Court of Appeal 
explicitly followed Common Law cases like the Australian case of Lange v Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation32 and the English case of Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd,33 and 
developed a defence of reasonable publication for the press: 
the solution of the problem in England, Australia and the Netherlands seems to me to 
be entirely suitable and acceptable in South Africa. In my judgment we must adopt this 
approach by stating that the publication in the press of false defamatory allegations of 
                                                 
27 Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 18; see also Le Roux and others v Dey (Freedom 
of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as amici curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 84. 
28 See Pakendorf en Andere v De Flamingh 1982 (3) SA 146 (A). 
29 Supra note 18. 
30 Ibid at 1205G. 
31 Ibid at 1209-1211. 
32 (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
33 2 AC 127 (HL). 
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fact will not be regarded as unlawful if, upon a consideration of all the circumstances 
of the case, it is found to have been reasonable to publish the particular facts in the 
particular way and at the particular time.34 
 
 A source of lingering confusion is the fact that in adopting this defence, the court also 
stated that media defendants could not escape liability by pointing to a negligent mistake 
demonstrating that they had lacked subjective awareness of the wrongfulness of their actions 
(consciousness of wrongfulness) and that they had therefore acted without fault and so should 
not be liable. Consciousness of wrongfulness is sometimes regarded as an aspect of intention 
or animus injuriandi,35 and the court thought it would upset the balance between freedom of 
expression and reputation to introduce a new defence of reasonable publication, but then also 
give media defendants another opportunity to escape liability by pointing to a negligent mistake 
which negated intention because it negated subjective consciousness of wrongfulness. The 
court stated the following: 
Against this background, it is necessary to raise the question left open in Pakendorf (at 
155A), namely whether absence of knowledge of wrongfulness can be relied upon as a 
defence if the lack of knowledge was due to the negligence of the defendant. If media 
defendants were to be permitted to do so, it would obviously make nonsense of the 
approach which I have indicated to the lawfulness of the publication of defamatory 
untruths. In practical terms (because intoxication, insanity, provocation and jest could 
hardly arise in the present context) the defence of lack of animus injuriandi is concerned 
with ignorance or mistake on the part of the defendant regarding one or other element 
of the delict (Burchell (op cit at 283); see also Raifeartaigh ‘Fault Issues and Libel Law 
- A Comparison between Irish, English and United States Law’ (1991) 40 ICLQ 763). 
The indicated approach is intended to cater for ignorance and mistake at the level of 
lawfulness; and in a given case negligence on the defendant’s part may well be 
determinative of the legality of the publication. In such a case a defence of absence of 
animus injuriandi can plainly not be available to the defendant.36 
 
 The above makes it clear that what the court was really considering was whether or not 
a negligent mistake should allow media defendants to escape liability, and the court thought 
that such an approach would not be consistent with a defence of reasonable publication. It 
would seem strange, in other words, to make liability turn on the reasonableness of the 
                                                 
34 Bogoshi supra note 18 at 1212G. 
35 See, for example, J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 2ed (2005): ‘Animus 
iniuriandi or the intention to defame, which can assume any of the three forms dolus directus , dolus indirectus 
and dolus eventualis, means the mental disposition to direct the will towards a certain consequence (the defamation 
of the plaintiff), with the knowledge that the consequence will be wrongful. If either direction of the will or 
consciousness of wrongfulness is absent, there is no question of intent to defame’ (163). Emphasis in the original. 
36 Ibid at 1214. 
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publication, and then allow another way to avoid liability even in circumstances where one had 
been negligent in some way (i.e., if one had made a negligent mistake). 
It does not inevitably follow from this decision, however, that no form of intention is 
required whatsoever. For a reduced form of intention, such as one that did not require subjective 
consciousness of wrongfulness, would be compatible with a defence of reasonable publication. 
One can require intentional (non-accidental) conduct for liability, and also require that one’s 
intentional conduct be reasonable.  But some courts and scholars have interpreted the Bogoshi 
decision as doing away with intention altogether for media defendants, and instead having 
introduced fault in the form of negligence.37 Others, however, have argued that the decision 
reversed strict liability, reinstated a minimal form of intention (minimal because it does not 
require consciousness of wrongfulness), and introduced an unlawfulness or wrongfulness 
defence of reasonable publication.38 On this interpretation, the reasonableness of one’s conduct 
plays a role in excluding the wrongfulness of one’s conduct, rather than excluding fault in the 
form of negligence. 
The precise fault standard for media defendants is, therefore, controversial. 
The meaning of ‘intention’ 
The above debate is especially complicated due to the controversy about whether or not 
consciousness of wrongfulness is, in any event, a normal or necessary aspect of legal intention. 
While some courts and scholars insist that intention requires consciousness of wrongfulness, 
others argue that intention does not require consciousness of wrongfulness, except in unusual 
cases.39 
                                                 
37 See Jonathan Burchell ‘Media freedom of expression scores as strict liability receives the red card: National 
Media Ltd v Bogoshi’ (1999) 116 SALJ 1; Mthembi-Mahanyele v Mail & Guardian Ltd and another 2004 (6) SA 
329 (SCA). 
38 See Anton Fagan ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict’ (2005) 122 SALJ 90 at 103ff. See also JR 
Midgley ‘Media liability for defamation’ (1999) 116 SALJ 211 for a third interpretation that the Bogoshi defence 
relates to consciousness of wrongfulness as an aspect of intention. This interpretation is contrary to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s interpretation in Mthembi-Mahanyele supra note 37, but support by the judgment in Khumalo 
v Holomisa supra note 27 para 20. For general discussion of the competing interpretations, see Daniel Visser 
‘Compensation for harm to the personality - actio iniuriarum’ in Francois du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of South 
African Law 9ed (2007) 1187-1190. 
39 Fagan ‘Rethinking wrongfulness’ op cit note 38; Le Roux and others v Dey 2010 (4) SA 210 (SCA) para 39: ‘I 
therefore conclude, especially in view of precedent and the constitutional emphasis on the protection of personality 




 What is clear is that there are some delicts where consciousness of wrongfulness 
certainly is not required as an aspect of legal intention. In Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr,40 the 
Appellate Division stated that consciousness of wrongfulness is not a requirement for 
committing the delict of unlawful detention, even though intention is required.41 The principle 
expounded in that case was then affirmed in the context of wrongful attachment of goods, 
where consciousness of wrongfulness was again not required for liability.42 The same principle 
(that consciousness of wrongfulness is not a requirement of intention) was also adopted by the 
High Court in C v Minister of Correctional Services,43 in the context, ostensibly, of privacy.44 
In Le Roux and others v Dey,45 the Supreme Court of Appeal noted these developments, and 
stated that this trend was also applicable to defamation, and personality rights in general: ‘I 
therefore conclude, especially in view of precedent and the constitutional emphasis on the 
protection of personality rights, that the animus injuriandi requirement generally does not 
require consciousness of wrongfulness (wederregtelikheidsbewussyn).’46 The Court was 
motivated by two considerations: First, there are clearly cases where consciousness of 
wrongfulness is not a requirement of intention (the argument from ‘precedent’). Second, that 
it seems ‘incongruous’ to allow a defendant who cannot establish a defence excluding 
wrongfulness (such as truth and public benefit) to escape liability on the basis of a mistaken 
belief that such a defence existed (a mistake which would exclude consciousness of 
wrongfulness, and therefore exclude fault in the form of intention, and therefore exclude 
liability): 
 
                                                 
40 1993 (3) SA 131 (A). 
41 Ibid at 154-157. 
42 In Sheriff, Pretoria East v Meevis 2001 (3) SA 454 (SCA) paras 11-14, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that 
when a sheriff attaches goods that are not in the possession of the judgment debtor, then the sheriff bears the risk 
that the goods might belong to someone other than the judgment debtor, and is liable for any losses suffered by 
the true owner that flow from the attachment, regardless of the fact that the sheriff thought that she was acting 
lawfully. 
43 1996 (4) SA 292 (T). 
44 The case concerned a prisoner who had consented to a blood test for the purpose of detecting HIV, but, due to 
institutional negligence, the consent given was not fully informed consent. The Court found that the plaintiff was 
aware that the test was for HIV and that he had a right to refuse the test, but, in this context, according to the 
Department of Correctional Services’ own policy, informed consent meant also having undergone pre-test 
counselling, which did not occur. The Sergeant who carried out the blood test was not aware of the policy, 
however, ‘through no fault of his own’, and it was accepted that he acted ‘bona fide’. The Court held, following 
the unlawful detention cases of Hofmeyr and Whittaker v Ross and Bateman 1912 AD 92, that acting deliberately, 
albeit with good intentions, was sufficient to meet the requirement of animus iniuriandi in such a case. 
45 Supra note 39. 
46 Ibid para 39. 
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It appears to me to be incongruous that a defendant who, for example, cannot establish 
truth and public benefit to justify defamation, can nevertheless escape liability by 
relying on a belief in either the truth or public benefit.47 
 
On appeal from that case, however, the Constitutional Court questioned the necessity of this 
enquiry into the nature of animus iniuriandi,48 thus leaving the door open for consciousness of 
wrongfulness to reassert itself in the context of defamation. 
 Ultimately this debate about consciousness of wrongfulness seems to be a question of 
how to balance the protection of personality rights with freedom of action. In Maisel v Van 
Naeren,49 for example, the Cape High Court thought that it was unreasonable to impose liability 
on someone who had mistakenly believed themselves to be acting lawfully (the defendant 
mistakenly thought that his publication was privileged). While in Le Roux v Dey (SCA), the 
Supreme Court of Appeal thought that a defence of mistake would clash with the defences that 
rebut wrongfulness. The fundamental issue here seems to be about where to draw the line in 
cases of mistake so as to balance freedom of action with the protection of reputation: Should 
we protect people’s freedom to act (such as when they are acting in good faith, whether or not 
they were negligent), or should we protect people’s reputations against innocent but potentially 
harmful positive conduct, positive conduct that one was free not to undertake? This is a 
question that seems to be resolvable either way without any obvious injustice or any obvious 
conceptual contradictions. It is, fundamentally, a policy decision about which reasonable 
people might disagree. 
 The fault standard in defamation is controversial, then, but what is clear is that more is 
required in the way of fault than in the English law of defamation. It is uncontroversial that, 
for ordinary defendants, intention is required, although it is controversial whether intention 
requires consciousness of wrongfulness. One of the unifying features of intention in South 
African law, however, is that it always seems to require some form of subjective foresight of 
harm. Intention (with or without consciousness of wrongfulness) seems to require that the 
defendant either subjectively intended the injury (dolus directus), saw it as a foregone 
conclusion (dolus indirectus), or foresaw the possibility of injury to some person and proceeded 
                                                 
47 Ibid para 37. See also Helen Scott ‘Contumelia and the South African law of defamation’ in Eric Descheemaeker 
and Helen Scott (eds) Iniuria and the Common Law (2013) for discussion. 
48 Le Roux and others v Dey (CC) supra note 27 para 137 (‘It was therefore not necessary for the Supreme Court 
of Appeal to embark upon the enquiry as to whether our law should still require knowledge of wrongfulness as 
part of animus iniuriandi. Nor do I find it necessary for this court to do so.’) 
49 1960 (4) SA 836 (C). 
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in any event (dolus eventualis).50 This aspect of intention would help to limit the scope of 
actionable conduct, regardless of whether or not consciousness of the wrongfulness of one’s 
actions was also required. The English approach does not even appear to require foresight of 
harm. 
In the case of media defendants, if the fault standard is negligence, then foresight of 
injury by a reasonable person is, once again, required.51 Both of these forms of fault restrict the 
net of liability by at least requiring some kind of foresight of injury. This is a reason why 
liability for risk is more justifiable in South Africa than it might be in England, for example. 
Not only are we dealing with a particular form of conduct infringing a particular interest, but 
the conduct also requires some kind of foreseeability of injury. A requirement of foreseeability 
of injury would exclude those cases where the requisite foresight was lacking, thereby 
restricting the net of liability, and further helping to avoid concern about over-prohibition of 
conduct that otherwise plagues the idea of risk-as-injury. 
V CONCLUSION 
Building on propositions established in earlier chapters, this chapter has helped to establish that 
the risk-as-injury interpretation is a more justifiable interpretation of the law of defamation 
than the causation-of-reputational-harm interpretation. The overall argument has taken the 
following form: 
According to the current rules, the plaintiff needs to produce slender evidence in order 
to establish her claim. When one compares this to the nature of Aquilian liability, where the 
protected interests allow for a ready observance of damage, alongside a requirement of 
patrimonial loss that helps to establish that damage, the unsatisfactory nature of the 
requirements for defamation becomes clear. A major reason for the difficulty in establishing 
damage is that it is hard to track the causal impact of defamatory publications. Nevertheless, 
one’s reputation matters and deserves protection, and, rather than just declaring the law of 
defamation unjustifiable, one can attempt to amend or justify the current practice in some way. 
For example, one can amend the practice by requiring the plaintiff to tender better evidence 
that reputational harm was caused, or one can justify the practice in an alternative way. Given 
the difficulty in tracking the causal impact of statements, this thesis has taken the approach of 
                                                 
50 J Neethling & JM Potgieter Law of Delict 6ed (2010) 126-129; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser op cit note 35 at 
163; Burchell Principles of Criminal Law op cit note 4 at 461-463. 
51 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A); Mukheiber v Raath 1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA) at 1077E-F. For more 
detailed discussion, see Fagan ‘Negligence’ op cit note 24. 
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justifying the current rules in another way. Rather than seeing the elements of liability as an 
attempt to establish causation of reputational harm, one can view them as an attempt to establish 
causation of an increase in the risk of reputational harm. By publishing a defamatory assertion, 
the defendant probably has increased the risk of reputational harm, even if it is less clear that 
the defendant has caused reputational harm. 
Viewing an increase in risk as the injury for which one is being compensated is 
controversial, however, and arguably unjustifiable in the case of some delicts. But the 
objections that apply to the concept of risk-as-injury in other contexts do not apply as strongly 
to defamation. This makes the imposition of liability for risk less controversial than it usually 
is. First, defamation is a vertical tort, rather than a transversal tort: it protects a particular 
interest from very particular types of conduct. This limits the scope of conduct that can attract 
liability. Given the value that reputation has, and the need to protect it, imposing liability for 
risk in these limited circumstances would not unduly limit freedom of action. Second, 
defamation in South Africa has a non-negligible fault standard, which also helps to limit the 
scope of liability. The fault standard always requires some kind of foresight of harm (either 
actual foresight, in the case of intention, or foresight by a reasonable person, in the case of 
negligence). This further helps to limit the scope of actionable conduct and makes risk-as-
injury more justifiable in South Africa than it might be in other jurisdictions or contexts, once 
one also takes the value of reputation into account. 
The justification of the rules matters because the law of defamation is an instance of 
force being applied by the State. The judgment will typically require the payment of money in 
the form of damages, which is a sanction or hardship imposed by the state. Second, court orders 
are backed up with a threat of criminal proceedings should the order be ignored. In a culture of 
justification, rules that are enforced with the might of the State need to be convincing.  While 
it is not convincing that findings of probable causation of harm are justified, findings of a 
probable increase in a risk of reputational harm would be convincing. Moreover, given the 
value of reputation, and given the ways in which usual objections against imposing liability for 
risk do not apply in the case of defamation, the risk-as-injury interpretation of the law of 
defamation appears to be preferable. The view taken here, then, is that the risk interpretation, 
all things considered, is more justifiable than the causation-of-reputational-harm interpretation.  
As the risk-as-injury interpretation is supposed to be an alternative justification of the 
existing rules, the following chapters will now demonstrate that this interpretation does fit with 
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the current structure of the South African law. These chapters will focus on the presumptions 
that feature in defamation cases, the defences, and the function of damages.
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CHAPTER 6: THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE RISK 
INTERPRETATION WITH THE PRESUMPTIONS AND 
DEFENCES OF DEFAMATION LAW 
I INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have explained the idea of risk and why risk-as-injury might be a better, 
alternative justification for the practice of defamation law in South Africa. Those chapters 
presented the fundamental ideas involved in the risk-as-injury interpretation and why one might 
prefer it, in the case of defamation, over the orthodox causation-of-reputational-harm 
interpretation. More should be said, however, about how the risk-as-injury interpretation fits 
with the existing case law. 
Defamation law makes use of legal presumptions, allows for particular defences, and 
features particular remedial responses. One might wonder whether the unorthodox risk 
interpretation is compatible with these essential features of the law. Risk-as-injury is being 
presented as an alternative justification of the existing rules, so it must fit with these rules. This 
chapter begins this demonstration of compatibility by showing how the risk interpretation fits 
with the presumptions and the defences of defamation law. The next two chapters will focus 
on its compatibility with the primary remedial response: damages. 
II THE STRUCTURE OF DEFAMATION LAW 
As noted in Chapter 3, it is generally accepted that ‘the elements of the delict of defamation 
are: (a) the wrongful and (b) intentional (c) publication of (d) a defamatory statement (e) 
concerning the plaintiff.’1 The plaintiff does not need to tender evidence to support every one 
of these elements to establish a prima facie case, however. All that the plaintiff needs to do to 
establish a prima facie case is prove that the defendant published a defamatory assertion about 
the plaintiff (items (c)-(e) above). It is then presumed that the publication was both intentional 
and wrongful (items (a) and (b) above). It is then up to the defendant to rebut one of the 
elements of liability to avoid being found liable. The Constitutional Court put it the following 
way in Khumalo v Holomisa:2 
                                                 
1 Khumalo and others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 18; see also Le Roux and others v Dey (Freedom 
of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as amici curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) para 84. 
2 Supra note 1. 
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Once a plaintiff establishes that a defendant has published a defamatory statement 
concerning the plaintiff, it is presumed that the publication was both unlawful and 
intentional. A defendant wishing to avoid liability for defamation must then raise a 
defence which rebuts unlawfulness or intention. Although not a closed list, the most 
commonly raised defences to rebut unlawfulness are that the publication was true and 
in the public benefit, that the publication constituted fair comment and that the 
publication was made on a privileged occasion. Most recently, a fourth defence 
rebutting unlawfulness was adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in National Media 
Ltd v Bogoshi. […] This fourth defence for rebutting unlawfulness […] allows media 
defendants to establish that the publication of a defamatory statement, albeit false, was 
nevertheless reasonable in all the circumstances.3 
This is the basic structure of the modern law of defamation. The risk-as-injury 
interpretation holds that the injury is not the causation of reputational harm but the causation 
of an increase in the risk of reputational harm. Is the structure described here consistent with 
the risk-as-injury interpretation of the law? 
The first feature of this structure that will be considered is the fact that wrongfulness 
and fault are presumed once a plaintiff has established that a defamatory statement concerning 
the plaintiff was published. The second feature that will be discussed in this chapter is the 
defences that rebut wrongfulness and fault, and how they are justified. 
(a) The presumptions of wrongfulness and fault 
The first notable feature of the structure of defamation law is that the plaintiff does not need to 
tender proof of every element of liability in order to establish a prima facie case. All that the 
plaintiff needs to do is establish that a defamatory statement was published by the defendant 
about the plaintiff. It is then presumed that the publication was wrongful and intentional, and 
the defendant then needs to raise a defence rebutting either wrongfulness or intention. The 
question is whether the risk-as-injury interpretation is consistent with this presuming of 
wrongfulness and fault, and the burden that then falls on the defendant to raise a defence. 
One way to approach this problem is to consider how this structure is currently justified, 
and then see whether that orthodox justification is still consistent with the risk interpretation, 
or whether a new justification would be necessary. Fortunately, I think the existing 
justifications for this structure are consistent with the risk interpretation. 
                                                 
3 Ibid paras 18-19. See also Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (A) 
588G-I; Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) 25C-E; Le Roux v Dey (CC) 
supra note 1 para 85, 121-124. 
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 In general, a plaintiff bringing a civil case needs to provide enough initial evidence to 
tip the balance of probabilities in his or her favour. As explained in Chapter 3, the balance of 
probabilities refers to epistemic probability, meaning that it must be more likely than not that 
the plaintiff’s version of events is correct. If the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case on 
a balance of probabilities, then the defendant will be absolved from liability without having to 
present any evidence to counter the plaintiff’s argument. 
This could imply that the plaintiff needs to provide positive evidence for all the 
essential elements of liability in order to establish that prima facie case, but the law of delict 
does not, in fact, always require this of the plaintiff. In this respect, civil law is different to 
criminal law, in that the civil law does not always require the individual bringing the claim to 
establish every element of liability. The Appellate Division put it the following way in Mabaso 
v Felix:4 
In its anxiety that no accused should be punished for a crime without proof of his guilt 
our common law deliberately places the burden of proving every disputed issue, save 
insanity, on the prosecution. But in civil law, as will presently appear, considerations 
of policy, practice, and fairness inter partes may require that the defendant should bear 
the overall onus of averring and proving an excuse or justification for his otherwise 
wrongful conduct.5 
 
Defamation is one of those cases where it is not necessary for the plaintiff to tender evidence 
for each of the elements of liability, as unlawfulness and intention are presumed, thus leaving 
it to the defendant to provide a justification or an excuse for his own behaviour.6 As we have 
seen, all that a plaintiff needs to do to establish a prima facie case is to provide evidence for 
the propositions that the defendant published a defamatory assertion about the plaintiff. It is 
then presumed that those publications were unlawful and intentional. The burden then falls on 
the defendant to rebut the presumption of unlawfulness or intention. 
 In order to fully understand this structure, however, it is not enough to simply know 
what the plaintiff needs to establish. One also needs to understand the nature of the burden that 
                                                 
4 1981 (3) SA 865 (A). 
5 Ibid at 872H. 
6 An example of a delictual case where the plaintiff is required to prove every element to establish a prima facie 
case are those instances of Aquilian liability involving so-called pure economic loss. In these cases, the 
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct is not presumed, and the plaintiff has to establish wrongfulness. Whether 
or not the conduct will be wrongful in a specific case depends on the policy considerations. See Trustees, Two 
Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA) para 10. For general discussion of how pure 
economic loss in particular fits within the normal Aquilian framework, see Anton Fagan ‘Aquilian liability for 




then falls on the defendant, for this affects the overall fairness of the chosen structure and its 
justification. The decision not to require the plaintiff to prove every element of liability directly 
feeds into the question of what the defendant needs to do to escape liability. So, in determining 
the fairness and practicality of this arrangement, one needs to understand not only what the 
plaintiff must prove, but also the nature of the burden that then falls on the defendant. As the 
Appellate Division stated in Mabaso v Felix, the decision not to place ‘the burden of proving 
every disputed issue’ on the plaintiff is affected by ‘considerations of policy, practice, and 
fairness inter partes’.7 So what is required of the defendant, then, once the plaintiff has 
established that a defamatory assertion was published? 
There was a debate in South African jurisprudence about the nature of the burden that 
fell on the defendant once the plaintiff had discharged her responsibilities. The courts’ 
responses to this debate help to explain why the burden to rebut these presumptions falls on the 
defendant, and also why these presumptions are made in the first place. 
For a time, it was controversial whether the burden that fell on the defendant in 
defamation cases was a mere ‘burden of adducing evidence in rebuttal’ or whether it was a ‘full 
onus’ in the sense of having to establish one’s position on a balance of probabilities. The 
difference between these two burdens was explained by the Appellate Division in Pillay v 
Krishna and another:8 
Any confusion that there may be has arisen, as I think, because the word onus has often 
been used in one and the same judgment in different senses, as meaning (1) the full 
onus which lies initially on one of the parties to prove his case, (2) the quite different 
full onus which lies on the other party to prove his case on a quite different issue, and 
(3) the duty on both parties in turn to combat by evidence any prima facie case so far 
made by his opponent: this duty alone unlike a true onus, shifts or is transferred.9 
 
The primary distinction being made here is that between a full onus (to establish a prima facie 
case), and a duty to rebut any prima facie case that has been made. It is only the latter duty that 
may shift from party to party throughout a case as evidence is tendered and arguments are made 
that may shift which version of events appears to be more likely. 
The difference between the duty to rebut a prima facie case that has been established, 
and the full onus to establish a prima facie case, is that the former only requires the party on 
                                                 
7Supra note 4 at 872H. 
8 1946 AD 946. 
9 Ibid at 952-3. 
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whom the burden falls to call the other party’s evidence into question. If enough doubt can be 
cast to prevent the balance of probabilities from tipping in the plaintiff’s favour, for example, 
then the burden to adduce evidence in rebuttal has been discharged. In the case of a full onus, 
however, one can only discharge that onus by doing enough to establish one’s case on a balance 
of probabilities. It would not be enough to merely call things into question. How this usually 
plays out is that the plaintiff has a full onus of establishing certain propositions, which the 
defendant would then need to call into question if the plaintiff had done enough initially to tip 
the balance of probabilities in his favour. In such a scenario, the defendant would not have to 
establish her own case on a balance of probabilities; she would just need to cast enough doubt 
on the plaintiff’s claims to prevent the plaintiff from succeeding in establishing his case on a 
balance of probabilities. 
 The debate in the law of defamation in particular was whether the defendant had a full 
onus when attempting to rebut the presumption of wrongfulness or intention10 (and thus had to 
meet the higher standard of establishing his defence on a balance of probabilities), or whether 
it was merely a burden to provide evidence in rebuttal that merely called the plaintiff’s version 
of events into doubt. This matter was settled in Neethling v Du Preez,11 where the Appellate 
Division stated that the defendant had a full onus when establishing the defences of qualified 
privilege and truth and public benefit. It was not simply a case of needing to provide enough 
evidence to call the plaintiff’s claims into question; the defendant has to do enough to establish 
the defence on a balance of probabilities. In other words, the judge needs to be convinced that 
the defendant’s version of events is more likely than not: 
If the defendant raises the defence of qualified privilege then he must prove his duty or 
right to communicate the defamatory matter to another; and the latter’s reciprocal 
interest to receive the communication. These are matters which need to be established 
on a balance of probabilities. The requirements of the substantive law cannot here be 
satisfied by a mere equiponderance of evidence which leaves the Court unable to say 
whether or not either element of the defence has been established. To hold otherwise 
would be subversive of principles governing the law of defamation deeply entrenched 
                                                 
10 It has been controversial whether a different burden of proof fell on the defendant when the defendant was 
attempting to rebut wrongfulness as opposed to when she was attempting to rebut intention (see J Burchell 
Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression (1998) 245-250). This issue seems to have been overlooked or 
treated as academic by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Hardaker v Phillips 2005 (4) SA 515 (SCA) para 14, 
which treats both of these presumptions in the same manner when it states the following: ‘It is now settled that 
the onus on the defendant to rebut one or other presumption is a full onus, ie it must be discharged on a 
preponderance of probabilities.’ The reference to ‘one or other presumption’, after having discussed both the 
presumption of wrongfulness and the presumption of fault suggest that the same burden of proof applies to both 
of them. For reasons discussed below, this position makes sense, when one analyses the reasons why one might 
have such presumptions in the first place. 
11 Neethling v Du Preez and Others; Neethling v The Weekly Mail and Others 1994 (1) SA 708 (A). 
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in our legal system […A]lso in regard to the defence of truth in the public benefit there 
is venerable authority in this Court for the proposition that the defendant likewise bears 
a full onus. […] I conclude that in our law a defendant in a defamation action is 
encumbered with a full onus in regard to the defences of truth in the public benefit and 
of qualified privilege. Such defences can be sustained by nothing less than proof on a 
balance of probabilities.12 
 
This position has been affirmed in subsequent cases. In Hardaker v Phillips,13 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal stated the following: 
 
Until comparatively recent times, there was doubt as to the nature of the onus of 
rebuttal. It is now settled that the onus on the defendant to rebut one or other 
presumption is a full onus, ie it must be discharged on a preponderance of probabilities. 
(Mohamed and Another v Jassiem 1996 (1) SA 673 (A) at 709H - I.) A bare denial on 
the part of the defendant will therefore not suffice. Facts must be pleaded by the 
defendant that will legally justify the denial of unlawfulness. (National Media Ltd v 
Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) (1999 (1) BCLR 1) at 1202H (SA).)14 
 
The nature of the burden that falls on the defendant is clear. If the defendant wishes to 
escape liability, he must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that his actions were not wrongful 
or that they were without fault. But what justification have the courts offered for this position? 
Reasons for imposing a full onus on a defendant were enunciated by the Appellate Division in 
Mabaso v Felix,15 where the Court stated that ‘considerations of policy, practice, and fairness 
inter partes may require that the defendant should bear the overall onus of averring and proving 
an excuse or justification for his otherwise wrongful conduct’.16 This foundational idea was 
quoted and endorsed more recently by the Supreme Court of Appeal in National Media Ltd 
and others v Bogoshi.17 Policy, practice, and fairness inter partes are very broad and open-
ended considerations, but in Mabaso v Felix the Court went on to specify what some of the 
more concrete considerations might be in cases involving personality rights. 
First, the court seems to endorse the following point made by the American jurist John 
Wigmore in his work on the law of evidence: 
 
in most actions of tort there are many possible justifying circumstances - self-defence, 
leave and license, volenti non fit injuria, and the like; but it would be most unfair and 
                                                 
12 Ibid at 769G-I. 
13 Supra note 10. 
14 Ibid para 14. 
15 Supra note 4. 
16 Ibid at 872H. 
17 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA). 
96 
 
contrary to experience to assume that one of them was probably present, and to require 
the plaintiff to disprove the existence of each of them; so that the plaintiff is put to prove 
merely the nature of his harm, and the defendant’s share in causing it; and the other 
circumstances, which if they existed leave him without a claim, are put upon the 
defendant to prove.18 
 
Rather than presuming that the defendant’s actions were lawful, then, and requiring the 
plaintiff to show that none of the many possible defences existed, the burden is instead placed 
on the defendant to choose an appropriate defence and prove that defence. This appears to be 
a practical consideration that perhaps falls under the banner of fairness inter partes. 
The Court in Mabaso v Felix also presents another argument, however, which is also 
endorsed in Bogoshi,19 namely, that ‘usually the circumstances so excusing or justifying [the 
defendant’s] wrongdoing are peculiarly within his own and not the plaintiff's knowledge […] 
it would for that reason be fair and accord with experience and good common sense that in 
such delicts the defendant should ordinarily bear the onus of proving the excuse or 
justification’.20 
In other words, as the defendant is best placed to shed light on the factual circumstances 
that might support a defence, the defendant should have the burden of proving those facts and 
establishing the defence for himself. This is seen as preferable to requiring the plaintiff to 
establish factual circumstances relating to the defendant’s own conduct that the plaintiff is not 
well-positioned to discuss, in order to show why an excuse or justification is not present. This 
consideration also seems to fall under the banner of fairness inter partes. 
(i) The relationship between placing a full onus on the defendant and presuming elements of 
liability in the first place 
These are the traditional reasons that the courts have offered for placing a full onus on the 
defendant to prove a defence. These considerations also appear to be reasons for having the 
presumptions of wrongfulness and fault in the first place, however. The Court in Bogoshi calls 
attention to this relationship between placing a full onus on the defendant and presuming 
certain elements of liability when it states the following: 
In civil law, as was said in Mabaso v Felix 1981 (3) SA 865 (A) at 872H, considerations 
of policy, practice and fairness inter partes may require that the defendant bears the 
overall onus of averring and proving an excuse or justification for his otherwise 
unlawful conduct. This remark is particularly apposite to cases of the present kind, 
                                                 
18 Mabaso v Felix supra note 4 at 873C. 
19 Supra note 17 at 1215C-F. 
20 Mabaso v Felix supra note 4 at 873E. 
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where there is a presumption of unlawfulness arising from the publication of 
defamatory material. And, even in the absence of a presumption, considerations of 
policy, practice and fairness would require the defendant to prove the justificatory 
facts.21 
 
In this extract, the Court states that the fact that it is dealing with certain presumptions makes 
it an even stronger case for placing a full onus on the defendant to prove a justificatory defence. 
The idea seems to be that in certain cases considerations of policy might require that a full onus 
be placed on a defendant to establish a defence, and that where there are presumptions of 
wrongfulness involved then this is an additional reason to place such an onus on the defendant. 
That it is, in other words, ‘particularly apposite’. However, the reasons the courts have 
presented for placing a full onus on the defendant also appear to be reasons for having such 
presumptions in the first place. Presumptions might not make it more appropriate to place a 
full onus on the defendant, then, for the same underlying reasons might be justifying both the 
presumptions and the fact that a full onus is being placed on the defendant. This might all be a 
single process, then, that is justified for the same fundamental reasons. For example, one reason 
why one might presume wrongfulness and intention in the first place is because it is peculiarly 
difficult for the plaintiff to provide proof of these elements. One reason why it might be difficult 
to prove these elements is because the facts for and against them might be peculiarly within the 
knowledge of the defendant. For example, damaging someone’s property, or someone’s body, 
or someone’s reputation appear to be acts that, more often than not, are not justifiable acts. It 
might accord with human experience, then, to presume that such acts are wrongful, and that a 
justification would require knowledge of unusual circumstances. The person who carried out 
these acts would also usually be best placed to prove why they were actually, and unusually, 
justified. This seems to be captured by the idea, endorsed in Mabaso v Felix, that it would be 
‘contrary to experience to assume that one of [the defences] was probably present, and to 
require the plaintiff to disprove the existence of each of them’.22 This is probably one aspect of 
what the Supreme Court of Appeal meant in Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey 
& Templer,23 when it stated that ‘negligent conduct manifesting itself in the form of a positive 
act causing physical damage to the property or person of another is prima facie wrongful.’24 
The Court might be making a technical legal point about the mere fact that technical legal 
wrongfulness is presumed in such cases, but it could also be alluding to the idea that certain 
                                                 
21 Supra note 17 at 1215C. Emphasis added. 
22 Supra note 4 at 873C. 
23 Supra note 6. 
24 Ibid para 10. 
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acts are, on the face of it, unjustifiable (prima facie wrongful), and require an unusual 
explanation – an explanation outside the scope of typical, everyday human experience - to 
make them justifiable. It is usually unjustifiable to take positive steps that cause damage to 
someone’s property, and so it seems practical to assume that it was wrongful and require the 
defendant to explain himself if there were unusual circumstances that justified the conduct. 
Similarly, positive conduct causing damage to someone’s reputation is prima facie wrongful; 
it is not the sort of thing that seems obviously justified in the normal course of experience. It 
would therefore be practical to assume that it is wrongful and require the defendant to explain 
her conduct by establishing a defence. These considerations seem to be reflected in the law of 
defamation itself. Certain circumstances may require that one say defamatory things, and in 
such cases the courts do not, in fact, presume wrongfulness. For example, judicial officers 
might need to say things about the parties present before them that might otherwise be 
construed as defamatory. In such cases, wrongfulness is not, in fact, presumed, and the plaintiff 
needs to establish wrongfulness by providing reasons for thinking that the judicial officer was 
acting outside the scope of his or her duty.25 
 Similar arguments – from everyday experience, and from the idea that the defendant is 
best placed to present certain evidence - can be made about why intentional conduct is 
presumed to have occurred. The making of defamatory assertions is not the sort of thing that 
tends to happen accidentally, and, so, it seems practical to presume that the conduct happened 
intentionally. Moreover, the factual circumstances as to whether or not the defendant had acted 
intentionally are, once again, especially within the defendant’s sphere of knowledge, and the 
defendant is best placed to tender evidence as to why the conduct was, say, accidental. 
 So, the courts have offered two arguments for placing a full onus on the defendant to 
justify or excuse his behaviour, instead of simply making it the plaintiff’s responsibility to 
discuss these issues when establishing a prima facie case. First, there are many ways in which 
a delict might be justified, and it would be overly burdensome to require the plaintiff to show 
why none of the defences are present in their case. Second, the defendant is often best placed 
to prove the factual circumstances that are necessary to establish a defence rebutting 
wrongfulness or fault. 
 These reasons are often presented in the context of why a full onus is being placed on 
the defendant, but this is essentially the same as explaining why certain presumptions are being 
                                                 
25 See May v Udwin 1981 (1) SA 1 (A) at 16. 
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made in the plaintiff’s favour in the first place. In other words, the reasons that justify placing 
a full onus on the defendant are also the reasons that support having presumptions in place that 
work to the plaintiff’s benefit. 
(ii) Constitutional reasons for placing a full onus on the defendant 
The question of why one might place a full onus on the defendant to defend himself has also 
recently been infused with constitutional principles. As we have seen, to have a prima facie 
case, a plaintiff in a defamation case has to prove that the defendant published a defamatory 
statement about the plaintiff. It is then presumed to be unlawful and intentional and it is up to 
the defendant to establish a defence. This structure was challenged in the Constitutional Court 
by the applicants in Khumalo v Holomisa,26 who argued that in defamation cases where the 
plaintiff is a politician or a public figure, or where the statement is in the public interest, the 
common law should also require that the plaintiff allege and prove that the defamatory 
statement is false. So, instead of merely requiring the plaintiff to prove that a defamatory 
assertion was published, the plaintiff would also have to establish that the statement is false. 
This argument was based on the constitutional right to freedom of expression,27 and the idea 
that, where the statement was in the public interest, not requiring a plaintiff to prove the falsity 
of the defamatory statement unduly limited freedom of expression.28  
 The Court proceeded to balance the interest of freedom of expression with the interest 
in one’s reputation, stating that ‘[t]here can be no doubt that the constitutional protection of 
freedom of expression has at best an attenuated interest in the publication of false statements.’29 
In other words, false statements made by the defendant should receive limited protection. At 
the same time, ‘no person can argue a legitimate constitutional interest in maintaining a 
reputation based on a false foundation.’30 So, while the defendant should not be overly 
protected in making false statements, so too a plaintiff should not be overly protected in having 
a reputation that is based on a false foundation. The question of where the balance between 
freedom of expression and reputation should lie, and what this means for true statements and 
false statements, led the Court to consider the structure of defamation law as a whole, including 
the way in which the defences are structured. The Court noted that, even if a plaintiff is not 
required to prove the falsity of the defamatory statement when establishing a prima facie case, 
                                                 
26 Supra note 1. 
27 Section 16 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
28 Supra note 1 paras 1-4. 




‘the common-law delict of defamation does not disregard truth entirely.’31 Instead, truth 
features in the defence of truth and the public benefit: 
[Truth] remains relevant to the establishment of one of the defences going to 
unlawfulness, that is, truth in the public benefit. The common law requires a defendant 
to establish, once a plaintiff has proved the publication of a defamatory statement 
affecting the plaintiff, that the publication was lawful because the contents of the 
statement were true and in the public benefit. The burden of proving truth thus falls on 
the defendant.32 
 The Court then had to ask whether this was a suitable arrangement. In other words, 
given the overall structure of defamation law, including the defences, was a suitable balance 
being struck between freedom of expression and reputation by not requiring the plaintiff to 
prove falsity, and leaving the burden to prove truth on the defendant. The Court noted that ‘[i]n 
considering the constitutionality of this rule, it must be realised that it is often difficult, and 
sometimes impossible, to determine the truth or falsity of a particular statement.’33  And that 
‘[i]n not requiring a plaintiff to establish falsity, but in leaving the allegation and proof of falsity 
to a defendant to a defamation charge, the common law chooses to let the risk lie on defendants. 
After all, it is by definition the defendant who published the statement and thereby caused the 
harm to the plaintiff.’34 
 The Court acknowledged that this arrangement could have a ‘chilling effect’ on 
publishers of information, who would be defendants with the burden of proving truth and the 
public benefit, when truth can be difficult to prove.35 Nevertheless, besides the point above 
about letting the risk of liability fall on those who publish the statement and thereby cause the 
harm, the Court also noted that the defence developed in Bogoshi (of reasonable publication) 
reduced the potential chilling effected created by not requiring the plaintiff to establish falsity. 
The chilling effect is reduced because proving truth in the public benefit is not the only way 
for the defendant to escape liability. According to the defence created in Bogoshi, the defendant 
could also prove that it was reasonable to publish the assertion in question in the manner in 
which it was published: 
 
this chilling effect is reduced considerably by the defence of reasonable publication 
established in Bogoshi’s case. For it permits a publisher who is uncertain of proving the 
                                                 
31 Ibid para 37. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid para 38. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid para 39. 
101 
 
truth of a defamatory statement nevertheless to publish where he or she can establish 
that it is reasonable.36 
  
 From this analysis, it is clear that the underlying justifications for the structure of 
defamation law – such as who needs to prove what - have taken on a constitutional dimension. 
The discussion in Khumalo v Holomisa indicates that the balancing act that was already taking 
place with respect to the interests of the parties has now had an additional consideration added 
in the form of ‘constitutional interests’, such as the defendant’s interest in freedom of 
expression and the plaintiff’s interest in reputation. In Mabaso v Felix,37 the Appellate Division 
stated that ‘considerations of policy, practice, and fairness inter partes may require that the 
defendant should bear the overall onus of averring and proving an excuse or justification for 
his otherwise wrongful conduct’.38 In Khumalo v Holomisa, constitutional rights and interests 
were added into this pre-existing policy framework. The Constitutional Court stated that the 
defence of reasonableness developed in the Bogoshi case ‘strikes a balance between the 
constitutional interests of plaintiffs and defendants’.39 
 This policy framework in which the structure of defamation law is constructed is not 
only concerned about the interests of the particular parties, however. It is also about public 
policy considerations, such as the type of society that is modelled in the Constitution and that 
the courts are obliged to protect. In Khumalo v Holomisa, the Court stated the following:  
The importance of the right of freedom of expression in a democracy has been 
acknowledged on many occasions by this Court and other South African Courts. 
Freedom of expression is integral to a democratic society for many reasons. It is 
constitutive of the dignity and autonomy of human beings. Moreover, without it, the 
ability of citizens to make responsible political decisions and to participate effectively 
in public life would be stifled.40 
 
In this paragraph, the Court refers to the two different types of justification that get offered in 
defence of freedom of expression.41 The first is about how freedom of expression relates to the 
interest every individual has in being able to express him or herself freely. In other words, that 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Supra note 4. 
38 Ibid at 872H. 
39 Supra note 1 para 43. 
40 Ibid para 27. See also South African National Defence Force Union v Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 
(CC) paras 7-8; Phillips v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC) 
para 23. 
41 Iain Currie and Johan De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 360-362. 
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freedom of expression is ‘constitutive of the dignity and autonomy of human beings’.42 The 
second type of justification relates to the public, instrumental reasons for protecting freedom 
of expression, namely, that it enables ‘citizens to make responsible political decisions and to 
participate effectively in public life’.43 These two different ways of justifying freedom of 
expression were highlighted by Ronald Dworkin, who argued that the various defences of 
freedom of expression can be divided into constitutive, personal reasons, and instrumental, 
political reasons.44 The law of defamation, and the policy considerations that affect its 
structure, has therefore been infused with constitutional reasoning that has both personal and 
public dimensions. 
It is clear, then, that the structure of defamation law, such as who bears the burden of 
proof with respect to which elements of liability, is affected by various policy considerations, 
some of which relate to questions of fairness and justice between the parties themselves, such 
as what it would be reasonable to require someone to prove, given the information that they 
have access to (whether something is peculiarly within one individual’s sphere of knowledge); 
and what their personal interests are in freedom of expression and reputation. Other 
considerations, however, relate to broader social interests such as the public value of freedom 
of expression, and how these affect the structure of defamation law, and the consequences this 
should have for the individual parties before the court and the defences available to them. The 
Bogoshi defence, for example, helps to protect society’s interest in responsible journalism. 
III THE COMPATIBILITY OF THIS STRUCTURE WITH THE RISK-AS-INJURY 
INTERPRETATION OF DEFAMATION LAW 
It is clear from the above that the structure of defamation law is justified in various ways. The 
presumptions of wrongfulness and intention can be justified by referring to the fact that, in the 
course of human experience, defamatory publications tend to happen intentionally and they 
tend to be unjustified. Furthermore, the circumstances that might justify the publication, or 
explain why it was not intentional, are usually essentially within the defendant’s sphere of 
knowledge. These reasons help to justify why the presumptions are made in the first place, and 
why a full onus is placed on the defendant to justify or excuse his behaviour. Constitutional 
considerations also now feature in this policy mix. Besides the fact that the defendant is usually 
best placed to justify his own behaviour, placing the onus on the defendant to defend his 
                                                 
42 Khumalo v Holomisa supra note 1 para 27. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ronald Dworkin Freedom’s Law (1996) 200. See also Currie and De Waal op cit note 41 360-361. 
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behaviour is now also regarded as the most appropriate way to balance the public and private 
interests in freedom of expression and reputation, given the defences that have been made 
available to him. The question now is whether this existing framework is consistent with the 
risk-as-injury interpretation. 
 First, the justificatory defences that have been designed to regulate the expression of 
defamatory assertions would still be applicable, in and of themselves, to defamatory assertions 
that increased the risk of reputational harm. The conduct in question is still the publication of 
a defamatory assertion, and so defences that concern themselves with defamatory assertions 
could still sensibly be applied. The risk interpretation does not alter the type of conduct that is 
under review, only the nature of the harm to which that conduct gives rise. So, the question is 
not whether the defences could still apply to that type of conduct, but whether they would still 
be justified. The nature of the wrong has been reinterpreted, so would the defences still be 
attaining the right balance of personal and public interests? 
 The risk-as-injury interpretation fits with the considerations described above just as 
easily as the causation-of-harm interpretation. Construing the delictual act as an increase in the 
risk of reputational harm, rather than the causing of reputational harm, does not clash with the 
justifications that are currently used to justify the presumptions and the structuring of the 
defences. For example, the defendant would still be best placed to explain why the publication 
of an assertion (and the consequential increase in risk) was justified, or why it was accidental. 
The factual circumstances that would establish one of the justificatory defences, or a lack of 
fault, would still essentially lie within the defendant’s sphere of knowledge. 
The balancing of constitutional interests that also manifests itself in the defences would 
also remain unaltered. The respective weight attached to freedom of expression and protecting 
people’s reputations would remain essentially the same. The fact that one is dealing with an 
increase in the risk of reputational harm, rather than the causing of reputational harm would 
not seem to require an alteration to the existing defences and the burdens that fall on the 
defendant. The concern would still essentially be about protecting people’s reputations versus 
the need to allow people to express themselves. For example, given the acknowledged 
difficulties that can arise in proving the truth and falsity of statements, it would still seem 
appropriate not to require the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the defamatory assertion, and 
instead require the person who made the decision to publish the defamatory assertion to 
establish the defence of truth and public benefit.  As the Constitutional Court stated in Khumalo 
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v Holomisa, ‘[i]n not requiring a plaintiff to establish falsity, but in leaving the allegation and 
proof of falsity to a defendant to a defamation charge, the common law chooses to let the risk 
lie on defendants. After all, it is by definition the defendant who published the statement and 
thereby caused the harm to the plaintiff.’45 The same consideration would apply to someone 
who has chosen to publish a statement that has increased the risk of reputational harm; the 
defendant has chosen to publish a statement that has increased the risk of reputational harm.  
Moreover, the other ways in which a publication might be justified, such as it being 
reasonable to have published the statement in the circumstances (Bogoshi) or the fact that the 
situation was privileged, or that one was making a fair comment, still apply to statements that 
increase the risk of reputational harm, just as clearly as they applied to statements that caused 
reputational harm. The reasons that justify a statement that caused reputational harm would 
also be reasons that justified a statement that merely increased the risk of reputational harm. 
This is the fundamental point when it comes to the compatibility of the existing defences with 
the risk interpretation. If a defence exists that was held to rebut the presumption of 
wrongfulness in the context of causation of reputational harm, then such a defence would 
certainly remain a good defence in the context of an increase in the risk of reputational harm. 
If anything, the risk interpretation would lower the weight that gets attached to reputation, 
rather than the weight that gets attached to freedom of expression. For an increase in the risk 
of reputational harm appears to be a lesser infringement of the right to reputation than the 
causing of reputational harm. In the one case you just have an increase in the risk of harm, 
while in the other case you have actual reputational harm. Presumably, actual reputational harm 
is a more egregious wrong than risking reputational harm. So, the existing defences, which 
amount to circumstances in which freedom of expression outweighed reputation, would apply 
just as forcefully, if not more forcefully, in the case of risk. 
Moreover, this shift in weight does not seem sufficient to precipitate a change in the 
structure of the law, such as attempting to make things easier for the defendant. One might 
think that if the defendant has infringed the right to reputation to a lesser degree by merely 
increasing the risk of reputational harm, rather than having caused reputational harm, then the 
respective obligations that fall on the plaintiff and the defendant in a defamation case might 
need to be altered to make things easier for the defendant. Reputations do still deserve 
protection, however, and the existing balancing act that is captured in the existing structure of 
                                                 
45 Supra note 1 para 38. 
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defamation law still seems to be an appropriate way to balance our interests in reputation and 
freedom of expression. If one bears in mind that it can be difficult to prove the causal impact 
of defamatory assertions (and thereby prove that harm was actually done), in conjunction with 
the fact that the defendant chose to publish the statement and thereby increase the risk of 
reputational harm, then there does not seem to be a reason to change the law to be more 
defendant friendly. 
IV CONCLUSION 
Given that the risk-as-injury interpretation is being presented as an alternative way of justifying 
the current practice, it is important that that interpretation fits with the outward appearance and 
structure of that practice. Defamation law is constituted by legal rules and presumptions, 
defences, and remedies, and the risk-as-injury interpretation would need to be consistent with 
these if it hopes to be regarded as a way of justifying these practices. This chapter began the 
demonstration of compatibility by showing that the current way in which the presumptions and 
defences of defamation law are understood is consistent with the risk-as-injury interpretation. 
 The respective burdens of plaintiffs and defendants are currently justified by referring 
to the way in which defamatory conduct is usually unjustified, and that the defendant is best 
placed to prove factual circumstances that might justify or excuse the conduct. These reasons 
still hold when assuming the risk-as-injury interpretation. 
 The overall fairness of the law is also influenced by other considerations, such as the 
various defences that are available to the defendant, and how these relate both to fairness inter 
partes and personal and public constitutional considerations. These, too, seem consistent with 
the risk-as-injury interpretation. First, if the defences could justify the behaviour of a defendant 
who had actually caused reputational harm by making an assertion, then they would certainly 
justify the behaviour of a defendant who had merely increased the risk of reputational harm by 
making an assertion. Second, this shift in the gravity of the infringement of the right to 
reputation (merely increasing risk versus causing reputational harm) does not seem to require 
a change in the respective burdens of the plaintiff and the defendant. It remains the case that 
reputation needs to be protected, and it remains the case that the causal impact of defamatory 
assertions can be hard to trace. Moreover, the defendant has also made the decision to publish 
the defamatory assertion. These considerations, along with the fact that the defendant is best 
placed to justify or excuse his own behaviour, suggest that the current burdens of proof that are 
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placed on the defendant remain sound, even when the defendant has merely increased the risk 
of reputational harm, rather than having caused reputational harm.
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CHAPTER 7: THE FUNCTION OF DAMAGES (1): RISK AND 
PUBLIC VINDICATION 
I INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters have attempted to explain why the current rules constituting defamation law 
are best interpreted through the lens of risk. In particular, it was argued that the wrong for 
which the defendant is being held liable is best construed as a wrong of having increased the 
risk of reputational harm, rather than a wrong of having caused reputational harm. As that 
argument is an attempt to interpret the existing rules in a new way, this alternative justification 
needs to be compatible with the current features of the law, including the remedial response. 
The primary remedy for defamation in South Africa is damages. The courts, moreover, 
typically understand those damages as serving two functions, namely, vindicating the 
plaintiff’s reputation and compensating the plaintiff for hurt feelings. This chapter will explain 
that the idea of damages as public vindication is compatible with the risk interpretation. The 
following chapter will explain that the idea of damages for hurt feelings is also compatible with 
the risk interpretation. In that way, the alternative interpretation of the wrong can be seen to be 
consistent with the existing remedial response. 
II DAMAGES AS PUBLIC VINDICATION AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH 
THE RISK-AS-INJURY INTERPRETATION 
Damages for defamation are generally interpreted by the South African courts as serving two 
purposes. First, they act as compensation for the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation by serving 
as a public vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation. Second, they act as compensation for hurt 
feelings. In Le Roux v Dey (CC),1 Brand AJ states for the majority that ‘according to established 
principle, an award of damages for defamation should compensate the plaintiff for both 
wounded feelings and loss of reputation. It is also accepted that in some cases the former may 
outweigh the latter’.2 What it means to compensate one for ‘loss of reputation’ can be hard to 
pin down, however. Compensation for loss of reputation, as distinct from compensation for 
hurt feelings, has historically been interpreted by the courts as either vindicating one’s 
reputation in the eyes of the public, or as having to do with indemnifying one for the various 
                                                 
1 Le Roux and others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as amici curiae) 2011 
(3) SA 274 (CC). 
2 Ibid para 151. 
108 
 
losses that may have arisen from an injury to one’s reputation. Both of these ideas can be 
accommodated under the concept of ‘compensation for loss of reputation’. The idea of 
vindication in the eyes of the public is the more modern interpretation, however, with only 
older cases giving express recognition to the idea of a full indemnification of the plaintiff for 
any losses that have arisen as a result of the defamatory publication, such as financial losses. 
The following extracts demonstrate this emphasis on public vindication. 
 In Mogale and others v Seima,3 a unanimous Supreme Court of Appeal endorsed a High 
Court decision that explained general damages in terms of wounded feelings and vindication 
in the eyes of the public. The context was a discussion of the inappropriateness of punitive 
damages in the law of delict but the SCA was nevertheless discussing the ‘principles’ of 
damages4 in a case where the ‘sole issue’ was one of ‘quantum’,5 so the dicta about the function 
of damages carries some weight. The court endorsed the following statement made by Hattingh 
J in Esselen v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd and Others:6 
In a defamation action the plaintiff essentially seeks the vindication of his reputation 
by claiming compensation from the defendant; if granted, it is by way of damages and 
it operates in two ways - as a vindication of the plaintiff in the eyes of the public, and 
as conciliation to him for the wrong done to him. Factors aggravating the defendant’s 
conduct may, of course, serve to increase the amount awarded to the plaintiff as 
compensation, either to vindicate his reputation or to act as a solatium. In general, a 
civil court, in a defamation case, awards damages to solace plaintiff’s wounded feelings 
and not to penalise or to deter the defendant for his wrongdoing nor to deter people 
from doing what the defendant has done. Clearly punishment and deterrence are 
functions of the criminal law, not the law of delict.7 
 So, while the SCA was focusing on the unacceptable nature of punitive damages, that 
Court and the High Court understood non-punitive damages as essentially being about 
compensation for wounded feelings and vindication in the eyes of the public. 
 A similar view was endorsed by Willis J in Mineworkers Investment Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Modibane8 when discussing the function and value of possible alternative remedial responses, 
such as apologies. His view has also been endorsed by a minority judgment in the 
Constitutional Court.9 Willis J stated that ‘the harm done by a defamatory statement is the 
                                                 
3 2008 (5) SA 637 (SCA). 
4 Ibid para 12. 
5 Ibid para 8. 
6 1992 (3) SA 764 (T). 
7 Mogale v Seima supra note 3 para 11. 
8 2002 (6) SA 512 (W). 
9 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC) para 64 per Mokgoro J who was in the majority on the merits but was 
in the minority on the question of damages. 
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damage to the reputation of the victim. A public apology which will usually be far less 
expensive than an award of damages, can “set the record straight”, restore the reputation of the 
victim, give the victim the necessary satisfaction, avoid serious financial harm to the culprit 
and encourage rather than inhibit freedom of expression’.10 Therefore, even though Willis J 
was considering the value and function of an unorthodox remedial response (namely, an 
apology), he also ultimately endorses the modern understanding of the basic function of any 
remedial response to defamation, namely, that it must satisfy the victim and ‘set the record 
straight’, i.e. vindicate the victim’s reputation in the eyes of the public. 
 One might wonder, though, how a monetary award can signify that someone’s 
reputation should be restored or has been vindicated.11 Where might a monetary award get its 
communicative potential or symbolic significance? Two features of the wider social and legal 
context appear to be relevant: First, damages are coupled with a declaratory judgment, where 
the meaning of the award can be expressed using spoken and written language. Second, the 
legal community assumes that the wider community ascribes meaning to different quantums of 
damages, an assumption that probably made its way into South African legal practice from 
English law. These two features of the vindicatory potential of damages will be unpacked 
below, before it is shown that this account of damages is consistent with the risk interpretation. 
(a) Declaratory judgments and public vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation 
When speaking about damages serving as a vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation, one cannot 
overlook the supportive communicative role played by the declaratory judgment itself. The 
vindicatory potential of a declaratory judgment was noted by Nugent JA in his minority 
decision in Media 24 v Taxi Securitisation.12 In his argument that corporations do have a right 
to their reputations13 but that they should not be entitled to general damages under the law of 
defamation,14 Nugent JA argues that a corporation’s reputation can be vindicated in the eyes 
                                                 
10 Mineworkers Investment Co (Pty) Ltd v Modibane 2002 (6) SA 512 (W) at 525. 
11 The idea that damages or declaratory judgments can be an effective means of communication or vindication has 
been criticised. See Dario Milo Defamation and Freedom of Speech (2008) 261-264; Norman Witzleb and Robyn 
Caroll ‘The role of vindication in torts damages’ (2009) 17 Tort Law Review 16 at 34-35. 
12 Media 24 Ltd and others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd (Avusa Media Ltd and others as amici curiae) 2011 
(5) SA 329 (SCA). 
13 ‘I see no reason why a trading corporation should not have the right to insist that others must not damage its 
good name unless they show legal justification for doing so, and that it is entitled to a legal remedy when that 
occurs’ (para 78). 
14 ‘The view that I take is that general damages to a trading corporation are inherently punitive, and thus not 
permitted by our law’ (para 65). 
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of the public by non-monetary remedies such as declaratory judgments.15 He thought that 
general damages in the law of defamation are primarily about compensating human beings for 
hurt feelings, which corporations do not have.16 Nugent JA therefore thought that vindication 
can occur by way of the declaratory judgment, rather than needing damages to assist in that 
vindication. 
Even if one disagreed with the claim that damages are not necessary, it seems likely 
that the vindicatory significance of damages is necessarily supported by the contents of the 
declaratory judgment itself. The declaratory judgment provides significant communicative 
context and helps to provide symbolic significance to the damages themselves. The fact that 
the damages even relate to a wrong against one’s reputation is only achieved through the 
declaratory judgment, for example. 
An interesting feature of declaratory judgements, however, is that their vindicatory 
potential can vary, depending on what the courts actually say about the character of the plaintiff 
and the reasons for their final judgment. If one’s reputation has actually been lowered (i.e, if 
people do actually think less of one), then a declaratory judgment can signify that the attack 
was unlawfully made. Yet that does not necessarily amount to an actual vindication of one’s 
reputation, for the courts might say very little about one’s deserved reputation or character, and 
might instead focus on the unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct. In other words, declaratory 
judgments can express nuanced judgments about one’s character, which may or may not help 
to clear one’s name. While the basic idea behind public vindication must be that the written 
opinion of the courts and an award of damages can help to restore one’s reputation by helping 
to make people change their opinion about you once again (or not believe the assertion in the 
first place), what the court actually says affects the vindicatory potential of the judgment. For 
example, in Norton and others v Ginsberg,17 the Trial Court had stated the following: 
Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a sum of money which, so far as is possible, bears a 
proper relation to the nature of the defamation and which will serve as the clearest proof 
of the Court’s view that the defamatory statements were and are completely devoid of 
truth.18 
                                                 
15 ‘Good name is restored when those who have heard the defamation are told that what was said is not true and 
it is retracted. So far as courts can restore good name, it is restored when a declaration to the same effect is made... 
That applies as much to a natural as to a juristic person’ (para 66). 
16 ‘Damages in our law are meant to compensate for loss. Humans suffer loss from defamation because humans 
experience feeling, and they experience feeling because they are alive... What is compensated for is harm to 
feelings […] Juristic persons do not experience feeling because they exist but they are not alive’ (paras 79-80). 
17 1953 (4) SA 537 (A). 




The reasons the Trial Court gives for its finding for the plaintiff and the quantum of damages 
serve as a relatively emphatic vindication of the plaintiff’s character. The statement that the 
defamatory assertions were ‘completely devoid of truth’ is an emphatic vindication of the 
plaintiff’s reputation. The vindicatory potential of a judgment can vary, however, for the courts 
do not always go as far as the Trial Court did in Norton v Ginsberg. In African Life Assurance 
Society Ltd v Phelan and others,19 for example, the Cape Supreme Court was more reserved, 
only going so far as to say that the attack was unlawfully made: 
 
As to whether this company is or is not a company which is stable and carrying on 
sound business on safe lines it is not for me here to say or pronounce upon, for I am not 
in a position to know whether the company is a good one or not, that not having been 
the object of the present inquiry. The only point before me is whether Mr. Phelan when 
he wrote the article was commenting in a fair way upon the position of the company, 
and was taking up the stand of a critic of a matter of public importance on the proper 
basis and within his rights as recognised by law. I do not think that he confined himself 
within his rights or that he commented in the manner accepted as fair. I am of opinion 
that there should be damages of a substantial nature. The judgment of the Court is for 
the plaintiff for the sum of £300 with costs.20 
 
The vindicatory intention or effect of this sort of statement is questionable, given that the focus 
is on the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct rather than on the true state of the plaintiff’s 
character or deserved reputation. Not every finding of unlawful publication necessarily entails 
vindication of one’s character in any strong sense, and whether it does will partly depend on 
what the court actually says. A finding that the situation was not privileged, for example, need 
not indicate anything about the plaintiff’s actual character, but it would be open to the court to 
say something in that regard. The English Court of Appeal has recognised this point, stating 
that a judgment rejecting a defence of truth by the defendant is ‘at least capable of providing 
some vindication of a claimant’s reputation’, but that the extent of the vindication depends on 
the circumstances, such as whether the defence was struck out for technical reasons or whether 
it had been dismissed on the merits, and that a judgment might still need to be supported by 
damages if it is to have an adequate vindicatory effect.21 
 Declaratory judgments can operate to clear the plaintiff’s reputation, then, by being an 
authoritative statement about one’s character by an important public institution, in the hope, 
                                                 
19 (1908) 25 SC 743. 
20 Ibid at 759-760. 
21 Purnell v BusinessF1 Magazine Ltd and another [2007] EWCA Civ 744 paras 27, 29-30, 34 (per Laws LJ). 
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presumably, that the plaintiff can actively use the judgment to vindicate his reputation in his 
community. What the courts actually say can affect the vindicatory potential of these awards, 
however. 
 In the case where reputational harm has already occurred, the hope must be that the 
declaratory judgment will help to persuade people to change their minds about the plaintiff’s 
character again. As far as risk of reputational harm is concerned, an authoritative statement by 
a public institution about one’s character could mitigate the risk of reputational harm, either by 
being wielded by the plaintiff in his or her community or by the judgment being communicated 
by the press. In the same way that one assertion can increase the risk of reputational harm, 
another, authoritative assertion can decrease the risk that the defamatory assertion will be 
heeded. The judgment can be used, in other words, to pre-empt people resolving to think less 
of the plaintiff. 
 It is true that these attempts at vindication might not always be effective. As Kit Barker 
puts it, discussing the general idea that declaratory judgments can be used to mark wrongs or 
declare rights publicly, ‘[s]ince all such public messaging functions rely for their validity upon 
untested empirical assumptions, it is only right to question them. Most judicial declarations of 
right will reach only a narrow audience, unless it is made a condition of an order that they are 
more broadly publicised.’22 The same point could be applied in the context of public 
vindication of one’s reputation. Nevertheless, one can still theoretically understand the function 
of declaratory judgments as being an attempt to mitigate the risk of reputational harm 
materialising by communicating vindicatory assertions that authoritatively oppose the 
defamatory assertion. Whether the plaintiff can wield the judgment effectively and whether it 
reaches necessary members of the community might indeed be questionable. But those 
empirical concerns do not seem to be good enough reasons, in and of themselves, to make no 
effort to mitigate the risk that reputational harm will materialise. And one way to mitigate the 
risk of reputational harm is to give the plaintiff an authoritative counter-assertion that can help 
prevent people from resolving to actually think less of the plaintiff. 
 However, even if using the law to perform acts of public messaging is questionable, 
there are reasons that it is essential in the case of defamation. There is a difference between 
using the law to vindicate rights generally (i.e., attest to the importance of the right or the 
underlying interest) and using the law to counteract a defamatory assertion by making 
                                                 
22 Kit Barker ‘Private and public: The mixed concept of vindication in torts and private law’ in Stephen GA Pitel, 
Jason W Neyers & Erika Chamberlain (eds) Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) 84. 
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vindicatory assertions in response. This difference will be explored in the following section, 
where the idea of general vindicatory damages will be unpacked, and its relationship to 
damages for defamation made clear. 
(b) Declaratory judgments and vindication of the right to reputation 
It is possible to supplement the above explanation of the function of declaratory judgments by 
also recognising the role that those declarations play in attesting to the value of reputation itself. 
This supplementary explanation is derived from recent theoretical developments in Anglo-
American tort law. The Anglo-American theory is worth examining because it sheds further 
light on the meaning of public vindication in the context of defamation, and helps to explain 
why defamation law’s social messaging function is necessary. 
(i) Rights-based accounts of tort law and their contributions to the theory of damages 
One of the most significant theoretical debates about English tort law in recent years has been 
about whether tort law is rights-based or loss-based.23 What it means to have a ‘rights-based 
view’ can vary, however. Nevertheless, Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson have outlined 
some general themes that tend to be associated with the rights movement in tort law. First, 
rights-based accounts are strongly associated with an anti-instrumentalist view of tort law. 
Rights-scholars emphasise the fact that tort law is about interpersonal morality, rather than 
being about the pursuit of public welfare goals. Second, rights-based accounts are sometimes 
contrasted with loss-based accounts. Robert Stevens, a prominent advocate of a rights-based 
view, defines loss-based accounts as those that hold that ‘the defendant should be liable where 
he is at fault for causing the claimant loss unless there is a good reason why not’.24 This 
contrasts with rights-based accounts in that liability does not seem to require the violation of 
primary rights, and instead starts with the premise that losses should always be compensated 
unless there is a good reason why they should not be. Loss-based accounts start with loss and 
look for reasons not to compensate them, while rights-based accounts start with a rights 
violation and ask what remedy is required for such a violation. Nolan and Robertson make the 
important point, however, that whether loss-based accounts are distinct from rights-based 
accounts largely turns on whether the compensation for loss is based on social or public-welfare 
grounds (such as a desire to spread losses fairly across society or across those who can bear 
                                                 
23 As Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson put it, ‘rights analysis has been at its most provocative and vociferous 
in relation to tort law, and has attracted an equally vociferous response from its critics’ (Nolan & Robertson 
‘Rights and Private Law’ in Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson (eds) Rights and Private Law (2011) 2). 
24 Robert Stevens Torts and Rights (2007) 1. 
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them most easily) or whether it is based on a need to compensate for wrongful losses, i.e. losses 
that arise from rights violations. They note that if the loss-based approach limited 
compensation for loss to compensation for wrongful losses, then the difference with a rights-
based approach becomes less clear. So long as wrongful losses means losses caused by 
infringing a right (and therefore being a wrong), there is less to distinguish such a loss-based 
account from a rights-based approach.25 The third general characteristic of rights-based 
approaches is their approach to methodology. They emphasise the fact that their approach is 
‘interpretive’; they claim to be striving for the ‘best account’ of private law or private law 
doctrines.26 According to Stephen Smith, interpretive accounts do not attempt simply to 
describe the law as it currently stands (descriptive), nor to give an account of an idealised law 
(prescriptive), nor to explain the historical forces that have led to the law’s current shape 
(historical). Instead, interpretive accounts aim to reveal ‘an intelligible order in the law, so far 
as such an order exists’.27 The focus, then, is on providing a compelling moral or normative 
justification of the law in a way that more or less fits with the existing outward appearance and 
structures of the law. According to Nolan and Robertson, interpretive theories aim to provide 
‘the most plausible, coherent and appealing account of the law as it stands’.28 One of the most 
interesting aspects of the various rights-based accounts, however, has been their 
reinterpretation of the function of damages. As Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson put it, ‘the 
most striking claims of rights theorists, and the most significant implications of rights analysis, 
may well be those that concern secondary or remedial rights, rather than primary rights’, and 
that ‘rights-based analysis has ignited debate on a number of significant remedial issues in 
private law’.29 
(ii) Vindicatory damages 
One prominent idea associated with rights-based accounts is that there might be a separate head 
of damages called ‘vindicatory damages’. This idea is associated with rights-based accounts 
because the focus of these damages is on vindicating the infringed right, rather than, say, 
compensating one for loss. As Jason Varuhas explains, 
‘Vindication’ is accepted by many textbook writers as a function of the law of torts. It 
is a concept increasingly invoked in case law and commentary within tort, one which 
                                                 
25 Nolan & Robertson op cit note 23 at 3-4. 
26 Ibid at 5. 
27 Stephen A Smith Contract Theory (2004) 4-5. See also A Beever & C Rickett ‘Interpretive legal theory and the 
academic lawyer’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 320. 
28 Nolan & Robertson op cit note 23 at 6. 
29 Ibid at 19-20. 
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has rhetorical appeal particularly when coupled with the idea of ‘rights’, and which has 
gained increasing currency with the emergence of a ‘rights’-movement within the law 
of torts and the ever-growing influence of human rights.30 
He also notes, however, that ‘the exact meaning of the concept has not been closely examined 
and remains relatively obscure.’31 
 The concept has indeed been used in different ways. Robert Stevens notes that the label 
vindicatory damages is sometimes used to describe something similar to his substitutive 
damages thesis (discussed in more detail in the following chapter): 
A meme which has gained significant prominence recently within private law is the 
idea that damages are sometimes awarded not to compensate for losses consequential 
upon the suffering of a wrong, nor to strip the defendant of any gain he or she may have 
made as a result of the wrong, but rather because of the wrong itself. I have labelled 
this award substitutive damages, whilst others have preferred the label vindicatory 
damages.32 
 The idea of damages being awarded ‘because of the wrong itself’ is capable of many 
interpretations, however, rather than only being synonymous with the idea of substitutive 
damages. Andrew Burrows, for example, notes that the term vindicatory damages has been 
used by the Privy Council in cases on appeal from Commonwealth courts that involved the 
breach of Commonwealth constitutional rights (meaning that these are cases that fall outside 
of tort law). His analysis of vindication in the context of those cases is that the term is being 
used to capture something similar to punitive or exemplary damages in English tort law, a 
function that is obscured by the language of ‘vindication’: 
“vindicatory damages” are multi-functional and are concerned, where compensatory 
damages are inadequate to achieve these aims, to reflect public outrage, to emphasise 
the importance of the right or the seriousness of the infringement, and to deter future 
wrongdoing [...] It further follows that, given the existence of punitive or exemplary 
damages in tort law, there would be nothing to be gained, except confusion, by 
introducing the idea of awarding “vindicatory damages” into tort law’ [given that the 
above functions are carried out in tort law using punitive or exemplary damages].33 
 Jason Varuhas’ concept of vindication provides a third way to understand the idea of 
vindicatory damages. It deserves consideration because it might at first seem like a better, 
alternative explanation of damages for defamation. However, there are reasons not to prefer it 
over the traditional idea of public vindication, as explained below. An analysis of his account 
                                                 
30 Jason NE Varuhas ‘The concept of ‘vindication’ in the law of torts: rights, interests and damages’ (2014) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 1 at 2. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Robert Stevens ‘Rights and other things’ in Nolan & Robertson op cit note 23 at 121-122. 
33 Andrew Burrows ‘Damages and Rights’ in Nolan & Robertson op cit note 23 at 304-306. 
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of vindication also helps to explain why public messaging is necessary in the case of 
defamation. 
 Varuhas attempts to draw a middle course between the camps represented by Robert 
Stevens (damages are non-compensatory) and Andrew Burrows (damages are compensatory). 
Varuhas agrees with Stevens that the idea of damages that do not have compensation-for-
factual-loss as their primary function is a crucial concept, but he disagrees with Stevens that 
such damages are the primary form of damages in tort law. Instead, they feature in certain torts, 
most significantly in the torts actionable per se (torts that typically feature strict rather than 
fault-based liability and that allow for substantial damages even in the absence of proof of 
factual loss).34 Varuhas also disagrees with Andrew Burrows, however, because Varuhas sees 
Burrows as attacking the idea of damages that do not compensate one for factual loss by 
pointing to weaknesses in others’ accounts, rather than conclusively showing that such 
damages do not exist.35 Varuhas attempts to steer a middle course by explaining how some 
damages have an overarching vindicatory function which is not about compensation for loss, 
but which can still be described as compensatory. 
 In one sense, a right is vindicated whenever a remedy is offered for its infringement. If 
there was no right, then there would be no remedy. So, every remedial response affirms or 
vindicates rights in this weak sense. The concept of vindication at work in Varuhas’s account 
means more than this, however; vindication in Varuhas’s strong sense means ‘to attest to, 
affirm and reinforce the importance and inherent value of particular interests.’36 In performing 
a vindicatory function in the strong sense, the law is doing more than just affirming the 
existence of a right, but affirming the special importance of the interest underlying a particular 
right. Varuhas thinks that this sense of vindication can be found in the English law of torts and 
that this function explains some of the differences between, say, the torts actionable per se and 
torts that require proof of loss before they are actionable, like negligence: ‘For the TAPS [torts 
actionable per se] vindication is the primary function. For other torts, specifically negligence, 
their radically different structures and remedial approach suggest a primary function of 
compensating for fault-based harm.’37 
                                                 
34 Varuhas op cit note 30 at 7. 
35 Ibid at 3. 
36 Ibid at 6. 
37 Ibid at 8. 
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 The vindicatory purpose of torts actionable per se is ‘to afford strong protection from 
external interference to the most basic of personal and proprietary interests’.38 This vindicatory 
function explains some of their features, such as strict rather than fault-based liability and 
getting substantial damages even in the absence of proof of factual loss.39 In order to achieve 
the vindicatory purpose outlined above, the courts construct what he calls ‘normative 
damage’,40 and it is for this normative damage that one is receiving compensatory damages 
that have the ultimate function of vindicating the protected interest: 
That an interference with the protected interest is in itself recognized as a form of 
damage is explicable by reference to the vindicatory aims of the law: in “constructing” 
this form of damage the law is seeking an end, to protect basic interests and to attest to 
and reinforce their importance and inherent worth. The status within the legal order and 
inherent value of the interests are reinforced by providing for monetary redress 
wherever those interests are wrongfully interfered with regardless of whether the 
interference has any negative effects on the claimant, such as lost earnings or mental 
suffering.41 
 Given this type of compensatory damages, as well as the existence of exemplary 
damages, there is then also no need for a special head of damages called vindicatory damages, 
he argues.42 Varuhas endorses a particular concept of vindication, then, without thinking that a 
new category of damages needs to be recognised. 
 The question now is whether Varuhas’s functional account is a superior justification for 
damages for defamation in South Africa than the orthodox accounts that view damages as being 
aimed at public vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation and compensation for hurt feelings. 
Defamation in South Africa, after all, does not require proof of factual loss, which might 
suggest that normative damage and vindication in Varuhas’s sense is at work.43 Furthermore, 
Varuhas notes that reputation is the kind of important interest that vindicatory torts would 
protect.44 Could it be, then, that the idea of normative damage and vindicatory damages offers 
a better account than compensation by way of public vindication and hurt feelings? I think that 
there are two reasons to deny that vindication provides a superior alternative to the functions 
described in this and the following chapter, although vindication in the weak sense can still be 
retained when thinking about the function of declaratory judgments and damages. 
                                                 
38 Ibid at 7. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid at 16. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid at 39. 
43 See the discussion of defamation by Varuhas op cit note 30 at 24-26. 
44 Ibid at 10. 
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(iii) Vindication in the weak sense being a subsidiary function of all judicial remedies 
The first reason to deny that vindication offers an alternative understanding of damages is the 
point made by Andrew Burrows and Kit Barker that vindication in some sense is achieved 
through all judicial remedies and recognitions of rights. This is not vindication in Varuhas’s 
strong sense, however. Andrew Burrows makes the following point about the way in which a 
weak sense of vindication underlies all judicial remedies for civil wrongs: 
all judicial monetary and non-monetary remedies for civil wrongs can be seen as having 
the subsidiary function of vindicating the right infringed. So, for example, the primary 
function of compensatory damages is to compensate the claimant’s loss but, in so doing, 
one is also inevitably vindicating the right infringed [...] It is only in respect of 
declarations and nominal damages that, in contrast, can one come close to saying that 
the primary function is to vindicate the right.45 
The concept of vindication at work here is Varuhas’s first, weak sense of vindication: 
Legal rights are vindicated by tort law in the basic sense that the law affirms the 
existence of the right through recognition of an action for breach, and providing for 
remedies such as damages and injunctions to redress violations. In this sense all torts 
share a vindicatory function, as do any bodies of law that provide for actions in respect 
of breaches of given rights.46 
A similar point is made by Kit Barker, who defines vindication in such a way that the 
term captures a number of well-recognised judicial practices: 
At its highest level of generality, then, a court vindicates private rights when it acts 
positively to affirm them. It does so, I suggest below, when it (i) prevents their 
infringement, when it (ii) declares them publicly, when it (iii) enforces them 
specifically and when it (iv) reverses the effects of their infringement. It is less clear 
that it does so in any way that is distinct from those just mentioned when it punishes 
those who violate them, although there is some debate about this issue [...] Collectively, 
these four events comprise private law’s conception of vindication.47 
 If this definition of vindication is used, then the orthodox understanding of damages 
would already amount to a vindication of the right to reputation. Vindication in this sense 
would not provide an alternative to the function of those damages, then, but would merely 
bolster one’s general understanding of their function. They would still be mitigating the risk of 
reputational harm, but in so doing one could also say that they are thereby vindicating the right 
to reputation in the sense of confirming its existence. This view is compatible with, and 
supplements, the orthodox understanding of declaratory judgments and damages, rather than 
                                                 
45 Burrows op cit note 33 at 304. 
46 Varuhas op cit note 30 at 6. 
47 Kit Barker ‘Private and public: The mixed concept of vindication in torts and private law’ in Stephen GA Pitel, 
Jason W Neyers & Erika Chamberlain (eds) Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (2013) 68. 
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being an alternative to them. However, this does not provide a response to Varuhas’s account 
of vindication, for it does not respond to Varuhas’s second (strong) sense of vindication, which 
could indeed provide an alternative explanation of the function of damages. Explaining why it 
is not a superior alternative helps to shed light on the nature of traditional public vindication 
too. 
(iv) Scepticism about vindicatory social messaging 
There is reason to be sceptical about whether Varuhas’s strong sense of vindication does 
provide a better account in the South African context than the orthodox account. 
 The first obstacle is that it would be at odds with the case law and what judges 
understand themselves to be doing. The concepts of public vindication and compensation for 
hurt feelings are well-established in the case law, as shown in the previous chapter. 
Nevertheless, one can still ask whether Varuhas’s account offers a better moral justification of 
damages, such that one should replace the standard justification of those damages. If we 
adopted an ‘interpretive’ methodological approach, then Varuhas’s account would be assessed 
according to four criteria, namely, fit, transparency, morality and coherence.48 Fit concerns 
how well the theory matches the case law, such as the outcomes of decisions. Transparency 
concerns how well the theory matches the reasoning expressed by judges. Morality concerns 
how the law might best be justified, even if this justification is not widely adopted in practice. 
And coherence means, in its weakest sense, that the law is not presented as contradictory, or, 
in its strongest sense, that the law is a unified system, perhaps under a single principle. It might 
be that Varuhas’s account scores low on transparency because it does not match the reasoning 
of judges, but it might score highly on fit, because it matches the outcomes of cases, and highly 
on morality, because it might be a superior moral justification of the practice of defamation 
law. It is not clear, however, that it does provide such a compelling moral justification that it 
manages to overcome the low score on transparency. The reason is that Varuhas’s second  and 
strong sense of vindication views damages as having an expressive function: they exist to attest 
to the importance of the underlying interest (reputation). But it is questionable whether such an 
expressive function really deserves to be elevated to the primary justification of damages, 
rather than being a subsidiary function that happens by way of public vindication of the 
plaintiff’s reputation and general recognition of the right to reputation. Kit Barker presents the 
following argument against damages having a primary expressive function: 
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120 
 
Since all such public messaging functions rely for their validity upon untested empirical 
assumptions, it is only right to question them. Most judicial declarations of right will 
reach only a narrow audience, unless it is made a condition of an order that they are 
more broadly publicised. The extent to which monetary judgments are capable of 
conveying precise public messages is also seriously questionable and indeed, in the 
majority of cases, the provision of clear reasons for judgment may be a more exact 
educational tool when it comes to explaining and validating the values upon which 
society is based. Money is a powerful incentive, but an inarticulate mode of expression. 
There are also, I think, real issues about whether it would be appropriate to make a 
defendant pay, through private litigation costs and damages awards, simply for the 
public to be better informed about rights generally.49  
 It may seem ironic that an argument was presented earlier generally supporting the idea 
about judicial declarations publicly vindicating one’s reputation through their expressive 
function, and now expressing scepticism about damages being able to perform the social 
messaging of attesting to the importance of reputation in general. But in the case of defamation, 
messaging is at the heart of the wrong - a message about one’s reputation constitutes the wrong 
- and it makes sense to counter that with an alternative, authoritative judicial message about 
the plaintiff’s reputation. One is fighting symbols with symbols, or messages with messages. 
What is being doubted here is the need to view the primary function of damages for defamation 
as being about generally attesting to the importance of people’s reputations, which is what 
vindication in Varuhas’ strong sense is all about. It makes sense to communicate something 
about the plaintiff’s reputation in order to combat the wrong of defamation, given that the 
wrong itself is a message about the plaintiff’s reputation. And in so doing, one is also attesting 
to the importance of the underlying interest (vindication in the weak sense). Moreover, it is 
open to the courts to declare the importance of reputation in general whenever they try these 
kinds of cases. There does not seem to be a need in the context of defamation to elevate 
vindication in the strong sense to the primary function of damages or the declaratory judgment. 
 From a functional point of view, the idea of vindicating the plaintiff’s reputation seems 
to be a more compelling justification for the function of damages and the declaratory judgment. 
The idea of vindication in the sense of attesting to the importance of reputation in general could 
rather be seen as a subsidiary function of these awards, one which is probably more precisely 
carried out in the declaratory judgement than in the quantum of damages. In the same way that 
the extent to which the plaintiff’s reputation is vindicated depends on what is said in the 
declaratory judgment, what is said about the value of reputation in general will provide much 
of the substance if vindication of the right to reputation is also sought. 
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 We have seen, then, that declaratory judgments are crucial to the idea of public 
vindication, and that this aspect of the remedial response to defamation is compatible with the 
idea of risk. 
(c) The symbolic significance of monetary awards 
The courts usually focus on the vindicatory potential of damages, however, rather than focusing 
on the fact that a declaratory judgment is being made. It is perhaps taken for granted that the 
damages are awarded in the context of a declaratory judgment. However, one might ask why 
an award of damages is needed on top of a declaratory judgment and how the damages 
themselves can have symbolic significance. One can also ask if this understanding of damages 
is compatible with the risk interpretation. 
We saw above that in his minority judgment in Media 24 v SA Taxi Securitisation,50 
Nugent JA thought that a declaratory judgment would be sufficient to vindicate a corporation’s 
reputation. The idea that damages themselves are also necessary to symbolise that one’s 
reputation has been vindicated has deep roots in South African legal history, however, and 
probably has its origins in English law. 
 In Steenberg v Cooper,51 De Villiers CJ stated that 
 
the only question which remained was what damages should be awarded. The 
Magistrate said that if he had found for the plaintiff, he would have given a farthing 
damages. That would certainly not have cleared the plaintiff's character [...] It was poor 
compensation to a man to have a farthing damages awarded him when he sought to 
clear his character, and show that he had not been guilty of a dishonourable act imputed 
to him. It appears to me that the Magistrate would have been quite justified in giving at 
least £5 damages. The appeal will be allowed, with costs in this Court, and judgment 
entered for the plaintiff for £5 damages.52  
 
As explained by Buchanan J in Hefer v Botha,53 the idea seems to be that ‘something substantial 
should have been awarded to show that the plaintiff had cleared his character’.54 A similar idea 
is expressed in Merwitz v Morris,55 where Juta JP states that ‘£12 would be a substantial 
amount, and would not convey the impression to that section of the public which has dealings 
                                                 
50 Supra note 12. 
51 (1904) 21 SC 493. 
52 Ibid at 495-496. 
53 1910 CPD 238. 
54 Ibid at 239. 
55 1916 CPD 164. 
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with the plaintiff that, although he succeeded in his case yet, as a matter of fact, an imputation 
still clings to him’.56 
This concern about a suitably high quantum is probably adopted from English law. In 
English law, nominal damages were sometimes awarded by a jury who were obliged to award 
some damages due to the fact that a right had been infringed, but who did not think that the 
plaintiff was deserving of substantial compensation. According to Frederick Pollock, whose 
work would have been influential in South Africa at the turn of the twentieth century:57 
 
The other kind of award of nominal damages, where the plaintiff’s demerits earn him 
an illusory sum such as one farthing, is illustrated chiefly by cases on defamation, where 
the words spoken or written by the defendant cannot be fully justified, and yet the 
plaintiff has done so much to provoke them, or is a person of such generally worthless 
character, as not to deserve, in the opinion of the jury, any substantial compensation.58 
 
It was probably this English custom of awarding nominal damages that led the South African 
courts to adopt the idea that a quantum that was too small would not vindicate a deserving 
plaintiff’s character, and that it could instead signify that there is something troubling about 
the plaintiff’s character. Consistent with this, a suitably large quantum is regarded as necessary 
in order to indicate that the plaintiff’s reputation was vindicated. 
This idea that the quantum of damages itself has a symbolic, communicative function 
is still endorsed in England and in other jurisdictions that were influenced by the English 
                                                 
56 Ibid at 166-167. 
57 See Herman Robert Hahlo and Ellison Kahn The Union of South Africa: the Development of its Laws and 
Constitution (1960) 17-20, for a general account of the influence of English law; and Martin Chanock The Making 
of South African Legal Culture, 1902-1936 (2001) 159 for reference to Pollock’s work on tort law in particular. 
See also Helen Scott Unjust Enrichment in South African Law: Rethinking Enrichment by Transfer (2013) 41, 
noting the influence of English nineteenth century textbooks on judges in the Cape Colony.  
58 Frederick Pollock The Law of Torts (1887) Philadelphia: Blackstone Publishing Company 122 [158]. The 
Philadelphia edition of the first edition of this work has been digitised by Google and it is in the public domain. 
It is available online at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112105001152. There had been some renumbering in 
the original Philadelphia text itself and the number in square brackets refers to the corresponding page number of 
the original English edition. 
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common law.59 In England, in Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle,60 Lord Radcliffe stated 
that ‘[a] libel action is fundamentally an action to vindicate a man’s reputation on some point 
as to which he has been falsely defamed, and the damages awarded have to be regarded as the 
demonstrative mark of that vindication.’61 In Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome,62 Lord Hailsham 
took a similar approach, although he also noted the need to point to a convincing award if the 
matter were to come to the public’s attention again in the future: 
 
In actions of defamation and in any other actions where damages for loss of reputation 
are involved, the principle of restitutio in integrum has necessarily an even more highly 
subjective element. Such actions involve a money award which may put the plaintiff in 
a purely financial sense in a much stronger position than he was before the wrong. Not 
merely can he recover the estimated sum of his past and future losses, but, in case the 
libel, driven underground, emerges from its lurking place at some future date, he must 
be able to point to a sum awarded by a jury sufficient to convince a bystander of the 
baselessness of the charge.63 
 
The underlying assumption here on the part of the courts is a sociological one. Perhaps due to 
the practice of juries awarding nominal damages in certain circumstances, the public is 
presumed to understand the symbolic connotations of the various amounts of damages in cases 
such as this one. Whether damages do signify anything at all, then, would depend on whether 
the courts are right to make such assumptions about the public’s understanding of damages.64 
 It seems clear, however, that this is the standard justification on the part of Common 
Law courts, and it seems like the most plausible explanation of what the South African courts 
also mean when they refer to the symbolism that damages can have, as seen the early judgments 
discussed above. 
                                                 
59 In Carson v John Fairfox & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44 at 60-62, the Australian High Court stated the 
following: ‘Specific economic loss and exemplary or punitive damages aside, there are three purposes to be served 
by damages awarded for defamation. The three purposes no doubt overlap considerably in reality and ensure that 
“the amount of a verdict is the product of a mixture of inextricable considerations”. The three purposes are 
consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused to the appellant by the publication, reparation for the harm 
done to the appellant’s personal and (if relevant) business reputation and vindication of the appellant’s reputation. 
The first two purposes are frequently considered together and constitute consolation for the wrong done to the 
appellant. Vindication looks to the attitude of others to the appellant: the sum awarded must be at least the 
minimum necessary to signal to the public the vindication of the appellant’s reputation. “The gravity of the libel, 
the social standing of the parties and the availability of alternative remedies” are all relevant to assessing the 
quantum of damages necessary to vindicate the appellant’. 
60 [1964] AC 371. 
61 Ibid at 396. 
62 [1972] AC 1027. 
63 Ibid at 1071 
64 The idea that damages or declaratory judgments can be an effective means of communication or vindication has 
been criticised. See Dario Milo Defamation and Freedom of Speech (2008) 261-264; Norman Witzleb and Robyn 
Caroll ‘The role of vindication in torts damages’ (2009) 17 Tort Law Review 16 at 34-35. 
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Where one’s reputation has actually been lowered, the idea is that the amount of 
damages awarded has the potential to indicate to people that one’s reputation has now been 
authoritatively cleared, and that they should once again have positive opinions about the 
plaintiff’s character. As Kit Barker puts it, ‘[s]ince reputational damage actually consists in a 
deleterious change in the public perception of a person, its remediation entails an equivalent 
change for the better in that perception and monetary sums are calculated symbolically with 
this objective in mind’.65 
 These sorts of symbolic damages are also capable, in theory, of addressing a risk of 
reputational harm, in the same way that declaratory judgments attempt to decrease the chances 
that the defamatory assertion will be heeded. If the awards do have symbolic significance, then 
the meaning communicated through these awards could reach relevant parties before the 
defamatory assertion does, either by being wielded by the plaintiff in his or her community or 
because the award gets communicated in the press. This would help to mitigate the chances 
that actual reputational harm will materialise. Attempting to decrease the probability that the 
unwelcome event will materialise appears to be a sensible way to provide compensation for a 
harm that is constituted by risk. One could question whether these awards have the symbolic 
significance ascribed to them,66 but, from a doctrinal point of view, symbolic damages are 
consistent with the idea of risk. 
III CONCLUSION 
We have seen that damages for defamation are generally interpreted by the South African 
courts as serving two purposes. First, they act as compensation for the damage to the plaintiff’s 
reputation by serving as a public vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation. The role of 
declaratory judgments in this respect should not be overlooked. Second, they act as 
compensation for hurt feelings. This chapter has attempted to unpack the idea of public 
vindication and show that it is compatible with the risk interpretation of defamation. 
 As the risk interpretation is being proposed as an alternative interpretation of the 
existing practices, it is important that it is compatible with the existing remedial responses. 
Damages that aim at publicly vindicating the plaintiff’s reputation can help to mitigate the 
chances that the threatened damage to the plaintiff’s reputation will materialise, for the plaintiff 
can wield the vindicatory assertions in his or her community to help prevent people from 
                                                 
65 Barker op cit note 22 at 76. Emphasis in the original. 
66 See Dario Milo Defamation and Freedom of Speech (2008) 261-264; Norman Witzleb and Robyn Caroll ‘The 
role of vindication in torts damages’ (2009) 17 Tort Law Review 16 at 34-35. 
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resolving to think less of the plaintiff. The vindicatory assertions could reach potentially 
important members of the community through the press, or the plaintiff can wield the judgment 
herself, should she suspect that someone is apt to think less of her as a result of the defamatory 
publication. 
 The compatibility of the second justification for damages with the risk interpretation, 
namely, compensation for hurt feelings, will be explored in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8: THE FUNCTION OF DAMAGES (2): RISK AND 
HURT FEELINGS 
I INTRODUCTION 
As seen in the previous chapter, damages for defamation in South Africa are understood to 
serve two functions: first, they help to publicly vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation. Second, they 
aim to compensate the plaintiff for hurt feelings. This chapter will explain the idea of damages 
for hurt feelings and show that they too are compatible with the idea that defamation concerns 
an increase in the risk of reputational harm rather than the causing of reputational harm. This 
chapter will also unpack the idea of substitutive damages in more detail, and defend the 
orthodox understandings of damages against that rival explanation. 
II TWO CATEGORIES OF HURT FEELINGS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
In South African case law, ‘hurt feelings’ is a compendious term that captures distinct sets of 
feelings. There are two broad categories. First, hurt feelings can refer to the feelings of 
annoyance that are caused by having to deal with something unpleasant. This is not a concern 
about insult but rather about the emotional or psychological consequences of having been the 
victim of a troublesome wrong. Second, it can refer to the specific feeling of having been 
insulted or treated in a disrespectful manner. 
 The first category is exemplified by the following: The courts, especially in older 
judgments, have referred to ‘the inconvenience and annoyance [the plaintiff] had been 
subjected to’,1 and the ‘natural irritation caused by the article.’2 Such irritation can be caused 
by the fact that one has been worried about friends and family thinking less of one: ‘it has cost 
him a great deal of anxiety and trouble I mean by that mental worry and so forth, in regard to 
his family and his friends; they have all heard what has been said of him.’3 Or the worry could 
be caused by a fear for one’s personal safety as a result of the publication. For example, in a 
case concerning a member of parliament who was said to have asked the police to shoot 
protesting mine workers during a time of labour unrest, the court stated the following: 
 
the Court must bear in mind, in connection with this action, the pain and suffering which 
the words complained of, and spoken of him, have caused him. In the very nature of 
things it must have caused a great deal of mental worry and suffering […] It placed him, 
                                                 
1 Smith v Gradwell (1902) 16 EDC 79 at 85. 
2 Taylor v Rand Daily Mails Ltd 1912 WLD 202 at 219. 
3 De Beer v De Villiers 1913 CPD 543 at 553 
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as an employer of labour, in a very difficult position, and I am satisfied upon the 
evidence, also a dangerous position from a personal point of view. His personal safety 
was certainly endangered by the remarks of the defendant.4 
 
The concern in these cases is the emotional turmoil and stress caused by the defamatory 
assertion, turmoil and stress that are not necessarily caused by the insult of the attack, but rather 
from having to deal with the social fallout of the statement. 
 The second category does concern feelings brought about by insult and that particular 
type of injustice. We have here the perhaps better-known idea that damages are for the insult 
or contumelia connoted by the attack. Innes ACJ, a great proponent of this idea, stated the 
following for the Appellate Division in Salzmann v Holmes5: 
 
The result is that there is no proof that the plaintiff's reputation did actually suffer as a 
result of these publications. […] The position then is this[:] there is no special damage 
and no proof of any general damage to reputation other than that implied by the bare 
publication. But the slander was of the grossest possible nature and the malice and 
ill-feeling undoubted. Under these circumstances, the Court should have awarded a very 
substantial sum by way of compensation to the plaintiff for the contumelia inflicted, 
and by way of penalty upon the defendant for his aggravated and malicious defamation. 
To my mind, £1,000 would have been a suitable and proper award under the 
circumstances.6 
 
The concern here is to compensate the plaintiff for the feelings of indignation and outrage the 
disrespectful attack caused, although the Court does also refer to a ‘penalty’ being imposed 
upon the defendant, which might be aimed at punishing the defendant rather than compensating 
the plaintiff.  
In order to see whether the concept of damages for hurt feelings is compatible with the 
idea of risk, we need to unpack what it means to say that damages are compensation for hurt 
feelings, and the relationship between compensating the plaintiff and punishing the defendant.  
III THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND PUNISHMENT IN 
DAMAGES FOR HURT FEELINGS 
One influential understanding of damages for hurt feelings is that they are really a form of civil 
punishment. Unlike compensatory damages which focus on the plaintiff’s loss, damages for 
                                                 
4 Farrar v Madeley 1913 CPD 888 at 893-4. 
5 1914 AD 471. 
6 Ibid at 482-483. Innes CJ had expressed similar ideas about insult when acting as the Chief Justice of the 
Transvaal Supreme Court. See his comments in Farrar v Hay 1907 TS 194 at 201-202, and Macgregor v Sayles 
1909 TS 553 at 557-558. 
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hurt feelings, or satisfaction, focus on the moral blameworthiness of the defendant. PJ Visser 
was a proponent of this idea, arguing that satisfaction is distinct from skadevergoeding or 
‘damage compensation’. Skadevergoeding, or compensatory damages proper, is aimed at 
providing an equivalent for the affected interest, so as to neutralise the ‘damage’.7 Satisfaction, 
on the other hand, is not concerned with neutralising the loss, but responds rather to the fact 
that the conduct was wrongful or blameworthy, in much the same way that a criminal 
punishment might look to the extent of the wrongdoer’s moral blameworthiness and the need 
to deter such conduct, rather than speaking to the extent to which the victim has been injured 
and the need to redress that injury. In this respect, satisfaction pays attention to the wrongdoer’s 
fault and motives, the victim’s feelings of injustice and questions of punishment and 
deterrence.8 Instead of focusing on the victim’s loss, then, satisfaction is focused on the 
defendant’s conduct and aims to punish and deter. Visser was a proponent of the idea that 
satisfaction is an important feature of the South African actio iniuriarum.9 One can see this 
idea reflected in Innes ACJ’s opinion above, where he speaks not only of a ‘substantial sum by 
way of compensation to the plaintiff for the contumelia inflicted’ but also about imposing a 
‘penalty upon the defendant for his aggravated and malicious defamation’. 
 The problem with this interpretation of damages for hurt feelings is that the South 
African jurisprudential landscape has become extremely critical of punishment and deterrence 
in civil law. 
The need to embrace a compensatory approach to damages in the law of delict was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mogale v Seima.10 Mogale v Seima was a 
defamation case in which the ‘sole issue’ before the SCA was the quantum of damages that the 
trial court had awarded.11 The trial court had granted the plaintiff an award of R70 000, the size 
of which the defendants subsequently appealed. When considering whether the trial court had 
erred in arriving at that amount, the SCA stated the following: 
 
As to the general approach to quantum, there are many dicta that create the impression 
that compensation may be awarded as a penalty imposed on the defendant and that the 
amount is not only to serve as compensation for the plaintiff's loss of dignity, for 
example, Die Spoorbond and Another v South African Railways; Van Heerden and 
Others v South African Railways 1946 AD 999 at 1005. These dicta were put in context 
                                                 
7 PJ Visser ‘Genoegdoening in die deliktereg’ (1989) 51 THRHR 468.at 485. 
8 Ibid at 486. Emphasis by Visser. 
9 Ibid. 
10 2008 (5) SA 637 (SCA). 
11 Ibid para 8. 
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by Didcott J in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) (1997 (7) 
BCLR 851) at 830 para 80 when he said the following: 
 
“Past awards of general damages in cases of defamation, injuria and the like 
coming before our courts have sometimes taken into account a strong 
disapproval of the defendant's conduct which was judicially felt. That has 
always been done, however, on the footing that such behaviour was considered 
to have aggravated the actionable harm suffered, and consequently to have 
increased the compensation payable for it. Claims for damages not purporting 
to provide a cent of compensation, but with the different object of producing 
some punitive or exemplary result, have never on the other hand been 
authoritatively recognised in modern South African law.” 
 
In like vein Hattingh J said in Esselen v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd and 
Others1992 (3) SA 764 (T) at 771G - I: 
 
“In a defamation action the plaintiff essentially seeks the vindication of his 
reputation by claiming compensation from the defendant; if granted, it is by way 
of damages and it operates in two ways - as a vindication of the plaintiff in the 
eyes of the public, and as conciliation to him for the wrong done to him. Factors 
aggravating the defendant’s conduct may, of course, serve to increase the 
amount awarded to the plaintiff as compensation, either to vindicate his 
reputation or to act as a solatium. In general, a civil court, in a defamation case, 
awards damages to solace plaintiff’s wounded feelings and not to penalise or to 
deter the defendant for his wrongdoing nor to deter people from doing what the 
defendant has done. Clearly punishment and deterrence are functions of the 
criminal law, not the law of delict. Only a criminal court passes sentence with 
the object of inter alia deterring the accused, as well as other persons, from 
committing similar offences in future; it is not the function of a civil court to 
anticipate what may happen in the future or to “punish” future conduct (cf Lynch 
v Agnew 1929 TPD 974 at 978 and Burchell The Law of Defamation in South 
Africa (1985) at 293).” 
 
I mention this because the learned trial judge was not made aware of these principles 
and he apparently considered that an award, which would teach newspapers to limit 
themselves to inform and entertain the public without affecting anyone, was justified. 
The “teach them a lesson” theme underlies the judgment, as the learned judge himself 
later emphasised. In this regard he erred.12 
 
The SCA, after canvassing other ways in which the trial court had erred,13 went on to reduce 
the award from R70 000 to R12 000.14 
 As is apparent from the sources that the SCA quotes, the SCA was confirming a move 
away from punitive damages that other courts had already been urging. Mogale v Seima was 
the first time that the Supreme Court of Appeal had definitively applied the principle of non-
                                                 
12 Ibid paras 10-12. 
13 Ibid paras 16-17. 
14 Ibid para 18. 
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punishment in the ratio of its decision, however. While the Constitutional Court in the earlier 
decision of Fose v Minister of Safety and Security15 had encouraged a move away from 
punishment in non-criminal contexts, the court did not have to decide whether there is any role 
for punishment in delictual damages. The question in Fose was whether, in the context of an 
assault by members of the South African police service, a new category of constitutional 
damages was needed in order to vindicate fundamental constitutional rights. These 
constitutional damages were framed by the plaintiff as going beyond that which was already 
recoverable in the law of delict for an assault, and which would be used, in part, to punish 
organs of state that had infringed fundamental rights.16 Fose was concerned, then, with the need 
to create a new category of constitutional damages, rather than with the nature of common law 
damages. Yet, in deciding that there was no need, on the facts, to create a new category of 
damages, the majority did question the desirability of blurring civil and criminal remedies. 
Ackermann J, for the majority, stated that 
 
I have come to the conclusion that we ought not, in the present case, to hold that there 
is any place for punitive constitutional damages. I can see no reason at all for 
perpetuating an historical anomaly which fails to observe the distinctive functions of 
the civil and the criminal law and which sanctions the imposition of a penalty without 
any of the safeguards afforded in a criminal prosecution.17 
 
Despite the impression created by the quotations used in Mogale v Seima, and Didcott 
J’s concurring judgment in Fose, the idea of civil punishment did have some purchase on the 
South African law of delict, as we saw above in Innes ACJ’s judgment in Salzmann v Holmes. 
As Ackermann J states in Fose: 
 
The question whether, in addition to compensatory damages, “penal” or “punitive” or 
“exemplary” damages (expressions often used interchangeably and confusingly) are (or 
ought to be) awarded in delictual claims is a matter of some debate in South Africa. It 
appears to be accepted that in the Aquilian action and in the action for pain and suffering 
an award of punitive damages has no place. The Appellate Division has, however, 
recognised that in the case of defamation punitive damages may in appropriate cases be 
awarded. In the case of damages for adultery it has been accepted that a penal 
component is still appropriate. It must of course be borne in mind that it is not always 
easy to draw the line between an award of aggravated but still basically compensatory 
damages, where the particular circumstances of or surrounding the infliction of the 
                                                 
15 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC). 
16 Ibid paras 11-13. 
17 Ibid para 70. 
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injuria have justified a substantial award, and the award of punitive damages in the 
strict and narrow sense of the word.18 
 
 The significance of Mogale v Seima, then, is that it was the first time that this move 
away from punitive damages had been used as part of the ratio of a decision in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. It is all the more significant because it happened in the context of defamation, 
an instance of delictual liability where previous statements by the courts could be interpreted 
as saying that punishment was playing a role. 
 The concern that South African courts and scholars have about not blurring the lines 
between civil and criminal proceedings is probably either based on concerns about the injustice 
of penalising people without ensuring that that appropriate procedural safeguards are in place, 
or it could be about the doctrinal untidiness that seems to result when different categories 
(compensation and punishment; civil and criminal) start to blur together. In Fose v Minister of 
Safety and Security, Ackermann J, for the majority of the Constitutional Court, expressed both 
types of concern, although he was probably most concerned about the question of safeguards, 
when he rejected the proposal to create a new category of punitive constitutional damages. He 
stated that ‘I can see no reason at all for perpetuating an historical anomaly which fails to 
observe the distinctive functions of the civil and the criminal law and which sanctions the 
imposition of a penalty without any of the safeguards afforded in a criminal prosecution.’19 PJ 
Visser was perhaps foregrounding the concern about doctrinal confusion when he stated that, 
due to its punitive nature, satisfaction conflicted with certain jurisprudential perspectives, such 
as there being a firm distinction between compensatory and punitive functions in the civil and 
criminal law (‘in stryd met sekere dogmatiese beskouinge’).20 
How, then, should damages for hurt feelings be understood if they are to be viewed as 
purely compensatory? There is prima facie agreement on the following: damages that had 
previously been construed as punitive should now be viewed as aggravated damages that are 
aimed at compensating the plaintiff for feelings of outrage at having been disrespected. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal endorsed this perspective in Mogale v Seima, where they quoted 
Didcott J’s statement in Fose that abhorrent behaviour ‘was considered to have aggravated the 
actionable harm suffered, and consequently to have increased the compensation payable for 
it.’21 
                                                 
18 Ibid para 62. 
19 Ibid para 70. Emphasis added. 
20 Visser ‘Genoegdoening’ op cit note 7 at 489. 
21 Fose supra 15 para 80, quoted in Mogale v Seima supra 10 para 10. 
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South African scholars have largely supported this idea. Jonathan Burchell states the 
following: 
 
In essence, the controversy surrounding punitive damages is one of emphasis. The 
critics of punitive damages rightly stress that the court in a civil case must not make an 
award of damages (or a portion of the award) purely to penalize the defendant for his 
conduct or to attempt to deter people in future from doing what the defendant has done: 
punishment and deterrence are functions of the criminal law, not delict. But even the 
critics of “punitive” damages would, I think, accept that factors aggravating the 
defendant’s conduct may serve to increase the amount awarded to the plaintiff as 
compensation, either to vindicate his reputation or to act as solatium. The emphasis 
must therefore be on compensating the plaintiff, not on making an example of the 
defendant.22 
 
More recently, Johann Neethling has also considered whether the idea of satisfaction is 
compatible with the courts’ increasing resistance to punitive damages.23 He essentially 
endorses the above view of Burchell and the similar position taken by Van der Walt and 
Midgley.24 The essence of this position is that so long as the courts are not allowing 
considerations of deterrence to motivate the quantum of the award, and so long as the focus is 
on compensating the victim, rather than on punishing the wrongdoer, then all is well: the 
distinct functions of the civil and criminal law can be maintained. Neethling, however, is 
reluctant to jettison every trace of punishment from satisfaction, given that he endorses PJ 
Visser’s understanding of what satisfaction is, which is that it is essentially punitive.25 This 
leads Neethling to view aggravated damages as including a ‘disguised penal element that will 
still do justice to the true concept of satisfaction’.26 
 The basic idea espoused above seems essentially correct: damages for hurt feelings can 
be accommodated within a compensatory framework so long as the focus is on the plaintiff’s 
losses rather than on deterrence or punishment per se. But Neethling’s continued emphasis on 
punishment does highlight a potential source of theoretical disagreement among these scholars. 
For one can still ask what it means to say that aggravated damages compensate the plaintiff for 
his or her hurt feelings. In what way does a higher sum of money compensate the plaintiff for 
hurt feelings? 
                                                 
22 Jonathan M Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa (1985) 293. 
23 Johann Neethling ‘The law of delict and punitive damages’ (2008) 29 (2) Obiter 238. 
24 Ibid at 245-246. See JC van der Walt and JR Midgley Principles of Delict 3ed (2005) 217 [par 143]. 
25 Neethling op cit note 23 at 245-246. 
26 Ibid at 246. 
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The general idea could be that damages for hurt feelings are an attempt to 
counterbalance the diminishment in the plaintiff’s wellbeing. The unpleasant emotional 
experiences that one has experienced, whether they are merely frustration or a deep-seated 
anger at the insulting nature of the conduct, constitute diminishments in one’s well-being that 
are addressed by a monetary award, probably in an attempt to provide pleasure that 
counterbalances the negative experiences that the defendant caused. 
While the concept of well-being is controversial, there are few people who disagree 
with the claim that unpleasant subjective experiences, such as frustration and anger, are 
generally bad for one’s well-being. As S. Andrew Schroeder puts it, ‘on nearly any account of 
well-being, pain and distress generally reduce well-being’.27 The key philosophical debates 
about pain and well-being are not about whether pain is bad, but about what makes it bad, 
whether it is always bad, and whether it is the only thing that should count as bad on one’s 
theory of well-being.28 And at least some of these discussions of pain also assume that things 
like ‘heartache, bitter disappointment, loss, despair, depression, [and] hopelessness’ count as 
‘pain’,29 which would allow the feelings falling under the legal category of ‘hurt feelings’ to 
be included as well. 
In any event, it is prima facie plausible that feeling distress and outrage are generally 
unpleasant experiences that one would prefer to go without. Having caused them, one can 
sensibly be said to be under a moral duty to correct that diminishment in well-being by 
providing a benefit of some kind aimed at equalising the overall amount of well-being that the 
victim would have had but for the wrong. At this point, however, there might be theoretical 
disagreement, such as how damages do in fact counterbalance the diminishment in well-being. 
 In the case of mild hurt feelings, i.e., frustration and annoyance, the creation of well-
being arguably comes from having the wrong recognised and addressed. Ronen Perry, for 
example, has argued that ‘imposing liability on the aggressor symbolizes public recognition of 
the wrong - a social validation of the victim’s personal sense of injustice’, and that there is 
some reason to think that public recognition of a traumatic event can help facilitate the 
plaintiff’s recovery.30 Even if the wrong was not quite a ‘traumatic event’, it is possible that 
                                                 
27 S. Andrew Schroeder ‘Health, disability and well-being’ in Guy Fletcher (ed) The Routledge Handbook of 
Philosophy of Well-Being (2016) 223. 
28 Guy Kahane ‘Pain, experience, and well-being’ in Fletcher op cit note 27 at 208-209. 
29 Ibid 208. 
30 Ronen Perry ‘Empowerment and Tort Law’ (2009) 76 (4) Tennessee Law Review 959 at 987. Perry’s position 
has been endorsed by other tort scholars: see Robyn Carroll and Normann Witzleb ‘“It’s not just about the money”: 
Enhancing the vindicatory effect of private law remedies’ (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 216 at 229-
230. See, also, Bruce Feldthusen ‘The civil action for sexual battery: therapeutic jurisprudence?’ (1993) 25 Ottawa 
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such recognition and an attempt at redress may at least alleviate feelings of frustration and help 
one to move on by instilling a sense that justice has been done.31 
If the wrong was particularly malicious or disrespectful, however, then it may be that 
only by extracting a significant amount of money from the defendant personally will the 
victim’s feelings of outrage be assuaged. For this reason, the damages are increased in order to 
allow for this (aggravated damages). In this instance, the plaintiff is given the specific joy of 
seeing the person who insulted one being heavily penalised. As J.M. Kelly put it in the context 
of English tort law, ‘the purpose of damages for non-pecuniary loss in the tort action is to put 
the plaintiff in possession of a sum of money which in the court’s judgment ought to be enough 
to satisfy his vindictive feelings against the wrongdoer’.32 This is perhaps also what Neethling 
has in mind when he states that satisfaction still requires the concept of punishment, that it is 
only by seeing the defendant punished (by having a suitably large quantum extracted) that the 
plaintiff’s feelings will be assuaged, and the diminishment in the plaintiff’s well-being 
subsequently undone by having the troubling feelings cease. 
This view seems to require quite a dark view of human nature (which may or may not 
be warranted), and there is an alternative theoretical explanation. Here too one could adopt 
Perry’s point about the therapeutic effects that a public validation of one’s sense of justice 
might have, and that this could explain how well-being is being restored in contumelious cases. 
In other words, pleasure might be derived from the validation of one’s sense of justice, rather 
than it just being about the vindictive pleasure of seeing the defendant having to pay a penalty. 
IV THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DAMAGES FOR HURT FEELINGS AND AN 
INCREASE IN THE RISK OF REPUTATIONAL HARM 
The idea of hurt feelings is arguably of lesser importance than public vindication once has 
moved away from the idea of insult to the idea of mitigating the risk of reputational harm. 
Nevertheless, there is still scope for the idea that damages are for hurt feelings if one adopts 
the risk interpretation of defamation.  For example, damages for annoyance and frustration 
might be appropriate for most cases where someone has increased the risk of reputational harm. 
                                                 
Law Review 203 for further discussion of the possible therapeutic effects of tort law, as well as scepticism about 
whether the advantages would really outweigh the costs. 
31 Kit Barker notes, in passing, that an argument could be made that ‘declarations of right provide a degree of 
psychological relief for a victim […] (don’t we all feel the better for being publicly affirmed?) […] The argument 
is then […] that it helps to reverse the effects of the wrong, where these effects take the form of harm done to a 
plaintiff’s mental welfare, dignity or autonomy’ (Kit Barker ‘Private and public: The mixed concept of vindication 
in torts and private law’ in Stephen GA Pitel, Jason W Neyers & Erika Chamberlain (eds) Tort Law: Challenging 
Orthodoxy (2013) at 73). 
32 JM Kelly ‘The inner nature of the tort action’ (1967) Irish Jurist (2) 279 at 287. 
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A defamatory publication is a vexatious thing to deal with, and if the courts can help to 
counterbalance that reduction in one’s well-being by awarding damages for hurt feelings then 
that seems prima facie justifiable. The hurt feelings would be consequential damage that is also 
being addressed in the remedial process, alongside the attempt to protect the primary protected 
interest (reputation). 
 An important point, however, is that not every intentional increase in risk is necessarily 
contumelious or insulting. Whether it is contumelious is dependent on one’s definition of 
‘intentional’, the different approaches to which in South Africa were outlined in Chapter 5. 
Given the tendency to focus on insult and contumelia in South African defamation cases, 
however, it is worth elaborating on this point. Simply assuming the presence of insult and 
contumelia in circumstances which do not really connote insult and contumelia can confuse 
one’s view about the nature of the wrong. It can lead one to view defamation as being primarily 
about insult, rather than reputation, for example. 
 Do all wrongs committed intentionally connote contumelia? In a discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of exemplary (punitive) damages in English tort law, Andrew 
Burrows raises the following concern: 
 
Even if one does confine exemplary damages to where a tortfeasor has acted in wanton 
and contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, is it not true that a vast number of 
cases fall within that test? For surely the test is sufficiently wide to encompass every 
case of a tort committed intentionally or with a high degree of recklessness. And if that 
is correct, do we really want to shake up the present law in such a radical way as to 
render exemplary damages commonplace rather than exceptional?33 
 
The force of Burrows’ point is really felt in the context of English law, where exemplary 
damages are supposed to be exceptional, rather than commonplace. Yet it does raise an 
interesting question about the role of damages for hurt feelings in the South African actio 
iniuriarum, which generally requires intentional conduct. Does the fact that defamation 
requires intentional conduct automatically imply that damages for hurt feelings (in the sense of 
damages for contumelia or insult) are always appropriate? The answer depends on one’s 
understanding of intention. 
 We saw in Chapter 5 that the definition of intention in the South African law of 
defamation is controversial. In particular, it is controversial whether intention requires 
                                                 
33 Andrew Burrows ‘Reforming exemplary damages: Expansion or abolition?’ in Peter Birks (ed) Wrongs and 
Remedies in the Twenty-First Century (1996) 167. 
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consciousness of the wrongfulness of one’s actions. Whether it does require consciousness of 
wrongfulness also speaks directly to the appropriateness of damages for insult. 
 If acting intentionally simply means acting deliberately, as opposed to inadvertently 
causing something to happen, then one can act with intention even though one did not act in 
wanton or contumelious disregard of someone’s rights. A journalist can deliberately defame 
someone in the belief that the defamatory assertion is true and in the public benefit, or that it 
was reasonable to publish the facts in the manner in which they were published. In neither case 
could such a person be said to be acting wantonly or contumeliously. Such a person might 
regret the fact that they are causing injury but still feel that the action is justified by a greater 
cause or public interest. This is intentional (deliberate) conduct that included foresight of injury 
but which is nevertheless devoid of contumelia or disrespect for the person being injured. 
 Acting deliberately with foresight of injury is not what some South African scholars 
have in mind when they speak about legal intention, however, as we have seen. Some scholars 
think that legal intention requires that one be conscious of the wrongfulness of one’s actions.34 
If this were true, then it would probably not be possible to act intentionally without also acting 
in wanton disregard of someone’s rights, or contumeliously. If one acted with foresight of 
injury and with knowledge that what one was doing was wrongful, then it would follow that 
one was acting in an insulting or disrespectful manner, disregarding the rights of the individual 
being injured. We saw in Chapter 5, however, that there is some reason, based on case law, to 
think that consciousness of wrongfulness is not always a requirement of intention in the law of 
defamation, which certainly leaves room for the position that not every intentional act 
necessarily implies insult or contumelia. 
 What this analysis does show is that we should not accept the proposition that every 
intentional delict would require damages for insult or contumelia without agreement on what 
legal intention means. 
Depending on the definition of intention that the courts ultimately adopt, damages for 
hurt feelings need not necessarily be about insult or contumelia. Damages for mild hurt feelings 
for vexatious conduct might be appropriate even in cases where one has not been insulted or 
disrespected; merely defending an action for defamation will bring emotions that tend to 
diminish one’s well-being. Whether damages for insult would also be appropriate would 
depend on the circumstances of the case and whether it could be said that the defendant had 
                                                 
34 See Chapter 5 for discussion of this view. Generally, see Anton Fagan ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of 
delict’ (2005) SALJ 90 at 117-122 for references as well as criticism of this position. 
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indeed acted contumeliously. In either case, damages for hurt feelings are consistent with the 
risk-as-injury interpretation, for either kind of emotional distress could be caused, depending 
on whether the defendant acted contumeliously in publishing the assertion. 
V THE DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS THAT CAN ARISE WHEN ONE FOCUSES 
EXCLUSIVELY ON HURT FEELINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF A RIGHT TO 
REPUTATION 
It was noted above that the idea of hurt feelings is arguably of lesser importance than public 
vindication once one has moved away from the idea of insult to the idea of mitigating the risk 
of reputational harm. The case of Media 24 v Taxi Securitisation35 presents an interesting case 
study for demonstrating the doctrinal knots that can develop when one focuses too heavily on 
hurt feelings in the context of a delict that is largely focused on protecting one’s reputation. 
The plaintiff in that case was a corporation that was claiming ‘general damages’ and 
‘special damages’ for defamation. By ‘special damages’ the court seems to mean patrimonial 
loss per se, rather than provable and quantifiable patrimonial loss that is special to the 
plaintiff.36 The majority then held that patrimonial loss suffered as a result of a defamatory 
statement needs to be regarded as an instance of pure economic loss that has to be recovered in 
terms of the lex Aquilia, rather than the law of defamation, which is an instance of the actio 
iniuriarum. As an instance of pure economic loss, wrongfulness will not be presumed, and 
instead the plaintiff will have to provide reasons in each case as to why the defendant’s conduct 
should be regarded as wrongful (i.e. why there really has been a breach of a legal duty giving 
rise to liability).37 The claim for general damages was also in dispute, however, for the 
defendants argued that the function of general damages under the actio iniuriarum is 
compensation for hurt feelings, and so corporations should not be able to recover general 
damages as they have no feelings to hurt; corporations should only be able to recover 
consequential economic loss using the lex Aquilia. This is an argument that has been popular 
in South Africa for some time,38 but, as the court in Media 24 notes, there is strong Appellate 
level authority that unequivocally grants corporations a right to claim damages for defamation 
                                                 
35 Media 24 Ltd and others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd (Avusa Media Ltd and others as Amici Curiae) 2011 
(5) SA 329 (SCA). 
36 Ibid paras 7-8. On the way in which the terms general and special damages can become misleading see JA 
Jolowicz ‘The changing use of “special damage” and its effect on the law’ Cambridge Law Journal 18 2 (1960) 
214. For the same perspective in a South African context, see MM Corbett & JJ Gauntlett The Quantum of 
Damages in Bodily and Fatal Injury Cases. Vol 1. General Principles 4ed (1995). 
37 Media 24 v SA Taxi Securitisation supra note 35 paras 8 - 11. 
38 Ibid para 41. 
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using the actio iniuriarum. The court found, ultimately, that there were no good reasons for 
overturning the established precedent that had been set allowing corporations a right to sue for 
general damages, especially in light of the fact that corporations do have an interest in their 
reputation that deserves protection, and that our legal system would be failing to perform a key 
function if it recognised an interest worthy of protection but did not grant a remedy if that 
interest was attacked.39 In arriving at this conclusion, however, the court seemed unable clearly 
to articulate the function of general damages for defamation in a case such as this (i.e. involving 
a corporation). On the one hand, the court relies on the premise that damages for defamation 
are essentially about compensation for hurt feelings when it banishes the recovery of economic 
loss to the lex Aquilia. The court states that ‘the rule of our law, in principle, is that patrimonial 
damages must be claimed under the actio legis Aquiliae, while the actio iniuriarum and its 
derivative actions, including the action for defamation, are only available for sentimental 
damages.’40 While the court does not explain what it means by ‘sentimental damages’, the 
standard interpretation of that term is compensation for hurt feelings.41 On the other hand, the 
court also rejects the idea that damages are just compensation for hurt feelings. After quoting 
Schreiner JA’s statement about how the modern law has moved away from its Roman ancestor, 
the Court states that ‘though traditionally the function of the actio iniuriarum was to provide a 
solatium or solace money for injured feelings, the position has become more nuanced in 
modern law. A natural person is not required to show sentimental loss. He or she will receive 
damages for defamation even in the absence of injured feelings’.42 Later in the judgment, 
however, the court then states that it is ‘mindful of the criticism based on mathematical logic, 
that an award of damages for defamation to a corporation is inappropriate, because it cannot 
serve to compensate the wounded feelings of an entity which has none’.43 The court clearly 
wants to allow corporations the right to sue for damages to protect their reputations using the 
actio iniuriarum, as an alternative to them only being allowed to sue for provable financial 
losses using the lex Aquilia, but it is unable to articulate what the function of these damages is 
and how they might relate to the damages recovered by a natural person for defamation. In 
short, while the court is certain that it wants corporations to be allowed to sue for defamation, 
it is not certain about how best to understand the damages being recovered. 
                                                 
39 Ibid paras 39, 53-55. 
40 Ibid para 8. 
41 Jonathan M Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa (1985) 46. 
42 Media 24 v SA Taxi Securitisation supra note 35 para 38. 
43 Ibid para 53. 
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 The fact that the damages cannot be understood to be about the recovery of financial 
losses, as these need to be recovered under the lex Aquilia, further complicates any possible 
explanation. It is not about hurt feelings and it is not about financial loss, yet these are the two 
things that damages are typically understood to be addressing: Andrew Burrows, for example, 
claims that ‘ultimately all non-pecuniary loss is concerned with the claimant’s distress or loss 
of happiness’.44 Eric Descheemaeker takes up Burrows’ point, arguing that the ‘harms (injuries, 
detriment)’ that flow from wrongs are either pecuniary or non-pecuniary, and that all non-
pecuniary losses ‘are reducible, in the final analysis, to mental distress in the widest sense of 
the term: emotional or sentimental harm […] Injuries that flow from the wrong are either to the 
claimant’s wallet or to the claimant’s mind.’45 The damages awarded in Media 24 seem to be 
a direct challenge to this idea, for they are not about hurt feelings or financial loss. At the same 
time, however, the court is unable to articulate what the function of these damages is supposed 
to be. The concept of damages for public vindication in the previous chapter provide the 
solution. Once the courts accept the idea that defamation is primarily about one’s reputation, 
then the typical function of damages should be to vindicate that reputation. That would make 
sense even in the context of corporations. Damages for hurt feelings could then be used where 
necessary in cases involving natural persons. 
VI WHETHER DAMAGES FOR RISK ARE BETTER EXPLAINED USING THE 
CONCEPT OF SUBSTITUTIVE DAMAGES 
In the previous chapter, the rights movement in tort was outlined, and it was noted that one of 
the major contributions of that movement has been to reconceptualise the function of damages. 
It was also noted that one of the important concepts that has arisen from that movement, 
namely, the idea of vindicating rights, does not present a superior alternative to the orthodox 
understandings of damages. One might wonder, however, whether another important 
theoretical development, namely, the concept of substitutive damages, might present a better 
explanation of the function of damages for defamation than the orthodox accounts discussed 
here, especially if the harm is being construed as an increase in the risk of harm. After all, the 
substitutive damages thesis rejects the idea that all damages are compensation for a loss of 
some kind. Instead, damages are awarded as a substitute for the infringed right. One might 
argue that if one reconceptualises a wrong as being about an increase in the risk of harm, rather 
than the causing of harm, then perhaps something like substitutive damages best explains the 
                                                 
44 Andrew Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract 3ed (2004) 31. 
45 Eric Descheemaeker ‘Unravelling harms in tort law’ (2016) Law Quarterly Review 595 at 597. 
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function of damages. Particularly as merely increasing the risk of harm does not necessarily 
mean that there has been any consequential loss. So, perhaps a theory of damages that does not 
rely on the idea of compensation for loss is a superior explanation of the function of damages 
in those circumstances. There are reasons to doubt that Stevens’ account is preferable to the 
orthodox accounts defended in this chapter and the previous chapter, however. 
Andrew Burrows explains the novelty of Stevens’ thesis well: Burrows notes that the 
term ‘compensatory damages’ is quite new, because the ‘traditional starting assumption was 
that all damages, with a few minor exceptions, aim to compensate loss’.46 According to 
Burrows, Stevens’ thesis rejects this assumption, and Stevens instead claims that ‘the basic 
award of damages in all cases of tort and breach of contract is non-compensatory.’47 Instead, 
‘the basic award of damages is to provide a substitute for, and hence to vindicate, the right that 
has been infringed. They are substitutive damages. They are concerned to value the right 
infringed and will be assessed, if there is no ready market value, by the methodology of 
constructing a reasonable hypothetical bargain between the parties. It is irrelevant to these 
damages whether a claimant has suffered any loss although, where it has, consequential 
compensatory damages can be added’.48 
 Stevens’ approach is novel, then, because instead of viewing damages as essentially 
compensatory, damages are instead seen as essentially non-compensatory. Rather than 
compensating one for loss, the primary function of damages is to provide a substitute for the 
right that has been infringed, and this is done by assigning a value to the right and providing 
damages in proportion to that value. In Torts and Rights, Stevens outlines the difference 
between substitutive damages and consequential damages in the following way: 
In the assessment of damages it is necessary to distinguish between damages awarded 
as a substitute for the right infringed and consequential damages as compensation for 
loss to the claimant, or gain to the defendant, consequent upon this infringement. 
Damages which are substitutive for the right which has been infringed are assessed 
objectively, save where the infringement is particularly egregious. The time for the 
assessment of the value of the right is the moment of infringement. The cause of action 
accrues at that point. Damages are awarded even if there is no loss to the claimant or 
gain to the defendant consequent upon the infringement of the right. All loss 
consequential upon the infringement of the right, generally economic loss, is also prima 
facie recoverable. Such loss is specific or special to the claimant and must be proven. 
It is not objectively assessed. Such loss may be, and generally is, suffered after the 
infringement of the right and is assessed at the time of judgment. Consequential loss is 
                                                 
46 Andrew Burrows ‘Damages and Rights’ in Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson (eds) Rights and Private Law 
(2011) at 277. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid 277 
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subject to limitations which do not apply to the substitutive award. For example, 
consequential loss which is too remote is not recoverable.49 
 Substitutive damages are a substitute for the right and as such they are quantified by 
assessing the value of the right. But how can a right be valued? Stevens acknowledges that this 
is easier to answer when the right pertains to something that actually has a market value, such 
as a right in relation to property that has been damaged, with the property itself having a market 
value. He notes the following: 
The distinction between damages which are awarded as a substitute for the right and 
those awarded to compensate for consequential loss can be obscured because in most 
cases the value attached to the right is precisely the same as the loss suffered, usually 
financial, by the claimant. If you smash someone else’s car the value of the right is the 
economic cost of fixing it. Where substitutive damages are recoverable and result in 
full compensation of loss, no further award should be made. The claimant cannot 
recover twice, although consequential losses over and above the value of the right 
infringed are recoverable, for example a taxi driver’s loss of earnings while his 
damaged car is being repaired. However, it is a mistake to think that where no loss is 
suffered no claim for damages is available.50 
 In some ways it seems too quick to tie the value of a right to the value of the underlying 
asset. The value that should be ascribed to property rights could be much higher than the value 
of the underlying asset in any one instance. Property rights might be valued for the freedom 
that they bring, rather than because they protect something that happens to have a particular 
market value. But it does make sense to look at the underlying asset and its market value if one 
is actually concerned about the loss that has been caused.  In response to this sort of concern, 
Stevens has pointed out that what is being quantified or valued is not the full right in and of 
itself, but the value (or the cost) of the infringement. Therefore, if your property has been 
damaged in a minor way, you are not entitled to the full value of the property.51 You are only 
awarded the value of the right to the extent of the right’s infringement. This does not avoid the 
objection that non-property rights, like the right to reputation, do not seem capable of being 
valued in any meaningful way, at least not if one is referring to the right’s market value. The 
very idea of a market value makes little sense. Ultimately, Stevens’ point above about valuing 
the infringement of the right rather than the full right does not seem like an adequate answer to 
the general objection that ‘the Stevens approach falls down in imagining that we sensibly can, 
                                                 
49 Robert Stevens Torts and Rights (2007) 60. 
50 Ibid at 61. 
51 Robert Stevens ‘Rights and other things’ in Nolan & Robertson op cit note 46 at 126-127. 
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or would want to, put a value on the right that has been infringed rather than the consequential 
impact of the infringement.’52 
VII CONCLUSION 
As the risk interpretation is being proposed as an alternative interpretation of the existing 
practices, it is important that it is compatible with the existing remedial responses. This chapter 
has focused on the compatibility of the risk interpretation with the idea that damages 
compensate for hurt feelings. 
The position taken here is that damages can help to counterbalance any reduction in 
wellbeing that has been felt as a result of the emotional turmoil caused by the publication. This 
turmoil could be in the form of annoyance at having to take action to defend oneself against a 
defamatory assertion. Or, if the conduct was also contumelious, the turmoil could relate to 
having been insulted or disrespected. Defamatory assertions that increase the risk of 
reputational harm can cause these kinds of unpleasant emotions, and, therefore, the risk 
interpretation is compatible with this orthodox understanding of damages. 
 In this chapter and the previous chapter, it was also noted that the orthodox 
understandings of damages remain preferable to the new accounts of damages that are being 
developed in Anglo-American tort theory, even though defamation is the sort of wrong that 
might, at first, seem to lend itself to ideas of (strong) vindicatory damages and substitutive 
damages.
                                                 
52 Burrows op cit note 46 at 280; See also J Edelman ‘The meaning of loss and enrichment’ in R Chambers, C 
Mitchell & J Penner (eds) Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (2009) at 219. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to shed new light on the law of defamation by presenting an 
alternative interpretation of the current practice. It began by noting the lingering controversies 
surrounding the nature of the wrong, the fault standard, and the function of damages. As a step 
towards developing the alternative interpretation, it was argued that reputation can be 
understood as ‘a social judgement of the person based upon facts which are considered relevant 
by a community’. These judgements often relate to one’s moral character. But, in some cases, 
defamatory assertions relate to other personal attributes, such as professional skill or 
competence, that are not necessarily a concern about one’s moral character. Finally, in some 
cases defamatory assertions relate to claims about one’s creditworthiness in particular. 
 Reputation deserves protection because, like property and bodily integrity, it is a 
welfare interest: it is the sort of thing that enables people to live a flourishing life. More 
specifically, reputation has both internal benefits (like allowing one to maintain a sense of self, 
and self-esteem) and external benefits (like the pursuit of relationships that have commercial 
and non-commercial benefits). 
 It has been controversial, however, whether the South African law of defamation does 
protect one’s reputation, rather than one’s right to be free from insult. There are reasons to 
think that it in fact protects one’s reputation, such as the many references to a right to reputation 
in the case law, the requirement of publication, the fact that hurt feelings are not essential for 
liability, and the existence of alternative explanations for the link that is frequently drawn 
between reputation and dignity. The most descriptively accurate account of the South African 
law of defamation appears to be that it protects one’s reputation as an interest in and of itself. 
 Even if one accepts the value of reputation and that it is an interest worth protecting, 
however, one might still wonder about the manner in which it is being protected, and the way 
in which that protection is justified by the state. 
 The orthodox interpretation of the law of defamation is that it involves the causing 
of reputational harm. The problem with the orthodox approach is that even though causing 
harm to someone’s reputation would justifiably be a delict, the current practice does not require 
enough in the way of evidence to support the plaintiff’s position that such an injury has 
materialised. The lack of evidence that an injury has been committed calls the practice into 
question, for its justifiability as an exercise of state power is questionable. This can be 
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contrasted with Aquilian delicts that do require proof of physical harm to a protected interest 
and/or proof of patrimonial loss, both of which go some way to establishing that the quality or 
utility of a protected interest has in fact been diminished on a balance of probabilities. 
 One could attempt to bring defamation law in line with the apparently more 
justifiable Aquilian practices by requiring the plaintiff to tender more substantial proof of harm. 
An alternative approach to the problem would be to reconceptualise the injury such that the 
current practice, and the evidence that currently gets tendered, does amount to a justifiable 
exercise of state power. In the case of defamation, it was argued that this kind of alternative 
justification can be provided, by conceptualising the injury as a probable increase in the risk of 
reputational harm, rather than the probable causing of reputational harm. The challenge with 
this approach is that imposing liability for merely increasing the risk of harm is highly 
contentious. One might wonder, in this case, whether imposing liability for risk is, in fact, a 
justifiable instance of state power, even if the evidence that gets tendered is sufficient to prove 
that the defendant probably did cause an increase in the risk of reputational harm. 
 In order to show that liability for risk is justifiable in the case of defamation, the thesis 
elaborated on the concept of risk and the various ways in which it might feature in the law of 
delict. Risk was defined as a concern about the possibility that an unwelcome event will 
materialise in the future; it is a product both of the magnitude of the possible harm and the 
probability of that harm occurring. In the context of the law of delict, this concept is typically 
used to either justify or limit liability, but it can do this in various ways. An uncontroversial 
application of the concept is in relation to fault, where foresight of the risk of harm is used to 
determine whether the defendant’s conduct was culpable. Risk could also be used, more 
controversially, as a way to hold someone liable simply for having increased the risk of harm 
occurring, even in the absence of a finding that the risky conduct caused some other, more 
tangible harm. This application has been used and understood in various ways in the English 
tort of negligence, either as a way of relaxing the requirement of causation or as a new way to 
understand the harm for which one is being compensated. It appears, however, that even though 
the courts sometimes understood themselves to be construing the increase in risk as the injury, 
there is reason to doubt that they actually were relying on the idea of risk-as-injury. 
Nevertheless, the consideration of those cases presented more general reasons for thinking that 
risk-as-injury is a bad idea in the law of negligence. If one takes a consequentialist approach, 
then one can see that imposing liability for mere risk in the context of a transversal tort like 
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negligence would err too far on the side of security and impose too high a cost on freedom of 
action (and negatively affect related matters, like the costs of insurance and litigation). 
However, understanding why risk-as-injury is problematic in the context of negligence 
provided a foundation to assess its applicability in the context of defamation. It was argued that 
the risk-as-injury interpretation is a more justifiable interpretation of the law of defamation 
than the causation-of-reputational-harm interpretation. The overall argument took the 
following form: 
According to the current rules, the plaintiff needs to produce slender evidence in order 
to establish her claim. When one compares this to the nature of Aquilian liability, where the 
protected interests allow for a ready observance of damage, alongside a requirement of 
patrimonial loss that helps to establish that damage, the unsatisfactory nature of the 
requirements for defamation becomes clear. A major reason for the difficulty in establishing 
damage is that it is hard to track the causal impact of defamatory publications. Nevertheless, 
one’s reputation matters and deserves protection, and, rather than just declaring the law of 
defamation unjustifiable, one can attempt to amend or justify the current practice in some way. 
For example, one can amend the practice by requiring the plaintiff to tender better evidence 
that reputational harm was caused, or one can justify the practice in an alternative way. Given 
the difficulty in tracking the causal impact of statements, this thesis took the approach of 
justifying the current rules in another way. Rather than seeing the elements of liability as an 
attempt to establish causation of reputational harm, one can view them as an attempt to establish 
causation of an increase in the risk of reputational harm. By publishing a defamatory assertion, 
the defendant probably has increased the risk of reputational harm, even if it is less clear that 
the defendant has caused reputational harm. 
As noted in the context of negligence, viewing risk-as-injury is controversial and 
arguably unjustifiable in the case of some delicts. But the objections that apply to the concept 
of risk-as-injury in other contexts do not apply as strongly to defamation. This makes the 
imposition of liability for risk less controversial than it usually is. First, defamation is a vertical 
tort, rather than a transversal tort: it protects a particular interest from very particular types of 
conduct. This limits the scope of conduct that can attract liability. Given the value that 
reputation has, and the need to protect it, imposing liability for risk in these limited 
circumstances would not unduly limit freedom of action. Second, defamation in South Africa 
has a non-negligible fault standard, which also helps to limit the scope of liability. The fault 
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standard always requires some kind of foresight of harm (either actual foresight, in the case of 
intention, or foresight by a reasonable person, in the case of negligence). This further helps to 
limit the scope of actionable conduct and makes risk-as-injury more justifiable in South Africa 
than it might be in other jurisdictions or contexts, once one also takes the value of reputation 
into account. 
The justification of the rules matters because the law of defamation is an instance of 
force being applied by the State. The judgment will typically require the payment of money in 
the form of damages, which is a sanction or hardship imposed by the state. Second, court orders 
are backed up with a threat of criminal proceedings should the order be ignored. In a culture of 
justification, rules that are enforced with the might of the State need to be convincing.  While 
it is not convincing that findings of probable causation of harm are justified, findings of a 
probable increase in a risk of reputational harm would be convincing. Moreover, given the 
value of reputation, and given the ways in which usual objections against imposing liability for 
risk do not apply in the case of defamation, the risk-as-injury interpretation of the law of 
defamation appears to be preferable. The view taken here, then, is that the risk interpretation, 
all things considered, is more justifiable than the causation-of-reputational-harm interpretation.  
Given that the risk-as-injury interpretation is being presented as an alternative way of 
justifying the current practice, it is important that that interpretation fits with the outward 
appearance and structure of that practice. Defamation law is constituted by legal rules and 
presumptions, defences, and remedies, and the risk-as-injury interpretation would need to be 
consistent with these if it hopes to be regarded as a way of justifying these practices. The thesis 
began the demonstration of compatibility by showing that the current way in which the 
presumptions and defences of defamation law are understood is consistent with the risk-as-
injury interpretation. 
 The respective burdens of plaintiffs and defendants are currently justified by referring 
to the way in which defamatory conduct is usually unjustified, and that the defendant is best 
placed to prove factual circumstances that might justify or excuse the conduct. These reasons 
still hold when assuming the risk-as-injury interpretation. The overall fairness of the law is also 
influenced by other considerations, such as the various defences that are available to the 
defendant, and how these relate both to fairness inter partes and personal and public 
constitutional considerations. These, too, seem consistent with the risk-as-injury interpretation. 
First, if the defences could justify the behaviour of a defendant who had actually caused 
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reputational harm by making an assertion, then they would certainly justify the behaviour of a 
defendant who had merely increased the risk of reputational harm by making an assertion. 
Second, this shift in the gravity of the infringement of the right to reputation (merely increasing 
risk versus causing harm) does not seem to require a change in the respective burdens of the 
plaintiff and the defendant. It remains the case that reputation needs to be protected, and it 
remains the case that the causal impact of defamatory assertions can be hard to trace. Moreover, 
the defendant has also made the decision to publish the defamatory assertion. These 
considerations, along with the fact that the defendant is best placed to justify or excuse his own 
behaviour, suggest that the current burdens of proof that are placed on the defendant remain 
sound, even when the defendant has merely increased the risk of reputational harm, rather than 
having caused reputational harm. 
 The next step in the demonstration of compatibility was to show that the risk 
interpretation is consistent with the current remedial response, namely, damages. It was shown 
that damages for defamation are generally interpreted by the South African courts as serving 
two purposes. First, they act as compensation for the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation by 
serving as a public vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation. The role of declaratory judgments 
in this respect should also not be overlooked. Second, they act as compensation for hurt 
feelings. 
Damages that aim at publicly vindicating the plaintiff’s reputation can help to mitigate 
the chances that the threatened damage to the plaintiff’s reputation will materialise, for the 
plaintiff can wield the vindicatory assertions in his or her community to help prevent people 
from resolving to think less of the plaintiff. The vindicatory assertions could reach potentially 
important members of the community through the press, or the plaintiff can wield the judgment 
herself, should she suspect that someone is apt to think less of her as a result of the defamatory 
publication. 
As far as damages for hurt feelings is concerned, it was shown that damages can help 
to counterbalance any reduction in wellbeing that has been felt as a result of the emotional 
turmoil caused by the publication. This turmoil could be in the form of annoyance at having to 
take action to defend oneself against a defamatory assertion. Or, if the conduct was also 
contumelious, the turmoil could relate to having been insulted or disrespected. Defamatory 
assertions that increase the risk of reputational harm can cause these kinds of unpleasant 
emotions, and, therefore, the risk interpretation is compatible with this orthodox understanding 
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of damages. It was also noted that the orthodox understandings of damages remain preferable 
to the new accounts of damages that are being developed in Anglo-American tort theory, even 
though defamation is the sort of wrong that might, at first, seem to lend itself to ideas of (strong) 
vindicatory damages and substitutive damages. 
 Even if the risk interpretation is not accepted wholesale, it is also hoped that the light 
shed on various aspects of the law of defamation in this thesis will provoke further scholarly 
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